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One of the most dramatic examples of increasing interaction
across national boundaries in recent years has been the burgeoning
volume of transnational transactions in corporate equities.1 Most
developed capitalist countries impose affirmative obligations on is
suers of corporate equity to disclose certain information about
themselves. While these obligations are imposed on issuers, they
are triggered by transactions. The growth in transnational transac
tions is thus increasingly raising difficult issues concerning the reach
of differing national regimes.2 Given the magnitude of legal re
sources devoted to compliance with such disclosure regulations,3
they promise to feature prominently in the larger discussion of

1. Foreign share transactions on the New York Stock Exchange in 1993 had a total value
of $1.2 trillion. See NEW YoRK STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BooK FOR nm YEAR 1994, at 89
(1995) [hereinafter 1994 FACT BooK]. The total value of share transactions on the New York
Stock Exchange in 1993 was approximately $2.28 trillion, a figure that must be doubled to
compare with the $1.2 trillion figure because it counts a purchase and sale as a single transac
tion. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BooK FOR nm YEAR 1993, at 7 (1994).
Compare an estimate of the 1986 value of transnational securities on the New York Stock
Exchange of $378 billion, see 1994 FACT BooK, supra, at 89, with a Salomon Brothers esti
mate of the total value of international equity trading during the same time period of $750
billion. See Steve Lohr, Investors Retreating from Foreign Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
1987, at Al.
2. See infra Part V. For a description of securities regulation regimes in other countries,
see Javier Lizardi Calderon & Samuel Wolff, Mexico, in lOC INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MAR
KETS AND SECURrTIES REGULATION, at 4A-1 (Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff eds.,
1982 & Supp. July 1991); Jeff G. Cowan & Richard J. Lachcik, Canada, in lOB INTERNA
TIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SEcURrTIES REGULATION, supra, at 4-1 (Supp. Apr. 1992);
Georgette Miller, France, in lOC INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SEcuRrTIES REG
ULATION, supra, at 7-1; G.K. Morse, United Kingdom, in lOC INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra, at 6-1; Eberhard H. R5 hm, Germany, in
lOD INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURrTIES REGULATION, supra, at 8C-1
(Supp. Dec. 1996); Misao Tatsuta, Japan, in lOD INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND
SECURITIES REGULATION, supra, at 11-1.
3. One estimate concludes that aggregate expenses for a normal common stock offering
range between 15 and 2% of the proceeds of the underwriting. See Louis Loss & JOEL
SEUGMAN, SECURrTIES REGULATION 339 (3d ed. 1989) (citing William J. Grant, Jr., Over
view ofthe Underwriting Process, in SECURrTIES UNDERWRITING: A PRACTITIONERS' GuroE
25, 32-33 (Kenneth J. Bialkin & William J. Grant, Jr. eds., 1985)). Thus, in 1995 alone, ap
proximately $1.6 billion (2% of $81.7 billion) was devoted to compliance with the U.S. securi
ties regime. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK FOR nm YEAR 1995, at 9
(1996).
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the role of national legal regimes in
interdependence.4

a

world

of

growing

A securities transaction has several dimensions of nationality:

the nationality of the issuer, the place of execution, the residence of
the buyer and, if it is a secondary transaction, the residence of the
seller. A transaction is transnational if at least one of these dimen
sions involves a country different from the country of the other
dimensions. Each of the countries associated with a transnational
transaction can make a claim for imposing its regime on the issuer
whose security is involved. This article addresses the question of
which of these countries should have the authority to regulate the
issuer's disclosures.
The answer to this complex question is of growing importance
for the proper functioning of the global economy. Strong argu
ments can be made that appropriate disclosure regulation corrects
market failures that otherwise would lead to misallocations of capi
tal and management inefficiencies. Disclosure regulations can also
increase investor utility under certain circumstances. Compliance
with these regulations, however, is costly, and the mere prospect of
their application can deter potential transactions that would be ben
eficial to the parties involved. Complicating the matter further, the
proper balance between these considerations of benefit and cost is
not the same for all issuers around the world under all circum
stances. Also, for any issuer of a given country and set of circum
stances, knowledge about what the appropriate balance is will not
be evenly spread around the world, nor will there be a consensus
about it, even among the persons who are the best informed.
4. The transnational reach of domestic regulation is an essential part of the modem ap·
proach to the subject area traditionally labeled as "international law." Most of the cases and
commentary until now have involved just a few areas of substantive regulation, most conspic
uously criminal law, welfare legislation for seamen, antitrust regulation, export controls, and
the antifraud provisions of securities laws. See, e.g., JoHN H. BARTON & BART S. FISHER,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT: REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 813·53
(1986); MYRES S. McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEM·
PORARY PERSPECTIVE: I'liE PUBUC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY 1295-392 (1981);
CoVEY T. 0UVER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
135-91 (1995); HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 885-983 (4th
ed. 1994); ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION
OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 515-704 (1991).
Recently the issue of the transnational impact of domestic regulation has come up in a
more indirect fashion in the areas of environmental regulation and labor standards. This
involves the situation where country A imposes more stringent environmental or labor regu
lations on producers operating within its territory than does country B on producers operat·
ing within its territory. A, in order to prevent B's producers from having a cost advantage
over A's producers, prohibits imports of products from B unless the producers conform with
A's more stringent standards. For an overview of such issues, see JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL.,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 559·95 (3d ed. 1995).
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Proper apportionment of the authority to regulate involves con
sideration of which country's officials are likely to be most knowl
edgeable about the benefits and costs of disclosure for a given
issuer and circumstance. Also, given the remaining uncertainty as
to the proper trade-off, the proper apportionment of authority re
quires consideration of on which authorities the benefits of a good
decision and the harms of a bad one will be concentrated. The issue
ultimately requires hoeing the narrow row between permitting the
needless evasion of valuable rules that correct market failures and
the unnecessary expense and frustration of hindering beneficial
transactions. The global aggregate of economic activity impacted
by this apportionment of authority is enormous. The gains from
getting the balance right are potentially very large. Yet, to date, the
question has not been a subject of much sustained, serious aca
demic inquiry.5
This article approaches the question of which countries should
regulate which issuers with the goal of determining what apportion
ment of regulatory authority would most enhance global economic
welfare.6 While this goal of maximizing economic welfare drives
the analysis, the recommended apportionment is clearly within the
range that would be permitted under international law. The analy
sis also suggests that an international agreement on a single regime
for all issuers around the world would not, for the medium-term
future anyway, enhance global welfare as much as properly appor
tioned regulation by national regimes.
5. There are some notable exceptions. For two less theoretical articles backing tradi
tional investor protection, see James A. Fanto, The Absence of Cross-Cultural Communica
tion: SEC Mandatory Disclosure and Foreign Corporate Governance, 17 Nw. J. INTL. L. &
Bus. 119 (1996); J. William Hicks, Protection of Individual Investors Under U.S. Securities
Laws: The Impact of International Regulatory Competition, 1 GLOBAL LEGAL Sruo. J. 431
(1994). For a less theoretical article taking a position closer to the issuer-nationality ap
proach that I advocate here, see Edward F. Greene et al., Hegemony or Deference: U.S.
Disclosure Requirements in the International Capital Markets, 50 Bus. LAW. 413 (1995). For
other, more theoretical works in this area, see Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The
Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INTI.. L. & Bus. 207
(1996); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money: Regula
tion in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1855 (1997). Choi and Guzman agree
with me that foreign issuers whose shares are sold to U.S. residents or are traded in the
United States should not necessarily be subjected to the U.S. regime. They come to signifi
cantly different conclusions, however, in that they favor giving issuers the freedom to choose
the jurisdiction governing their disclosure. For reasons discussed infra in sections IV.B.3 and
V.B.2, I believe that such freedom would lead to an undesirable "race to the bottom" in the
content of national disclosure regimes.
6. Distributional issues, in the sense of redistribution from rich persons to poor persons
or vice versa, are not at the heart of this question. As will be developed further, see infra
notes 71, 103 and accompanying text, whatever approach to regulating disclosure is adopted,
it will not likely have any systematic wealth redistribution effect.

2504

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:2498

The market for a security is "fully global" if it matters little to
the probability of a transaction taking place whether the issuer, the
parties, and the place of execution are of the same country or differ
ent ones. Part I examines the extent of globalization today and the
process by which it is occurring. It considers trends in the factors
favoring globalization and in the counterfactors resisting it. Part I
concludes that while the market today is by no means fully global, it
will, over the next decade or so, move substantially in that direction
for all issuers of any significance, absent obstruction by IJ.ationally
based disclosure regulation.
Parts II, III and IV address the question of which country or
countries should regulate which issuers. Part II considers what are
as a general matter the benefits and costs of an issuer disclosing
more about itself. Part III examines how these benefits and costs
are divided up among the countries related to any transnational
transaction involving an issuer's shares. It considers three dimen
sions of nationality: the residence of the buyer,7 the place of the
transaction, and the nationality of the issuer.s The issuer's disclo
sure behavior affects each of these countries. The analysis of how
each is affected reveals the distribution of the disclosure behavior's
benefits and costs, and hence. of the benefits and costs of the regula
tions that govern it.
Given this, Part IV considers what apportionment of regulatory
authority among these countries would lead the issuer to disclose at
a level closest to that which would maximize global economic wel
fare. It concludes that each country should be the exclusive regula
tor of all issuers of its nationality, regardless of where in the world
the shares of that country's issuers are offered and traded, to whom
they are offered, and among whom they are traded.
7. In a primary transaction, the issuer is the seller. The nationality of the issuer and seller
thus do not constitute separate dimensions of nationality. In a secondary transaction, the
seller is someone different than the issuer. This additional fourth dimension of nationality
will not be considered in this analysis, however, because the secondary transaction seller's
direct stake in issuer disclosure - being protected from making a damaging securities portfo·
lio adjustment as a result of being poorly informed - is essentially the same as the buyer's
stake. The only difference is formalistic. The portfolio adjustment the seller is choosing is
whether or not to sell, and the portfolio adjustment the buyer is choosing is whether or not to
buy. The policy issues raised by the buyer dimension and seller dimension of nationality are
thus identical and do not merit the additional complexity that separate treatment would
involve.
8. The nationality of an issuer would be determined by where the issuer as a firm has its
center of gravity. Factors important to this determination include the location of the entre
preneurs who formed the enterprise, the location of the current headquarters, and the loca
tion where the bulk of its operations are conducted. See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
The issuer's jurisdiction of incorporation would not be a factor in this determination, nor
would the residency of its shareholders.
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Part Vis a preliminary application of these findings to U.S. pol
icy. In the U.S. selection of which issuers onto which to impose its
regime, the traditional focus has been on the national residence of
the buyer. The articulated rationale for this selection has been "in
vestor protection": the protection of U.S. investors from making
damaging securities choices as a result of being poorly informed.
This rationale leads directly to the principle that the only transac
tions that should trigger U.S. disclosure regulation are those involv
ing U.S. investors, but that they should do so even in cases where
the issuer involved already is complying with some other country's
disclosure regime.
Recently, however, the SEC has proposed a different, "capital
market protection" approach. This approach maintains the goal of
protecting certain investors from being poorly informed but refor
mulates the class of persons protected to consist of all purchasers in
the U.S. market, wherever their residence, but not U.S. purchasers
in foreign markets. Thus, the SEC is proposing a shift in focus to
the place of the transaction.
The analysis that this article employs, however, shows that
neither the traditional investor protection approach nor the pro
posed market protection approach is in the enlightened self-interest
of the United States. In contrast, I conclude that the United States
should apply its regime only to issuers of U.S. nationality, but do so
regardless of the location of transactions in the issuer's shares and
regardless of who the buyers are. This set of issuers, of course, is
exactly the same set of issuers the United States would regulate
under the optimal apportionment authority at the international
level recommended here.
Globalization is an occasion for a fundamental reassessment of
the proper function of mandatory disclosure, a reassessment that
can benefit from our greatly increased sophistication about finan
cial economics since the passage of the securities acts in the 1930s.
As Part II demonstrates, the traditional investor protection ration
ale misidentifies the most important stake that a country can have
in the disclosure practices of an issuer: the efficiency gains in its
real economy that can be derived from better capital allocation and
more effective disciplining of managers to act in the best interests of
shareholders. This misidentification was relatively harmless in an
era of primarily domestic transactions, because investor protection
and efficiency considerations each led to applying the rules to the
same set of issuers. Now that the United States must make deci
sions concerning the reach of the U.S. regime to issuers whose

Michigan Law Review
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shares are involved in transnational transactions, however, the error
can be much more costly.
The gains and costs of applying a particular set of disclosure
rules to a given issuer are, as shown in Part III, primarily concen
trated within the country with which the issuer is most closely asso
ciated - that is, the country of which it is a "national." Despite the
rise of "multinational" corporations, the bulk of the world's eco
nomic activity is still undertaken by enterprises (including many
that are labeled "multinational") for which one country is the resi
dence of the entrepreneurs that took the enterprise public, the
place of its headquarters, and the location of the largest portion of
its operations.9 With the increasing globalization of financial infor
mation and ease of effecting transactions abroad, the mobility of
investment funds is increasing dramatically. For at least the next
few decades this is likely to make investors' portfolios more inter
national than the issuers in which they invest. This increasing inter
nationalization of portfolios should not obscure the fact that, as the
analysis of national stakes shows, it is still in the best interests of the
United States and of the global economy as a whole for disclosure
regulation to be undertaken at the national level and for the United
States to apply its regime only to those issuers that have their eco
nomic center of gravity in the United States.

I.

.
THE PROCESS OF GLOBALIZATION

An essential first step to analyzing which countries should regu
late which issuers is understanding why transnational securities
transactions take place and what their impact is. By definition, the
existence of transnational transactions in corporate equities means
that the market for the securities involved reaches beyond the
boundaries of the country of the issuer. Such transactions have to
reach a certain level of intensity, however, before their impact is
sufficient for us to say that the whole world forms "one market" in
the same way that a country has traditionally formed one market
for the equities of its nationally known issuers.
The extent of the impact of transnational transactions in form
ing a one-world market can be measured along two dimensions:
9. In 1990, profits from foreign operations of U.S. corporations amounted to only about
one-sixth of all corporate profits. See SuRv. CURRENT Bus., Dec. 1992, at 14 tbl.6.16C. In
1989, overseas assets of U.S. corporations designated as "multinational" were only about
one-fifth of their total assets. See Jeffrey H. Lowe & Raymond J. Mataloni, Jr., U.S. Direct
Investment Abroad: 1989 Benchmark Survey Results, SuRv. CURRENT Bus., Oct. 1991, at 29
tbl.l.
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price and pattern of investor holdings. The price dimension con
cerns the extent to which such transnational transactions assure that
the "law of one price" applies - that is, that a security promising
its holder a given future cash flow will have the same price
whatever the nationality of its issuer or of the exchange on which it
is principally traded.10 The price dimension is often referred to by
financial economists as "integration."11
The pattern of holdings dimension concerns the extent to which
transnational transactions result in the typical investor around the
world holding an equity portfolio containing shares of issuers of dif
ferent countries roughly in proportion to the countries' respective
total market capitalizations, as opposed to a portfolio primarily
containing shares of issuers of her own country.12 Putting it another
way, the market for a security is "fully global" along this dimension
if it matters little to the probability of a transaction taking place
whether the issuer, the parties, and the place of execution are of the
same country or different ones.
The extent to which the market for corporate equities is fully
global along both the price and holdings dimensions depends on
two contending sets of factors considered below. Factors favoring a
global market in large part reflect two constant pressures inherent
in the economics of investing: the desire by investors to earn high

10. More precisely, the law of one price is said to apply where a security with a future
cash flow detennined by a given probability distribution - conditional on the publicly avail
able infonnation known by the best infonned investors ...:_ has the same price whatever the
nationality of the issuer or exchange on which it is traded.
11. See infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
12. I use the word "roughly" because, as we shall see, differences among investors of
different national residences may call for deviations from these proportions even in a market
for securities in which distance otherwise means nothing. Relevant differences among inves
tors include their tax situation, their consumption of nontraded goods in a world of unpre
dictable inflation and deviations of currency exchange changes from purchasing power
equity, and their need to hedge against risks associated with human capital. See infra section
I.D.
For the market for securities to be fully global along the holdings dimension, the average
U.S. and Japanese investors would both have to have roughly 40% of their share portfolio in
U.S. stocks and 28% in Japanese stocks. This estimate is derived from figures showing that in
1995, the total capitalization of all the world's publicly traded issuers was estimated at $17
trillion, the total capitalization of U.S. issuers was about $7 trillion, and the total capitaliza
tion of Japanese publicly traded issuers was about $4.7 trillion. See J AMES L. CocHRANE ET
AL., FOREIGN EoumES AND U.S. INVESTORS: BREAKING DOWN THE BARRIERS SEPARAT
ING SUPPLY AND DEMAND 1 (New York Stock Exch. Working Paper 95-04, 1995); Big Board
Capitalization Hits a Record $5 Trillion, WALL ST. J., May 9, 1995, at C17. In fact, however,
investors display an extreme home bias. For example, at least as recently as 1989, U.S. inves
tors on average held 93.8% of their portfolios in U.S.-issuer stocks and only 1.3% in
Japanese-issuer stocks, and Japanese investors on average held only 0.3% of their portfolios
in U.S.-issuer stocks and 98.1 % in Japanese-issuer stocks. See Kenneth R. French & James
M. Poterba, Investor Diversification and International Equity Markets, AM. EcoN. REV., May
1991, at 222 & tbl.1.
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expected returns and the desire to reduce risk through diversifica
tion. The counterfactors to a global market are barriers to these
pressures that traditionally have been sufficiently high to result in
the market for most equities being largely segmented along na
tional lines. A weakening of these counterfactors in recent decades
has led to the market for corporate equities becoming more
globalized.
Part I addresses the current status of market globalization and
its potential in the next few decades. The extent of market global
ization along the price dimension is unclear; some financial econo
mists argue that it is already fully global, and others argue that it is
not.13 As for the pattern of holdings dimension, however, the mar
ket is clearly far from fully global. Full globalization would involve
a manifold increase in transnational share transactions. Rather
than being a small fraction of purely domestic transactions, transna
tional transactions would come to dominate them. Such a develop
ment would profoundly impact national regulation of issuer

disclosure. It is a development that ultimately will have to be faced,
quite possibly in the next decade or so, because the counterfactors
favoring segmented national markets will continue to weaken while
factors favoring a global one will continue inherently strong.
A.

Factors Favoring a Global Market

1. Returns to Rea llocation of Savings
The existence of differences among nations in domestic savings
relative to the quality of available opportunities for domestic real
investment works in favor of a global securities market.14 Real in
vestment opportunities in each nation display diminishing marginal
returns. The proposed projects that constitute any given nation's
set of domestic real investment opportunities are bound to have dif
fering earnings prospects. If projects are implemented in rank or
der of their prospects, the more of a nation's projects that are
implemented - that is, the greater the amount of total domestic
real investment - the lower the return on the marginal project.
The amount of available domestic savings and the sets of pro
posed domestic investment projects are unlikely to be distributed
13. See infra section I.C.
14. Real (as opposed to financial) investment involves the use of resources such as skilled
labor, machinery, bricks, and mortar to create new capacity to produce a particular good or
service. F'mancial investment involves the acquisition of rights to receive cash returns - for
example, the purchase of a share or bond, the lending of money, or the deposit of money in
an interest-bearing savings account.
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among nations such that, if there were no transnational investment
and each nation invested all its domestic savings in just its projects,
the expected return on the marginal project of each nation would

be exactly the same. If country A's marginal project would have, in
the absence of transnational investment, a lower expected rate of
return than would country B's marginal project, country A has
more savings relative to the quality of its investment opportunities
than country B.15 A reallocation of savings for investment from A
to B reduces the number of projects implemented in A and in
creases the number of projects implemented in B. This enhances
global economic efficiency because the projects that go unimple
mented in A have a lower expected return than the resulting addi
tional ones that are implemented in B. As long as a shift of funds
from A to B will have this result, there will exist incentives for per
sons with savings in A to invest them in B.
The market purchase of the securities of the issuer of one nation
by an investor in another nation is one of the ways that transna
tional reallocations of savings occur. There are other institutions
through which reallocations occur as well, such as internal financial
flows of multinational corporations engaging in direct investment,
bank lending, private block purchases of securities, and even the
purchase of government debt. But publicly traded securities in an
international market, just like those in a domestic market, have the
advantages that they a r e liquid

and

facilitate investor

diversification.

2.

Greater Diversification

The future return on most securities is probabilistic, not certain,
and so each has a certain riskiness associated with it. Global invest
ing offers investors a way of reducing the negative impact of this
riskiness to their welfare more than is possible with exclusively do
mestic investing. To understand why requires a brief diversion into
15. A related phenomenon has been the continuing U.S. trade deficit, which creates dol
lars abroad in need of investment. In essence, the United States, with its chronic federal
budget deficit and low private savings rate, has a low amount of domestically generated sav
ings relative to its investment opportunities, which means that there are incentives for foreign
investors to invest in U.S. securities. In 1994, for example, the dollar volume of shares
purchased by foreigners from U.S. residents on the New York Stock Exchange exceeded the
dollar volume of shares purchased on the Exchange by U.S. residents from foreigners by an
estimated $7.7 billion. See 1994 FACT BooK, supra note 1, at 89 (basing its estimation on an
annualized projection of the figure for the first nine months). This represented 16% of the
total capital inflow into the United States in 1994. See Russell B. Scholl, The International
Investment Position of the United States in 1994, Suav. CuRRENT Bus., June 1995, at 52, 56-57
& tb!J.
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the theory of portfolio choice, a pillar of the modern approach to
finance.
Portfolio choice theory teaches the investor to focus on what the
acquisition of a given security does to his whole portfolio of securi
ties rather than on the security's characteristics in isolation.16 The
critical lesson of portfolio choice theory is that holding a diversified
set of risky securities results in lower risk for any given level of
expected return.17 The expected return of a portfolio is the aggre
gate of the expected returns of its individual securities. The vari
ance of a portfolio is not, however, the aggregate of the variances of
its individual securities, because the actual returns of some of the
securities will likely exceed their expected returns and the actual
returns of others will likely fall short of their expected returns.
Consequently, the deviations of the securities that perform better
than expected and the securities that perform worse than expected
will, to one extent or another, cancel each other out. By diversify
ing in accordance with the dictates of portfolio theory, the investor
maximizes, for any given level of portfolio expected return, the ex
tent to which this type of canceling out is likely to occur.
There are limits, however, to the effectiveness of diversification
for reducing risk. This is most easily seen in terms of a simplified
model of portfolio choice theory that focuses on the correlation be
tween return on each individual risky security and the return on the
market of securities as a whole.1s
16. Theories of individual investment behavior assume that the purpose of saving and
investment is to consume the results of the investments at the end of the investment period.
Because funds are fungible, whatever the combination of gains and losses on the investments
in individual securities, all that counts is the total. Portfolio choice theory tells the investor
how to compose a portfolio at the beginning of the investment period that will maximize the
expected utility he will derive from the end-of-period value of this invested wealth (the
means of his consumption at that time). If we assume that an investor is a rational maximizer
of his expected utility, we can also use the theory to predict his behavior.
17. Investors are typically assumed to be "risk averse" - that is, they like expected re
turn and dislike risk. Thus, for any given level of expected return, the lower a portfolio's risk
the better. The assumption of risk aversion is in tum derived from an assumption that the
investor will derive declining marginal utility from consuming end-of-period wealth - that is,
each successive dollar of increasing wealth adds less to his total utility. Risk aversion occurs
because - compared to the expected utility from a given level of end-of-period wealth
known with certainty - the chance of a return of one dollar over the expected level does not
compensate for an equal chance of a return of one dollar under the expected level. Thus, in a
choice between two portfolios with differing risk, the investor will choose the riskier one only
if it has a sufficiently higher expected return to compensate him for the disutility he associ
ates with the greater risk.
18. This model was originally developed by Sharpe. See William F. Sharpe, A Simplified
Model for Portfolio Analysis, 9 MGMT. Sa. 277 (1963). For a nontechnical exposition of this

model, see JAMES H. LoruE ET AL., THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 108-31
(2d ed. 1985).
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Each security has two kinds of riskiness associated with it: un
systematic or "alpha" risk, the portion of the security's variance
that has a zero correlation with the market, and systematic or
"beta" risk, the portion of its variance that is perfectly correlated
with the market. Unsystematic risk results from factors specific in
their effects to the issuer or its industry - for example, uncertainty
concerning the quality of an issuer's management. Systematic risk
results from factors affecting all issuers whose securities are traded
in the market - for example, uncertainty concerning future inter
est rates.

Sufficient diversification can essentially eliminate the

contribution of the

unsystematic risk

of individual securities to a

portfolio's overall risk, because the deviations of the individual se
curities are due to factors unrelated to each other and will cancel
each other out. Diversification cannot eliminate the

systematic risk

of the individual securities, however, because, to the extent that in
dividual securities deviate from their expected returns due to fac
tors causing systematic risk, generally all securities deviate in the
same direction.
Global investing offers investors an opportunity to construct a
portfolio with lower risk for any given level of expected return. The
less each issuer in a market shares in common with the others, the
smaller the proportion of systematic risk and the higher the propor
tion of unsystematic risk. Issuers worldwide share less in common
with each other than issuers of a given nation share in common with
each other. Thus, if the relevant securities market is global rather
than merely national, a larger proportion of each issuer's variance
will constitute unsystematic risk, and diversification will further re
duce portfolio risk.
The concern with diversification highlights that capital markets
not only decide which proposed real investment projects should be
implemented, but also who will bear the risk resulting from uncer
tainty concerning the investments' future returns. Two modifica
tions of the simple model that views transnational investment
simply as reallocation of savings flow from this observation. First,
the desirability of a given project now depends not only on its ex
pected return but also on its risk characteristics. Second, investors'
beliefs concerning the probability distributions of the returns on
available securities and investors' needs for diversification, not the
amount of savings reallocated transnationally, determine the level
of transnational transactions as a

proportion

of all transactions. If

one nation consistently has more savings relative to its real invest
ment opportunities than another, its investors will accumulate a
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larger absolute share of the joint pool of securities of the two naM
tions. However, the proportions of the securities of the two nations
that the investors of each would hold in their portfolios will depend
on their respective beliefs.19 Transnational transactions, through
their capacity to reallocate risk in this fashion, have the potential to
add significantly to global economic growth as the increase in the
possibilities for diversification leads persons to shift to higher
expected return investments despite their higher individual
variances.
B.

Factors Favoring National Markets

1. Specialized Information Concentrated Nationally
Finance theorists often assume that all investors share identical
beliefs concerning the probability distribution of the future returns
of the available securities. This assumption is useful for underM
standing certain aspects of investor behavior. It permits the conM
struction of testable models relating securities prices to systematic
risk.20 It also permits the demonstration that a totally passive invesM
tor, who has no specific information concerning the future prosM
pects of available securities, can minimize risk for any given
expected return simply by randomly choosing a sufficiently large
number of different securities from all the securities available in the
market.21
In reality, however, investors in different countries still possess
significantly different bodies of information, despite the trend toM
ward information globalization. The assumption of identical beliefs
in the face of this reality obscures our view of two other aspects of
investor behavior that have significantly hindered complete globalM
ization of the market for equities, at least along the pattern of holdM
ings dimension.22 First, for the totally passive investor to be willing
19. If, as most finance models commonly assume, investors' beliefs were all identical, the
proportions would be identical. The larger absolute amount of transnational investment by
the investors of the nation with relatively greater savings will be counterbalanced by the
smaller absolute amount of such investment by investors in the other nation.
20. See infra section I.C.1.
21. See infra section I.A.2.
22. Investors in all the larger developed capitalist countries still hold the bulk of their
equity portfolios in home country issuers. See infra section I.D. Prominent financial econo
mists have suggested for some time that this "home country bias" is related to differences
between the information investors possess concerning home country issuers and that con
cerning foreign issuers. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein & Charles Horioka, Domestic Savings and
International Capital Flows, 90 EcoN. J. 314, 316, 321 (1980) (finding a high correlation be·
tween marginal increases in domestic savings and in domestic investment and attributing
these in part to investors' greater uncertainty concerning foreign issuers due to less informa
tion); Martin Feldstein, Domestic Saving and International Capital Movements in the Long
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to undertake the strategy of randomly choosing securities, she
needs basic faith in the market pricing of the securities from which
she makes her selection. This faith arises from a level of familiarity
that, for many of today's investors, is still attained only for the do
mestic market. Second, some investors ("speculators") choose their
portfolios on the basis of their own beliefs, not randomly. These
beliefs, in turn, are based on specialized information not possessed
by all participants.23 Speculators are likely to do better concentratRun and the Short Run, 21 EUR. EcoN. REv. 129, 130-31 & 148 n.27 (1983) (finding substan

tial imperfections in the international capital market and attributing them in part to investors
having a higher subjective variance on foreign returns due to less information); Robert E.
Lucas, Jr., Interest Rates and Currency Prices in a Two-Country World, 10 J. MONETARY
EcoN. 335, 357 (1983) (explaining home bias as the result of the local nature of information
but noting the lack of models that even begin to explain the relationship).
More recently, scholars have begun to study this relationship between local information
and home bias in more formal ways, constructing theoretical models and investigating it em
pirically. Cooper and Kaplanis, for example, undertake an empirical study that rejects, as a
sufficient explanation of home bias, inflation hedging and observable proportionate dead
weight costs, such as withholding taxes on dividends and the extra management fees that
funds charge for investing abroad. By process of elimination, they cite information asymme
tries as the most likely alternative explanation. See Ian Cooper & Evi Kaplanis, Home Bias
in Equity Portfolios, Inflation Hedging, and International Capital Market Equilibrium, 7 REv.
FIN. STUD. 45 (1994).
Kang and Stulz, in a recent paper, construct three models, each based on a different factor
that could generate home bias: (i) an up front lump sum cost to an investor, such as basic
knowledge acquisition costs about a foreign country, before she is willing to begin investing
in shares of its issuers; (ii) observable deadweight costs that are proportionate to the amount
invested, such as dividend withholding taxes or extra management fees; and (iii) information
asymmetries. Using Japan, which has particularly easily available data about the foreign
ownership of the shares of Japanese issuers, Kang and Stulz show that non-Japanese investors
have a stronger home bias against small Japanese issuers than against large ones. They also
show that non-Japanese investor portfolios of Japanese stocks underperformed the Japanese
market as a whole. These results, they conclude, are consistent with a combination of the up
front lump sum cost of knowledge acquisition model and a simple extension of the informa
tion asymmetry model, which posits that because less is known by foreigners about the
smaller issuers, the asymmetry with respect to them is greater. Kang and Stulz conclude that
their results are inconsistent with the proportional deadweight loss model. See Jung-Koo
Kang & Rene M. Stulz, Why Is There Home Bias? An Analysis of Foreign Portfolio Equity
Ownership in Japan (May 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
French and Poterba suggest that information asymmetry-related "behavioral finance" the
ories can shed light on the home bias phenomenon. For one such explanation of home bias,
they cite work by Robert Shiller showing that investors in Japan and the United States were
each relatively more optimistic in their forecasts of the returns from their home country
issuers than of the returns from the issuers of the other country. French and Poterba suggest
that such biases, whatever their origins, can persist for a long time, even if risk-adjusted
expected returns (presumably involving expectations conditional on all knowledge available
somewhere in the world) are equal in the two countries. This persistence is due to the inef
fectiveness of feedback in correcting the biases. The problem is that the use of historical
actual returns to estimate historical expected returns is plagued by large statistical uncertain
ties. As a second behavioral explanation of home bias, French and Poterba suggest that
investors, due to a lack of knowledge about foreign markets, institutions, and firms, regard
investments in foreign stocks as "unfamiliar gambles" and impute to them a special kind of
extra, apparently undiversifiable, "risk" even when they assign identical probability distribu
tions to foreign and domestic stock. See French & Poterba, supra note 12, at 225.
23. This use of the term speculator covers both (i) persons who buy or sell for the short
run on the basis of information, or evidence of the existence of information, that they believe
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ing their buying and selling in equities of issuers about which they
and their advisers start with natural information advantages.24
These are likely to be domestic issuers because the futures of most
issuers are determined more by "inside" forces - those occurring
within the borders of their an issuer's own nation - than by forces
occurring outside.
For several reasons residents of a given nation have advantages
over foreigners in gaining specialized information about their na
tion's inside forces and are more familiar with the institutions in
volved . in the process of price formation for their own nation's
issuers. One reason is that the costs of acquiring bits of local infor
mation are lower for a resident. Residents are more likely to be
able to read the language in which materials containing such infor
mation are published and to receive such materials promptly and
cheaply. Also, the costs of such information-gathering tasks as tele
phone conversations, face-to-face conversations, and site visits are
lower for residents. Thus it is far easier for a resident to gather
more bits of local information at a reasonable expenditure.
More important, these same economies permit a resident who
receives a large number of bits of such information to develop re
fined rules for evaluating them: to choose which bits to analyze
seriously and by which to be influenced.25 This evaluation must be
will soon become more widely known and (ii) investors who purchase for the longer run on
the basis of what they believe to be their superior analysis of the "fundamentals" - i.e.,
information concerning the underlying business of the issuer and its prospects.
24. This statement is not necessarily inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis
(EMH), which is another pillar of the modem approach to finance. The EMH, most broadly
stated, holds that the market price of a security fully reflects all information available at the
time in question. The seminal article reviewing the work to its date that formed the basis for
the hypothesis is Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empir
ical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). While one of the implications of the EMH is that the ordi
nary investor is wasting his time trying to pick "winners" on the basis of information he
gleans from public sources, a subset of all investors encompasses persons who initially obtain
new information and whose trades cause the price to reflect such new information. See Ron
ald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms ofMarket Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV.
549, 569-70 (1984). This subset may be responsible for a substantial percentage of all transac
tions. It should also be noted that the EMH is controversial and is less accepted with respect
to "soft" information about issuers than it is with respect to hard data such as the announce·
ment of a dividend increase. See Merritt B. Fox, The Role ofthe Market Model in Corporate
Law Analysis: A Comment on Weiss and White, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1015, 1044 (1988); Gilson &
Kraakman, supra, at 561-62.
25. The questions addressed here really apply to the processing of information by a whole
network of persons - the participants in the finance process - whose decisions ultimately
determine which real investment projects are implemented. The role played by these differ
ent participants - project proponents, firm managers, financial intermediaries, investment
advisers, and individual investors - and the nature of the rules by which these participants
process information are considered in more detail in MERRrIT B. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUS·
TRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC ECONOMY: THEORY, PRACI1CE, AND POLICY 92-232
(1987).
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based both on the source of the information as well as on its con
tent. The concern with source goes to the accuracy of the informa
tion. It asks how trustworthy the source is and, assuming the
information has an interpretative element, how competent the
source is. The concern with content asks how much the bit, assum
ing the information is accurate, tells the recipient about whether a
particular security is underpriced or overpriced.
The resident recipient, through his education and his continuous
absorption of general information concerning his nation, starts with
a much richer context in which to make these evaluations. He can
also obtain cheaply much more information concerning both the
structure of the source's motivations and the reputation of the
source. Because acquiring information from the source is generally
less expensive for residents than nonresidents, the resident recipi
ent is also more likely to have had prior personal experience with
the source and hence has more feedback on the quality of informa
tion the source provides.26 The resident recipient is, for the same
reasons, more likely to have had prior experience by which to assess
the usefulness of information with any particular content when the
information involved relates to local forces.

2. Currency Exchange Risks
If a resident of the United States purchases a security of an is
suer of France, the investor must consider the possibility that when
he converts the return back into dollars, the rate of exchange may
be different than at the time of the purchase. Thus, to the U.S.
investor, the French security has an additional element of risk - an
additional source of variability of return - that would not be pres
ent with an otherwise identical U.S. security.27 Moreover, the size
of many exchange rate fluctuations in recent years has been suffi-

26. For an example in the legal literature of the use of this kind of "reputation theory,"
see, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming ofAge in a Corporate Law Firm:
The Economics of Associate Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REV. 567, 578-79 (1989).
27. Financial economists often assume away foreign currency exchange risk entirely,
under the theory that it can be easily eliminated through hedging. See, e.g., Kang & Stulz,
supra note 22, at 9. This is probably true for large institutional investors that, at a low cost
per dollar invested in foreign shares, can engage in privately negotiated forward contracts
and other hedging devices extending out over many years. It is not true, however, of the
typical individual investor, who can only hedge by dealing in the currency futures market,
where the maximum duration of available hedges is much shorter and transactions costs are
significant. Even if individual investors have the alternative of investing in mutual funds
specializing in foreign stocks that can hedge cheaply and over the long term due to their size
and sophistication, the limitations on the hedging ability of individual investors can be a
factor favoring segmented national markets, because some of them would rather invest on
their own.
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cient to swamp the other factors that make the return on a security
variable.28 The extent, however, to which the possibility of ex
change rate fluctuations deters transnational security transactions
depends on the effect of the fluctuations on the riskiness of the in
vestor's whole portfolio, not on individual securities, and on the im
pact of portfolio riskiness on the individual's utility.

If, in our example of a U.S. investor, the rates of exchange of

the dollar for the currency of each other nation vary independently
of each other, the added riskiness of the individual foreign securi
ties need not add anything to the riskiness of the investor's portfo
lio as a whole. With holdings of foreign securities from a diversified
set of nations, the variations in return of individual securities
caused by exchange rate fluctuations would tend to cancel each
other out. For a U.S. investor, such exchange rate independence
would be approximated in a situation where the exchange rate per
formance of the dollar, compared to other nations, was in some
sense average - that is, the dollar's value was stable relative to a
basket made up of the currencies of the other nations of the world.
Where foreign currencies move systematically vis-a-vis the in
vestor's national currency, as has been the case with the dollar over
the last fifteen years, exchange rate fluctuations do not cancel out
each other in this fashion. Other factors, however, may neverthe
less limit the effect of the resulting variation in portfolio return on
the investor's utility.29 First, changes over time in currency ex
change rates between two countries are heavily influenced by dif
ferences in the countries' relative rates of inflation. The direction
of the influence tends to compensate for the effects of the respec
tive rates of national inflation on the issuer's return measured in the
issuer's national currency and on the investor's cost of consumption
measured in his national currency.
With a U.S. investor and a French issuer, for example, a higher
inflation rate in the United States than in France would mean that,

ceteris paribus,

the dollar cost of consumption in the United States

would increase more as a result of inflation than would the French
security's return as measured in francs. But the effect of the higher
inflation in the United States on the dollar/franc exchange rate
would be to weaken the dollar so that the investor would receive
28. For example, between January and June of 1995, the dollar dropped 15.3% against
the yen. See Strong Yen Steadily Contributing to Lower Domestic Prices, JAPAN EcoN. NEW
SWIRE PLus, Dec. 25, 1995, available in Westlaw, Dialog, Japanecon database.
29. The investor is assumed to choose the portfolio that will provide the investor with the
highest expected utility from the consumption of the end-of-period invested wealth. See
supra note 16.
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mor e dollars p er franc. Cons equ ently , his r et urn on th e s ecurity
m easur ed in dollars might w ell , as a r esult , k eep up with th e U .S.
rat e of i nflation . Thus , in t erms of th e ultimat e goal of inv es tment
- futur e consumption - exchange rat e fluctuations may have a
stabi lizin g rath er than d estabilizin g eff ect.3o
Anoth er f actor limitin g th e eff ect of variation in por tfolio r eturn
caus ed by fluctuations in exchan ge rat es on th e investor 's utility is
th e probabi lity that part of what th e inv estor is lik ely to consum e is
import ed from abroad : in dom estic curr ency t erms , exchan ge rat e
fluctuation will aff ect the r et urn on for eign s ecuriti es and th e cost of
import ed goods in th e sam e dir ection. Sinc e on e is income and th e
oth er exp enditur e, th e eff ects t end to comp ensat e for each other .
Finally , to th e ext ent that dom estic issu ers th ems elv es mak e di
r ect inv es tments abroad , th eir r eturns too ar e aff ect ed by for ei gn
exchange rat e risk . As a cons equ enc e, th er e is l ess inc entiv e to
avoid s ecuriti es of for eign issu ers just to avoid for eign exchan ge
risk .31
3. Government Impedimen ts to Transnational Investmen ts
In th e cas e of

a pot ential transaction involvin g an issu er or s ec
ondary s ell er of on e nation and an inv estor of anoth er , th e gov ern
m ent of eith er nation may hav e tax or curr ency exchan ge
r egulations that cr eat e suffici ent disinc entiv es that th e transaction
do es not tak e plac e.32 Th e gov ernment of th e inv estor , for exam30. The risk of inflation at home in goods and services that are available only from do
mestic (i.e., nontraded) sources may still be a residual source of home bias. Compared to
investing in foreign equities, investing in domestic equities may be a better hedge against this
risk, because the nominal returns on domestic equities may well correlate more closely with
changes in the nominal prices of nontraded goods and services than do nominal returns on
foreign equities, even after adjustment for changes in the exchange rate. This is because
factors other than domestic inflation rates can substantially influence exchange rates and
cause large deviations from the rates that would achieve purchasing power parity - i.e., rates
where the same representative bundle of consumption goods costs the same in dollars - or
any other currency - in every country. See Michael Adler & Bernard Dumas, International
Portfolio Choice and Corporation Finance: A Synthesis, 38 J. FIN. 925 (1983); Cooper &
Kaplanis, supra note 22, at 46-47. Cooper and Kaplanis, however, test empirically the propo
sition that this is an explanation of home bias and reject the hypothesis. See Cooper & Ka
planis, supra note 22, at 50-52.
31. The existence of domestic issuers with direct foreign investment also weakens the
incentive to diversify by investing in foreign securities. One empirical study, however, sug
gests that a diversified portfolio of U.S. multinational corporations does not achieve nearly as
much risk reduction as does a portfolio of internationally diversified issuers. See Bertrand
Jacquillat & Bruno Solnik, Multinationals Are Poor Tools for Diversification, J. PoRTFouo
MGMT., Wmter 1978, at 8.
32. These factors, if they do not render the transaction impossible, at the very least re
duce the investor's expected return from undertaking the investment Absent these factors,
an investor in country A would be able to enjoy the same rate of return from an investment
in the stock of an issuer from country B that investors in B would enjoy. The investor from A
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ple, may make it difficult or impossible to obtain the foreign cur
rency with which to purchase the security, may tax the returns on
foreign securities at a higher rate than it taxes the returns

�m do

mestic securities,33 or may refuse to grant the domestic holder of a
foreign security a tax credit for taxes withheld from the returns by
the government of the issuer. The government of the issuer may
make it difficult or impossible for a foreign investor to turn returns
paid in the local currency into the investor's domestic currency or
impose a withholding tax on the returns that, for a number of possi
ble reasons, may not reduce the investor's home tax obligations by
a commensurate amount.34 Transnational transactions can be dis
couraged not only by currently existing regulations of these sorts
but also by the fear that they might be imposed at some time in the
future during the investor's period of ownership.

4. Transaction Costs of Trading in Foreign Securities
A final factor favoring national securities markets is the extra
costs to the purchaser and to the issuer or secondary seller of enter
ing into transactions occurring across national lines. These include
the additional costs associated with international communications,
currency exchange, and clearance and settlement - the physical
would therefore find attractive, for diversification reasons, an investment in the stock of a B
issuer that is priced to produce an expected return for investors in B comparable to the
expected return the investor in A could earn on investments in the stocks of his own coun
try's issuers. With these factors lowering the expected return available to the A investor,
however, diversification considerations may be insufficient to attract him to invest at all and
will certainly induce him not to invest as much.
33. The United States Interest Equalization Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 88-563, 78 Stat. 841
(1964) (formerly codified at scattered sections of the I.R.C.; repealed 1974), which was in
effect between 1963 and 1974, was an example of a tax provision intended to discourage
investment in foreign securities by U.S. residents. The Act imposed a 15% tax on the
purchase of such securities. The idea behind this tax-induced segmentation of the world's
financial markets was to permit the United States to pursue a monetary policy of interest
rates lower than those prevailing abroad without aggravating its balance of payments
problems. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMN., REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE U.S. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE CoMMISSION TO THE SENATE COMMI1TEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND UR·
BAN AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE COMMITIEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE ON THE INTERNA·
TIONAUZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKET III-14 to -15 & n.21 (1987) [hereinafter 1987
SEC INTERNATIONAUZATION REPORT] ; Robert L. Maines, Note, The Interest Equalization
Tax, 17 STAN. L. REV. 710 (1965).
34. Cooper and Kaplanis give as an example a U.K. pension fund, the income of which is
tax exempt under U.K. tax law, but the U.S. income of which would be subject to a 15% U.S.
withholding tax. Thus, for a dividend yield of 7%, there would be a reduction in the return
on investment down to approximately 6% when the fund chooses U.S. rather than U.K.
equities. Cooper and Kaplanis question the relative importance of this factor, however.
They argue that even after taking account of the extra expenses of foreign investing, it would
take levels of risk aversion well above what is commonly believed to be that of the average
investor for this to explain most of why U.K. investors invest such a small portion of their
portfolios in foreign stocks. See Cooper & Kaplanis, supra note 22, at 55-57; see also Kang &
Stulz, supra note 22, at 7-8.
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delivery of the security in exchange for the payment of the purchase
price.35 Some of these costs are not present where a foreign issuer
is listed on a domestic exchange, but in that event the issuer faces
extra costs.36
C.

The Current Extent of Globalization - The Price Dimension

Economic forces exist that by themselves would lead to a truly
global securities market. But as we have seen, these forces face
counterforces favoring segmented national markets. Do these
counterforces reduce the level of transnational transactions to the
point where the price of an equity, whose future cash flows are de
termined by a given probability distribution, would vary based on
the nationality of its issuer or of the exchange on which it is princi
pally traded? In other words, are these counterforces still suffi
ciently strong to keep the "law of one price" from applying globally,
or have they weakened to the point that we can say the market for
securities is globally integrated?

1. International Capital Asset Pricing Model Studies
One way to test this question is to construct a plausible model
for the pricing of risk in a global market for securities, patterned
after the domestic capital asset pricing model (CAPM).37 The
35. Cooper and Kaplanis try to give a feel for the scale of this factor by noting a study
that found the expense ratio for U.S. mutual funds specializing in foreign issuers was 0.68%
per annum higher than for funds investing primarily in U.S. issuers. As noted above, this
factor, combined with the impact of withholding taxes, is unlikely to explain most of the
home bias of U.S. investors. See Cooper & Kaplanis, supra note 22, at 56. For institutional
investors, the 0.68% per annum figure probably overstates the extra transaction costs associ
ated with investing in foreign equities, as it also would include the presumably larger research
expenses associated with foreign investment. For individual investors who trade with any
frequency, however, it probably considerably understates the impact of the extra transaction
costs, as they do not enjoy the volume discounts available to institutional investors.
36. These extra issuer costs include a listing fee on the domestic exchange, maintenance
of a transfer agent, and the costs of compliance with any applicable local securities laws.
37. The CAPM is a widely used model of the pricing in a domestic market of capital
assets such as securities. The CAPM assumes, among other things, that (i) the "market port
folio" - a portfolio containing all available capital assets in the same proportions to each
other as they are found in the market - is efficient; that is, it has the lowest variance of any
available portfolio with its expected return; and (ii) all investors have identical beliefs con
cerning the probability distribution of future returns on the available assets. This second
assumption can be used to prove the first. Because the market portfolio is efficient, it con
tains no diversifiable (unsystematic) risk, only systematic risk. Thus the systematic risk of
any given asset can be measured by its covariance with the market portfolio. Because any
portion of the risk of such asset that does not covary with the market portfolio can be diversi
fied away, the only portion of the risk that investors will pay a premium to avoid is the
portion that does covary. From this, it can be shown that each asset will be priced so that its
expected return is a function of (i) the covariance between the asset's return and the return
on the market portfolio, (ii) the rate of return on a "safe" asset, and (iii) the expected return
on the market portfolio. See Wtlliam F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market

2520

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 95:2498

model can then be tested empirically to see how well it explains the
pricing of securities around the world. If the model has strong em
pirical support, that would suggest that the law of one price does
apply in the market for corporate equities, with the shares of all
issuers, whatever their nationality, being priced, after adjustment
for risk, to yield the same expected retum.38 While some early
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964). A particularly accessible de
scription of the model is found in LORIE ET AL., supra note 18, at 132-43.
The CAPM cannot be tested directly because expected returns are subjective, unobserv
able judgments of investors. It can be made empirically testable, however, by assuming that
the market is a "fair game" - i.e., on average the actual return on an asset equals its ex
pected return. If this is the case, data on past actual returns can provide information about
past expected returns. Returns on the market portfolio are measured by a market index that
is composed of a set of securities that is assumed to be a representative proxy for the market
portfolio. The existing empirical tests of the CAPM have, however, been subjected to some
important criticisms. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Cross-Section of Ex
pected Stock Returns, 41 J. FIN. 427 (1992); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Effi
cient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 775-86
(1985); Richard Roll, A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory's Tests - Part I: On Past and
Potential Testability of the Theory, 4 J. FIN. EcoN. 129 (1977). Nonetheless, the wide use of
the CAPM by finance economists suggests that a large portion of them view the tests as
showing that it has significant power to explain securities pricing. See RONALD J. GILSON &
BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAw AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcouxsmoNs 101 (2d ed.
1995).
38. The basic approach is to construct a model of what securities pricing in an integrated

global market would look like and then to test the model to see if the experience in the real
world conforms. The seminal work in this area was performed by Solnik, on the international
asset pricing model (IAPM), which resembles the CAPM but is modified to take account of
the possibility of international diversification and the effect that it might have on the pricing
of assets. See B.H. Solnik, The International Pricing ofRisk: An Empirical Investigation of
the World Capital Market Structure, 29 J. FIN. 365 (1974). The CAPM cannot be applied
without such modification because the returns of different securities are denominated in dif
ferent currencies. This creates exchange risk for each investor when she invests in any secur
ity other than risky securities of her own nation or its "safe" asset - that is, an asset with a
payoff known for certain, denominated in his nation's currency. The solution is to separate
the risk of each security as denominated in its local currency and the exchange rate risk it
poses for foreign investors by assuming that each investor behaves as if she purchases a world
market portfolio when: (i) she hedges each purchase of a foreign security by borrowing in
the local currency or purchasing an exchange rate future and (ii) she invests as well in a pure
exchange risk portfolio consisting of a weighted average of the safe assets of each country in
proportion to its net foreign investment position. From this, it can be shown that each secur
ity of a given nation will be priced so that its expected return is a function of (i) the covari
ance between the security's return and the return on the world market portfolio, (ii) the
expected return on the world market portfolio, (iii) the rate of return on that nation's safe
asset, and (iv) the weighted average of the rates on the returns of the safe assets of all na
tions. See id. at 368-69.
Solnik's tests of the IAPM purport to show that a security's covariance with his index for
the world market portfolio - his measure of the security's international risk - has signifi
cant power explaining the prices of each nation's securities. See id. at 372-73 & tbl.3; see also
Bruno H. Solnik, An International Market Model of Security Price Behavior, 9 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 537, 552 (1974) [hereinafter Solnik, International Market Model].
From this, he concludes that the "international capital market seems to be sufficiently inte
grated and efficient to induce an international pricing of risk for common stocks." Id. at 553.
Adler and Dumas concluded in a later survey article that the tests of the IAPM, including
Solnik's, have been "inconclusive . . . from a statistical standpoint." Adler & Dumas, supra
note 30, at 954. Stehle focuses more directly on the segmentation versus integration issue by
testing the hypothesis that the U.S. market is totally segmented against the null hypothesis
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studies appeared to provide empirical support for such models,39
more recent work suggests that this support is at best weak.40
What inferences concerning global integration can be drawn
from this? One explanation for the low level of empirical support is
that the market is, in fact, not globally integrated. Another is that
the market is globally integrated, but that the tested models do not
correctly describe the pricing of risk and so apparent differences
among countries in terms of the risk-adjusted expected returns of
their issuers' equities are simply the result of errors in the risk ad
justments. Alternatively, the market, while integrated, may not be
efficient. Equities of particular countries may be systematically
traded at prices deviating from their fundamental values because of
"noise traders" influenced by "fads" or "fashions" concerning these
countries.41
that it is completely integrated with the rest of the world and by testing the reverse set of
hypotheses. See Richard Stehle, An Empirical Test of the Alternative Hypotheses of National
and International Pricing of Risky Assets, 32 J. FIN. 493 (1977). He was unable, however, to
reject either theory in favor of the other. See id. at 501. Expressing various methodological
concerns, Solnik himself joined this more skeptical view in a later article. See Bruno H.
Solnik, Testing International Asset Pricing: Some Pessimistic Views, 32 J. FIN. 503 (1977).
The IAPM has been subject as well to more basic theoretical criticisms that are relevant
to its utility as a method of determining the degree of segmentation in the market for securi
ties. The most important problem is that the price of consuming a given good or service in
one country differs from the price, translated at existing exchange rates, of consuming the
same good or service in another country. Because the criteria by which an investor chooses
her portfolio is the maximization of her expected utility from future consumption, an investor
in one country will use a different yardstick to measure the real return to her of a security
than will an investor in another country. Hence a different portfolio will be optimal for each,
and there is no single optimal world market portfolio for all investors. This problem is com
pounded by the fact that consumption preferences vary among investors of different coun
tries so that they want to consume different bundles of goods. These kinds of problems led
Adler and Dumas to conclude that "there is as yet no definitive empirical method for deter
mining whether and to what extent the international capital market is segmented." Adler &
Dumas, supra note 30, at 967; see also Rene M. Stulz, Pricing Capital Assets in an Interna
tional Setting: An Introduction, J. INTI.. Bus. Sruo., Winter 1984, at 55.
39. See supra note 38.
40. In a recent survey of the literature, Jeffrey Frankel states: "We have seen that the
tests, even those that make full allowance for the range of international assets to be held and
the range of countries where investors live, seem consistently to reject the international
CAPM hypothesis." Jeffrey A. Frankel, Introduction to THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF EQ
UITY MARKETS 1, 12 (Jeffrey A. Frankel ed., 1994). Similarly, Froot and Dabora state:
"There is a large literature that finds evidence of international segmentation. Risk return
tradeoffs, as measured by a pricing model such as the international CAPM, appear to differ
in some countries." Kenneth A. Froot & Emil Dabora, How Are Stock Prices Affected by
the Location of Trade? 2 (Dec. 8, 1995) (unpublished paper, presented at NYSE Palm Beach
Conference); see also Vihang Errunza & Etienne Losque, International Asset Pricing Under
Mild Segmentation: Theory and Test, 40 J. FIN. 105, 121 (1985); Campbell R. Harvey, The
World Price of Covariance Risk, 46 J. FIN. 111, 147 (1991).

41. See infra note 76. The first and third explanations may amount largely to the same
thing, because each implies that a project's cost of capital would differ depending on the
primary trading place for the shares of the issuer considering the project.
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2. Studies of Securities Sharing the Same Underlying Cash Flows
Another approach to determining whether the market is glob
ally integrated is to find securities trading in different markets that
share the same underlying cash flows and test whether they are
priced to produce the same expected return. This avoids the tricky
problem of modeling the price of risk that is necessary when cash
flows with different risk characteristics are compared.
One example of securities sharing the same underlying cash
flows involves closed-end country funds. These are irivestment
companies whose shares are traded on a major developed country
exchange such as the New York Stock Exchange and whose assets
consist solely of shares of issuers of some other country. Thus two
sets of securities - a share of a country fund and a bundle of indi
vidual shares identical to what the fund holds as assets - share the
same underlying future cash flow. Studies show, however, that the
typical fund's share price deviates, often substantially, from the
price of the bundle of individual shares that make up its assets. The
direction and extent of this deviation is significantly influenced by
what is happening in the market on which the fund shares are
traded.42

Another example is "Siamese twin" stocks, which are stocks of
companies whose charters fix proportionally the division of a com
mon pool of current and future equity cash flows, with both twins
traded on the same two developed country markets but with one
traded more actively on one market and the other more actively on
the other. In an efficient integrated market, we would expect their
prices to move in lockstep, particularly because both securities are
traded in both markets so that the transaction costs of arbitrage
between them are low. Such pricing studies, however, also find
large deviations that are "highly correlated with the relative stock
market indexes of the country where each stock is traded most
actively."43
The price deviation in each example suggests either a lack of
global integration or lack of market efficiency based on fads and
fashions related to local markets. But in each example the devia42. See James N. Bodurtha, Jr., et al., Closed-End Country Funds and U.S. Market Senti
ment, 8 REv. FIN. STUD. 879 (1995); GIKAS A. HARDOUVEUS ET AL., WHAT MOVES THE

D1scoUNT ON COUNTRY EQUITY FUNDs? (National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper No. 4571, 1993).
43. Froot & Dabora, supra note 40, at 3; see also Leonard Rosenthal & Colin Young, The
Seemingly Anomalous Price Behavior ofRoyal Dutch/She// and Unilever N. V./PLC, 26 J. FIN.
EcoN. 123 (1990) (finding large deviations in the pricing of the twin companies' stocks).
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tion is open to an alternative explanation that is consistent with a
globally integrated, efficient market for equities. For the closed
end country funds, the market for the underlying stocks may be
sufficiently nonliquid and inaccessible as to create very large arbi
trage costs.44 For the Siamese twin stocks, there may be tax
induced differences in the composition of each firm's shareholder
group, with the kind of investors interested in each having different
reservation prices for the stock.45

3. Conclusion
Empirical work to date has provided no clear assessment of the
extent to which today's equities market is globally integrated.
Some sense of the predominant opinion among financial econo
mists, however, can be gleaned from the standard texts in the field.
These suggest that some sets of countries already have relatively
highly integrated markets for securities - for example, the United
States and Canada, or the Benelux countries. Most others are less
integrated but are moving in that direction.46 We will see that my
conclusions concerning the appropriate apportionment of regula
tory authority will hold whether the market for corporate equities is
fully integrated along the price dimension or not, but the reasoning
used to get there differs at some points in the argument.

D.

The Current Extent of Globalization The Pattern of Holdings Dimension

The counterforces favoring segmentation clearly continue to
have a strong negative effect on globalization as measured along
the investor holdings dimension. Absent the continued existence of
these factors, transnational transactions would be of much greater
44. See

Froot & Dabora, supra note 40, at 2.
45. See id. at 15-17 (asserting that the Siamese twin stock deviations results are best ex
plained by the market for equities being segmented and inefficient but that tax-induced in
vestor heterogeneity is the most likely alternative explanation).
46. See EDWIN J. ELTON & MARTIN J. GRUBER, MODERN PORlFOLIO THEORY AND IN
VESTMENT ANALYSIS 272-74 (5th ed. 1995). Another commentator states that "[t]he evi
dence suggests that world security markets are [at least partially] integrated . . . [and t]o the
extent there is some segmentation the corporation may be able to do something for its stock
holders that they cannot do for themselves, namely, reduce risk through direct foreign invest
ments." JAMES c. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 715 (10th ed. 1995).
Still another commentator reviews one study as having "found some evidence that markets
are integrated" and another as having "also found weak evidence in support of integration."
THOMAS E. CoPELAND & J. FRED WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CoRPORATE POLICY
811 (3d ed. 1988) (citing F.L.A. Grauer et al., Sharing Rules and Equilibrium in an Interna
tional Capital Market Under Uncertainty, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 233 (1976); Solnik, International
Market Model, supra note 38).
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importance than they are. The correlations between indices repre
senting the equity markets of different countries are remarkably
low and generally well below the average correlation coefficient be
tween a pair of United States securities.47 This suggests that a large
amount of risk reduction is possible from international diversifica
tion beyond what can be accomplished by diversification among the
issuers of a single nationality. For example, Solnik showed that the
average variability - including the exchange risk to a U.S. investor
- of return for a set of portfolios, each of which consisted of equal
investments in fifty securities chosen randomly from a list of Euro
pean and U.S. securities, was less than half of the average variabil
ity of a set of portfolios composed on the same basis but from a list
restricted to U.S. issuers.48 Turning the risk/return tradeoff around
the other way, French and Poterba show, for example, that to justify
as rational current patterns of holdings, given their foregone diver
sification opportunities, U.S. investors must believe that U.S. issu
ers have expected returns 2.5% higher than Japanese issuers have
and Japanese investors must believe that U.S. issuers have expected
returns 3.5% lower than Japanese issuers have.49 One set of inves
tors has to be wrong; quite possibly both are. If it is one set, they
are missing out on transnational investments that would both signif
icantly add to portfolio expected return and significantly reduce
portfolio risk; if it is both, they are missing out on transnational
investments that could significantly reduce risk while maintaining
expected return.
These data suggest that if U.S. investors believe that the average
rate of return on U.S. and non-U.S. equities is the same, they
should, in the absence of factors favoring national markets, hold
U.S. and non-U.S. equities in approximately the same proportions
to each other as the proportions of U.S. and non-U.S. equities in
the total market value of all equities available in the world. The
same suggestion would apply to non-U.S. investors.50
47. See ELTON & GRUBER, supra note 46, at 274.
48. See Bruno H. Solnik, Why Not Diversify Internationally Rather Than Domestically?,
FIN. ANALYSTS J., July-Aug. 1974, at 48, 51 fig.11. The gains in risk reduction from interna
tional diversification presumably would have been even greater if Japanese and Latin Ameri
can securities had been included. See id. at 52.
49. See French & Poterba, supra note 12, at 223.
50. Putting aside for a moment differential pricing depending on the tendencies of securi
ties of different countries to contribute to the riskiness of a diversified portfolio (as predicted
by the CAPM and IAPM), one would expect that if investors worldwide share identical ex
pectations, equities would be priced so that they all have the same expected return and inves
tors of any one nation would have no reason to choose domestic over foreign securities.
There is, of course, the possibility that the market is not well described by the assumption
that investors in different countries share the same beliefs concerning the future returns of
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The extent of international diversification by both U.S. investors
and non-U.S. investors falls far short of this crude prediction of
what would prevail without counterfactors favoring national mar
kets. For example, in 1993, the U.S. and non-U.S. markets repre
sented, respectively, 37% and 63% of the total market value of all
publicly traded equities available in the world. However, U.S. in
vestors on average held only

5.7%

of their equity portfolios in non

U.S. issuer stock, the remaining 94.3% being devoted to U.S. issu
ers. The portfolio imbalance was similarly reflected in non-U.S. in
vestor holdings, which consisted of
U.S. issuer stocks.s1

97%

non-U.S. issuer stocks and

3%

These data show that the counterfactors favoring national mar
kets continue to restrain the level of transnational transactions suf
ficiently that the market for corporate equities still falls far short of
being "truly global" in terms of the pattern of holdings dimension.
But they also show the potential for a vast increase in the volume of

such transactions. If, as predicted in the next Section, these
counterfactors weaken significantly, transnational transactions will

in the future constitute a much larger portion of all transactions,
perhaps five or ten times greater than today.

any given security, which, as developed below, may help explain why transnational transac
tions are not more prevalent. To the extent that pricing does depend on systematic risk, the
conclusion in the text still holds, because in such a market any investor that does not fully
diversify will be taking on uncompensated risJ<.
51. All percentages are derived from the following data for calendar year 1993:

U.S. issuer equity

Non-U.S. issuer equity

Total

equity market
capitalization

$5.2 trillion {37%)

$8.9 trillion {63%)

14.1 trillion

holdings by
U.S. investors

$4.9 trillion (94%)

$ .3 trillion {6%)

5.2 trillion

holdings by nonU.S. investors

$ .3 trillion (3%)

$8.6 trillion (97%)

8.9 trillion

Figures in the above table come from the following sources: U.S. SEC. & EXCH. CoMMN.,
1994 ANNUAL REPORT 28 {1994) (reporting that U.S. equity market capitalization in 1993
equalled $5.2 trillion and reporting that worldwide equity market capitalization in 1993 was
$14.1 trillion, allowing a calculation of non-U.S. equity market capitalization as $14.1 trillion
minus $5.2 trillion); Russell B. Scholl, The International Investment Position of the United
States in 1994, SuRv. CuRRENT Bus., June 1995, at 52, 56 (reporting holdings by non-U.S.
investors of U.S. equity securities in 1993 of $340.0 billion); id. at 54 (reporting holdings by
U.S. investors of non-U.S. equity securities in 1993 of $297.7 billion). Thus, based on the
foregoing figures, holdings by U.S. investors of U.S. equity securities in 1993 equalled $5.2
trillion minus $340 billion, or $4.9 trillion; holdings by non-U.S. investors of non-U.S. equity
securities equalled $8.9 trillion minus $297.7 billion, or $8.6 trillion.
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The Future of the Factors Favoring National Markets

1. Information
Until recently, U.S. investors, including sophisticated institu
tional investors, held very few foreign equities in their portfolios.52
Because this would be hard to explain solely as the result of the
other counterfactors favoring national markets, the information ad
vantages that investors of a given nation have concerning the pros
pects of that nation's issuers must have played a substantial role in
explaining why international diversification has historically been so
limited.53 Conventional theories of investment behavior for both
speculators and passive investors would not, however, have pre
dicted this reluctance to invest in foreign securities.

In conventional theory, the speculator in the domestic market
designs his portfolio on the basis of his own beliefs, formed by the
information in his possession, concerning the probability distribu
tions of the future returns of the available securities. The fact that
52. See ELTON & GRUBER, supra note 47, at 262. Although these authors do not mention
them, casual empiricism and the SEC rules both suggest that Canadian securities have been
an exception to the historical tendency of U.S. investors to shun foreign equities. This fact
tends to support the information explanation for home bias, because U.S. investors know
more about Canadian issuers than any others, but Canadian securities are the least desirable
foreign security from the diversification point of view. Canadian share prices are far more
highly correlated with United States share prices than the share prices of any other nation.
See ELTON & GRUBER, supra note 46, at 267 tbl.12.3.
As recently as 1979, only eight percent of the 1600 largest U.S. pension funds, despite
their sophistication, invested any money at all in foreign stocks. See Marcia Berss, Tomorrow
the World, FORBES, July 2, 1984, at 104, 107. In 1983, pension funds invested only $8.7 billion
in foreign securities, see id., a tiny portion of the $981.1 billion then entrusted to them, see
Steven Greenhouse,Just Whose Money ls in an Employee Pension Plan?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
1987, § 4, at 7. By 1991 the top 200 pension funds alone invested $68 billion in foreign mar
kets. See Margaret Price, International Assets See Healthy Increase, CRAIN's PENSIONS &
INV., Jan. 20, 1992, at 17. Also by then, over 400 mutual funds, with assets of about $80
billion, invested almost exclusively in foreign securities. See Remarks of Richard Breeden,
Chairman of the SEC, to the Investment Company Institute General Membership Meeting,
Wash., D.C. (May 21, 1992), available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew file.
53. An extensive literature relating to home bias discussed in prior notes supports this
conclusion. See supra notes 22, 27, 32, 35 and accompanying text. The point is also well
illustrated by an example developed by Lessard. He calculated, assuming the expected re
turn on United States equities is 15%, the minimum expected return of a security from each
of a variety of foreign countries that could still, because of its capacity to reduce portfolio
risk, justify inclusion in the portfolio of a U.S. investor. For a substantial majority, the ex
pected return can be less than 10% and still justify inclusion. These figures were based on
the covariance between each nation's securities and a world index (a statistical measure of
the extent to which the two moved together), all translated to dollars so that exchange risk is
already considered. See Donald Lessard, World, Country, and Industry Relationships in eq
uity Returns: Implications for Risk Reduction Through International Diversification, 32 FIN
ANALYSTS J. 32 (1976); see also ELTON & GRUBER, supra note 46, at 277 tbl.12.10. It is
highly unlikely that, for every one of these major developed nations, the existence, or fear of,
differential taxes and exchange controls and the extra transaction costs of transnational trans
actions together would be sufficient to constitute the equivalent of a burden of more than
five percent in rate-of-return terms.
.
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he is not fully informed about a given security causes him to assign
a variance to his prediction of the future return, and the less he
thinks he knows, the larger the variance. He assumes, however,
that his prediction is unbiased - i.e., on average neither high nor

low. A greater variance does not lead him to keep the security out
of his portfolio.
The passive investor in the domestic market is unconcerned with
his ignorance and buys securities because it is a way to store his

savings tha� historically has produced, on average, a positive rate of
return. He chooses a random selection of available securities as
suming that the market price is the best estimate of the future re
turn of each of the securities selected and that the portfolio's
diversity will give him the maximum possible protection from risk.

The historical, near-total unwillingness of U.S. investors of both
types to buy foreign equities suggests that their sense of greater ig
norance about these issuers compared to domestic issuers has had a
radical effect. The speculator must have felt that he did not know
enough to make sensible evaluations of the probability distributions
of their future returns.54 The passive investor must have felt that he
did not know enough to trust the process by which foreign equities
were priced.55
The recent increase in ownership of foreign equities by U.S. in
vestors suggests that this barrier - the unwillingness by most inves54. Ruth Mack, who has developed a general model of decisionmaking under uncer
tainty, suggests that human beings have an intolerance, which ex post appears irrational, for
actions involving "ambiguity" - i.e., actions the riskiness of which is hard to evaluate. See
RUTH P. MACK, PLANNING ON UNCERTAINTY 55-58 (1971). The process by which investors
evaluate the risks associated with investment in domestic equities is well established. See
supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. In comparison, a general lack of experience in
evaluating the risks associated with foreign equities may lead to ambiguity-caused intoler
ance. Similarly, Heath and Tversky ran an experiment in which they found that subjects,
faced with two gambles to which they assigned identical probability distributions, behaved as
though the less familiar gamble was riskier. See Chip Heath & Amos Tversky, Preference
and Belief: Ambiguity and Competence in Choice Under Uncertainty, 4 J. RISK & UNCER
TAINTY 5 (1991). French & Poterba cite this study and suggest that home bias may be ex
plained in part by investors treating foreign stocks in the same way. See French & Poterba,
supra note 12, at 225 n.4. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice
and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251 {1986).
55. Going back further in history, there is precedent within the borders of the United
States for this same kind of reluctance to invest outside a local market. Lance Davis con
cluded that until about 1914 a national capital market, even in large bank deposits, did not
exist. Prior to that date, he found major differences in the interest rates offered by the major
city banks in different regions of the country. These rate differences exceeded what could be
accounted for in the default risk differences. This suggests that savers in low interest rate
regions felt sufficiently ignorant about the banks in the high interest rate regions so as not to
trust their savings to them and that there did not exist well-informed intermediaries with
sufficient trustworthiness to obtain the amount of capital necessary to arbitrage the differ
ence away. See Lance E. Davis, The Investment Market, 1870-1914: The Evolution of a Na
tional Market, 25 J. EcoN. HIST. 355 (1965).
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tors even to consider their purchase - has been broken. Yet, the
information advantages possessed by such investors with respect to
domestic issuers probably still explains much of why investors are
not nearly as diversified internationally as they would be if the mar
ket were truly global as measured by the pattern of holdings dimen
sion. The asset pricing models, from which this projection of high
diversification arises, create an image of a market entirely popu
lated by passive investors who select random portfolios. The specu
lators - the participants responsible for the process by which
prices are set and adjusted as new information reaches the market
- are not considered. Yet speculators appear to hold a substantial
portion of all outstanding equities. For example, institutional inves
tors, most of which engage in at least some management of their
portfolios, hold almost fifty percent of such securities.56 A large
portion of individual investors, the holders of the remaining fifty
percent, do not have well-diversified portfolios,57 suggesting that at
least some are "playing the market," whether it makes sense for
them to do so or not. Speculators, as noted earlier, are likely to do
better concentrating their buying and selling in equities of issuers
about which they start with a natural information advantage. In
large measure, this is still domestic issuers.
In the future, however, technological change is likely to narrow
substantially the differences in the respective costs of timely acqui
sition of information from foreign and domestic sources by tele
phone calls, links to computerized databases, electronic document
transmission, and travel to engage in face-to-face meetings and on
site inspections. This is true both of information directly relevant to
predicting the prospects of issuers and information about the moti
vations and reputation of the sources of the directly relevant infor
mation. These same technological changes, through their effect on
mass media, marketing, education, scholarly research, and direct
personal interaction, are working toward creating a more uniform
social and economic culture among the developed nations of the
world. This greater uniformity will assist the investor in evaluating
the information he receives. Moreover, the rules by which investors
and their advisers evaluate information have a "learning by doing"

56. See Financial Assets and Equity Holdings, BRANCANTO REP., Jan. 1995, at 42 tbl.11.
57. See MARSHALL E. BLUME & IRWIN FRIEND, THE CHANGING ROLE OF nm INDIVID·
UAL INVESTOR 46-50, 117-20 (1978); Marshall E. Blume & Irwin Friend, The Asset Structure
of Individual Portfolios and Some Implications for Utility Functions, 30 J, FIN. 585 (1975).
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aspect and improve with experience,58 so that even the decline in
information costs to date has not yet had its full impact.
In addition, the technological changes that have already signifi
cantly narrowed information cost differences have been accompa
nied by the emergence of truly international securities houses
backed by large amounts of capital.59 This development permits a
very efficient transfer of information across national lines. Because
the sender and the receiver of information are members of the
same organization, the receiver has an unusually high degree of
trust in, and experience with, the sender. They can employ well
recognized symbols that incorporate a great deal of information.
Again, the learning-by-doing aspect of this form of communication
means that the full impact of this development has probably not yet
been felt.
2. Exchange Rates

The recent increase in the importance of transnational transac
tions has occurred despite the likely inhibiting concurrent increase
in the instability of exchange rates over the past twenty years, par
ticularly the sharp increase followed by the sharp decrease in the
value of the dollar against other major currencies in the 1980s.60 In
recent years, however, fluctuations among the major currencies
seem to have decreased,61 perhaps due to increased efforts by the
world's monetary authorities to coordinate their actions so as to re
duce instability.62 If these efforts are perceived as succeeding and
investors feel less inhibited by exchange rate concerns, transna
tional transactions will be encouraged. The inhibiting effects of ex
change rate concerns will be further softened if there is a continued
58. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanyi)lg text.
59. For example, in mid-1995 Merrill Lynch acquired London's largest stockbroker,
Smith New Court, for $842 million in cash. The merger created the largest securities firm in
the world. See Helen Dunne, Merrill in £530m Cash Offer for Smith Deal With US Broker
Creates World's Largest Securities Organisation, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), July 22, 1995,
City, at 1; Peter Truell, Merrill Lynch Buying Big British Securities Firm, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
1995, at 33; Deal Would Form Biggest Brokerage, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 1995, at D2.
60. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, at 400, tbl.B-106 (1996).
61. Recently there has been a renewed interest and emphasis by the G7 countries in
reducing currency fluctuations. See Forex, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1996 (1996 Guide to Switzer
land Supp.), available in LEXIS, News Library, Mags Ftle; G7 Optimistic on World Economy
Despite Slowdown, REUTERS FIN. SERVICE, June 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Non-US Ftle; Santer Calls for Move to Stabilise Dollar, AGENCE FRANCE PRESsE, June 15,
1995, Financial Pages, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
62. See C. Randall Henning, Europe's Monetary Union and the United States, FOREIGN
POLY., Spring 1996, at 83; Leonard Silk, World System Seeks Stability, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
1987, at D2; cf. Leonard Silk, ls 'Conventional Wisdom' Wise?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1989, at
D2 (noting that floating exchange rates have not provided predicted stability).
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increase in foreign trade.63 As we have seen, the effects of ex
change rate fluctuations on the cost of consuming imported goods
and on the returns on foreign investment tend to compensate for
each other.

3. Government Impediments
The period between World War II and the early 1970s witnessed
a variety of currency control and tax measures that tended to rein
force segmentation of markets along national lines.64 These meas
ures have been largely dismantled in the last 15 years.65 While a
return of such measures is conceivable, it is unlikely. The interna
tional finance genie is too much "out of the bottle." National econ
omies have become structured on the expectation of a continued
flow of international finance. Nations compete with one another to
provide environments congenial to the financial services industry,
which regards such taxes and regulations as an anathema.66 The
further back in history tax and currency control measures become
with the passage of time, the less will be the fear of their reimposi
tion and the inhibiting effect of that fear on transnational
investment.

4.

Transaction Costs

The same technological changes that narrow the cost differential
of obtaining information from foreign and from domestic sources
63. Total U.S. exports and imports of goods in 1965 equalled 9.4% of Gross National
Product (GNP), while the comparable total in 1994 equalled 22.2% of GNP. See ECONOMIC
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 60, at 280-81 tbl.B-1.
64. At the end of World War II, the U.S. dollar was the only major currency that was
freely convertible. It was not until 1958 that the major European currencies achieved full
convertibility. See Richard Myrus, From Bretton Woods to Brussels: A Legal Analysis of the

Exchange-Rate Arrangements ofthe International Monetary Fund and the European Commu
nity, 62 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2095, 2098 n.24 (1994).
65. See, e.g., Mark A. Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 471, 489

(1993) (arguing that the elimination of currency exchange controls has been a dominant force
behind the creation of a global securities market).
66. The Interest Equalization Tax imposed by the United States between 1963 and 1974,
see supra note 33, is an example of the kind of damage that such taxes and regulations can do
to a nation's financial services industry. The tax is generally believed to be a major cause of
the development abroad of the Eurobond market and of the rebirth, at the expense of New
York City, of London as an international financial center. See Hugh Stephenson, Shadow
Over Banks in London: American Phaseout of Curbs May Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1973,
§ 3, at 6. In contrast, deregulation of restrictions on foreign ownership of securities firms
participating in the Tokyo and London stock markets contributed to the large growth of
these markets in the years immediately following deregulation. See Martin French & Peter
Lee, World Equity Flows into London, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1987, at 54; Big Bang Brief, ECON
OMIST, Aug. 2, 1986, at 60; Japanese Give Foreign Brokers More Than They Bargained For,
EcoNOMIST, May 17, 1986, at 85.
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will greatly reduce differences in real costs between executing a
purchase or sale on a foreign exchange versus on a domestic ex
change, as it becomes practical for the major exchanges around the
world to compete for listings and orders. In the event that comput
erized electronic trading of securities worldwide replaces trading on
organized stock exchanges, differences in the cost of executing
transactions in the shares of domestic and foreign issuers would to
tally disappear.67
F.

Conclusion

The foregoing survey suggests that, at least if we put aside any
possible segmenting effects of national securities laws, there are
strong underlying forces at work that, over the next decade or two,
will greatly increase the percentage of foreign ownership of most
sizable corporations around the world and create a severalfold in
crease in the relative importance of transnational securities transac
tions. The prospect of this fundamental change underlies all of the
discussion that follows.
67. Whether this current exchange-based structure of secondary trading will continue
into the foreseeable future or there will be a move to electronic trading is a matter of debate.
Exchange trading and computer trading are each institutions that centralize order flow.
Computer trading has a number of advantages: easy investor access from anywhere through
computers with real-time displays of bids, offers, and volume; low cost of operation; and ease
of transaction reconstruction leading to more reliable clearance and settlement and more
effective enforcement of regulations. A number of observers predict that computer trading
will probably, or at least possibly, replace exchange trading. See JosEPH A. GRUNDFEST,
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF TIIE WORLD'S SECURITIES MARKETS: ECONOMIC CAUSES AND
REGULATORY CONSEQUENCES - OR - BEWARE nm UBER-REGULATOR 19-20 (John M.
Olin Program in Law & Econ., Stanford Law Sch., Working Paper No. 68, Aug. 1990);
MORRIS MENDELSON & JUNIUS W. PEAKE, ELECTRONIC EXECUTION SYSTEMS: MYTH VS.
REALITY (U. Penn. Law and Economics Discussion Paper, Apr. 1990); Therese H. Maynard,
What Is an "Exchange?" - Proprietary Electronic Securities Trading Systems and the Statu
tory Definition of an Exchange, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 833, 862 (1992).

The key question is whether a computer trading system can provide liquidity comparable
to that provided by a system based on specialists operating on an exchange floor. See Wil
liam C. Freund, Electronic Trading and Linkages in International Equity Markets, FIN. ANA
LYSTS J., May-June 1989, at 10, 12; Lewis D. Solomon & Louise Corso, The Impact of
Technology on the Trading of Securities: The Emerging Global Market and the Implications
for Regulation, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 299, 318-19 (1991). There are real questions as to

whether specialists in fact provide such liquidity, however, as their obligation to do so is
vague and the capital at their disposal is small compared to the largest traders. See Jonathan
Macey & Hideki Kanda, TM Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of Close Substitutes
for the New York and Tokyo Exchanges, 75 CoRNELL L. REV. 1007, 1026-34 (1990). Macey
and Kanda point out that the Tokyo Stock Exchange essentially works without specialists
who attempt to provide liquidity as the saitori firms, the ones that most resemble specialists,
act as pure conduits that match buy orders and sell orders and are not allowed to trade on
their own account in the stocks assigned to them. See id. at 1043-44. Macey and Kanda
speculate that the functions that the saitori firms do provide could be done largely by com
puter. See id. at 1046.
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The large increase in transnational transactions, with their po
tential for triggering imposition of the disclosure regimes of multi
ple countries on a single issuer, will make the question of the
apportionment of regulatory authority more critical. Increased
globalization will also be seen as the key factor undermining the
long-run viability both of the existing traditional U.S. approach to
the reach of its disclosure scheme, with its emphasis on "investor
protection," and of the recent SEC proposal to shift that emphasis
to "market protection." These problems are likely to force a funda
mental reassessment of the proper function of mandatory
disclosure.
II.

THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF GREATER DISCLOSURE

The central purpose of this article is to determine which country
or countries associated with a transnational share transaction
should have the authority to require the issuer to reveal more about
itself than it would voluntarily. In order to make this determina
tion, we need to consider why anyone would care about the issuer's
disclosure practices: What as a general matter are the benefits and
costs of the issuer revealing more about itself? We then need to
know how are these benefits and costs of issuer disclosure distrib
uted among the multiple countries associated with the transaction.
These are critical questions, because we cannot determine which
country or countries can best weigh these costs and benefits without
knowing the stakes of those doing the weighing.
This Part starts the analysis by looking at a single closed econ
omy and considering the overall benefits and costs of greater issuer
disclosure. This single closed economy can be thought of as the
national economy of the past, when corporations invested primarily
in their home country and there were relatively few transnational
securities transactions - the kind of economy with which national
regulations were originally designed to deal. It can alternatively be
thought of as the likely global economy of the long-term future
when there will be a single highly integrated market for securities,
in which issuers responsible for a large portion of the world's pro
duction will have their operations dispersed around the world,
showing no national pattern of concentration, and decisions con
cerning mandatory disclosure will be made by a single global
authority.

We will assume throughout this article that all issuers are subject
to a basic antifraud rule that prohibits the making of materially
false statements and of omissions that make the statements made
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misleading. There is a great deal of information, however, that issu
ers subject only to an antifraud rule would choose not to make pub
lic. That, of course, is why systems of mandatory disclosure
regulation developed in the first place.

A. Benefi ts of Greater Disclosure
Three kinds of rationales can be put forward for forcing issuers
to disclose any given kind of information, suggesting three possible
benefits from greater disclosure: (1) the market will be a fairer
place in which to invest; (2) the market will be a less risky place to
invest; and (3) resources will be allocated more ef:ficiently.68
The following discussion uses the learning of modem :financial
economics to analyze each of these possible benefits. It finds the
first - greater fairness - the least compelling and the third efficient allocation - the most.69 The approach looks at a hypo
thetical issuer X and a hypothetical piece of information that is rel
evant to predicting the future cash flows produced by X's shares. It
is information that the public does not know and that management
either does know or could more easily ascertain than could outsid
ers. The question is how, if at all, public disclosure of the informa
tion can improve anyone's position.

1. Fairness
A securities market is fair if the "actual value"70 of the shares
that investors buy is on average at least as great as the price they
68. An auxiliary rationale would be to assist a ban on insider trading. When more is
disclosed, there is less material nonpublic infonnation on which insiders can trade. I have
argued elsewhere that the reach of insider trading regulation should also be based on issuer
nationality. See Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regu
late What?, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Autumn 1992, at 263.
69. The efficiency-enhancing features of mandatory securities disclosure have been em
phasized elsewhere. See Merritt B. Fox, ShelfRegistration, Integrated Disclosure, and Under
writer Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 10 VA. L. REv. 1005, 1015-25 (1984); Marcel
Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977
(1992). For other perspectives on the efficiency-enhancing features of securities disclosure,
see Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REv.
763 (1995) (arguing that while regulators chase the goal of price accuracy enhancement, the
laws enacted under this banner actually work to reduce the flow of infonnation relevant to
accurate pricing of securities); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to
Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. RE.v. 1047 (1995) (arguing that the goal of disclosure should
be focused on, and limited to, helping investors uncover breaches of contractual or fiduciary
obligations); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of
Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 613 (1988) (disputing the premise
that a market with accurate share prices is able to monitor or structure efficiently the alloca
tion of scarce resources in the economy).
70. The "actual value" of a share is the future stream of income - composed of divi
dends and other distributions - accruing to its holders, discounted to present value. For an
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pay. More, rather than less, public knowledge about X is not a nec
essary condition for a market to display this kind of pricing. Fair
ness is thus not a compelling rationale for mandatory disclosure.n
To see why this startling conclusion is correct requires a consid
eration of the process by which securities are priced. Securities are
priced by the actions of speculators.72 Each speculator, in making
her assessment of the probability distribution of future returns from
holding a share of an issuer such as X, will include the fact that the
issuer has not addressed certain matters. There is no reason to be
lieve that the inferences that the speculator draws from the issuers'
absences of comment will bias her assessments of their future re
turns - that is, result in her consistently over- or underestimating
these returns.73 As a consequence, there is no reason to expect that
elaboration of this concept of actual value and its relationship to market price, see Fox, supra
note 69, at 1010-14.
71. I refer here to the fairness of an issuer practice of providing less, rather than more,
information. Although nothing in the law is more debated than concepts of fairness and their
applicability to particular situations, the concept and application put forward here is highly
defensible. It is true that any particular individual who enters into any particular transaction
may end up in a worse position than if there had been greater disclosure. This would hold in
the case of a purchase if (i) the price was higher than what turned out to be the shares
actual's value and (ii) the price would have been lower with more disclosure. It is of course
possible to argue that in this case the practice of less disclosure has led to an "unfair" result.
This kind of ex post evaluation of fairness, however, seems an inappropriate way of assessing
the interaction of issuers and investors in a financial market. Assume that the market dis
plays the kind of pricing termed fair in the text. At the level of the overall economy, a
practice of less disclosure will not work any overall transfer of wealth to sellers (including
issuers) from buyers. At the individual level, it is true that the investor, when she decides to
buy, is engaging in a larger gamble if there is less disclosure. But the odds are fair, and she
knows before she acts that she is taking the gamble. The question, considered below, re
mains as to whether decreasing this risk by increasing disclosure is desirable, but that issue is
distinct from fairness. It should also be noted that an individual purchaser is likely to engage
in many different share purchases in her lifetime, and the purchases that turn out to have
been overpriced are likely to be canceled out by underpriced purchases. For further elabora
tion of this concept of fairness, see Fox, supra note 68, at 272-74; Fox, supra note 69.
72. The term speculator is defined in Part I to mean any investor who chooses her portfo
lio on the basis of her beliefs concerning the future returns of available securities rather than
randomly or on the basis of the security's historical Beta. These beliefs are based on the
information possessed by the investor. See supra note 23.
73. This is because the speculator makes an inference from the fact that the issuer, when
not required to say something one way or the other about a certain matter, chooses not to
disclose. Making an inference of this sort is the same kind of behavior that investors are
assumed to exhibit in signaling theory. See, e.g., Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in
Financial Markets: Implications of Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in lssuES
IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177 (Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979). The claim here concerning
the consequences of investors making such inferences is much more modest, however. Un
like in signaling theory, there is no suggestion here that as a result of the competitive interac
tion among issuers in the financial market and the motivations of management, a pattern of
disclosure will develop whereby, between affirmative statements by some issuers and investor
inferences from the silence of others, the exact state of affairs at each firm can be ascertained.
To see how the more modest proposition made here works, consider the following exam
ple. Suppose that country A's mandatory disclosure scheme requires an issuer to describe
whether its business is distributed relatively evenly over many customers or is concentrated
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the market prices of such issuers' shares will be biased - that is, on
average different from their actual values - just because the issuers
are not required to address matters that a mandatory regime might
require them to address.74 The finding of unbiased pricing in the
with one or a few customers. Country B's scheme does not require such disclosure. Assume
that it is generally considered better in issuer X's industry to have a broad customer base.
Country A's scheme does not apply to issuer X, and X chooses not to say anything about its
customer distribution. The speculator is likely to view X's future earnings less favorably than
if X had made an affirmative statement that it had a broad customer base. She will not,
however, necessarily view X's future earnings as unfavorably as she would have if X had
affirmatively stated that its business was concentrated with just one or a few customers. This
is because there may be a variety of reasons, besides in fact having a concentrated customer
base, why X might choose not to address the matter if it were not forced to, such as the
usefulness of this information to competitors and customers. See infra section II.B.2. The
speculator takes all the information available to her, including, if she is well informed, what
she knows about the character of management in terms of volunteering bad news, the past
experience with issuers generally as to what silence has turned out to mean, the existence of
circumstances that would make the disclosure of good news costly for the firm, and any
information available from other sources concerning X's customer base. She then makes her
best guess, on the basis of all the information that is available to her, as to the probability of
one state of affairs versus the other and makes her assessment of X's future earnings
accordingly.
In a situation such as this example, where an issuer has not commented on a matter, the
speculator on average guesses correctly. The idea behind this proposition is that each specu
lator's expectations concerning a share's future returns are based on the particular informa
tion within her possession. There is nothing structural in the process that determines the
information received by the speculator that would lead her to underestimate or overestimate
the value of a share's future returns, and so there is no reason to believe ex ante that the flow
of information that goes to each speculator is going to bias that individual's expectations
concerning future returns. The actual bits received may lead to an underestimate or overesti
mate of value in any particular assessment but, just like in sampling, the direction in which
the estimate errs is purely a matter of chance. For an elaboration of this view of how inves
tors form their subjective probability distributions concerning the future returns of securities,
see Fox, supra note 25, at 76.
74. This statement relies on the premise that a lack of bias in speculators' assessments of
future returns translates into a lack of bias in prices. This premise is true under a variety of
theories of price formation in markets where investors have heterogeneous views concerning
the probability distribution of the future value of the available securities. See, e.g., Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1165 (1981) (theorizing that any investor possess
ing new information will trade to his profit on it until the price moves to the point when there
are no more profits to be made because the information is fully reflected in price); Sanford
Grossman, Further Results on the Informational Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets, 18
J. EcoN. THEORY 81 (1978) (theorizing that final equilibrium market prices reflect the most
accurate possible prediction of future value given all information possessed by any one or
more investors as a result of each investor "reading" the information possessed by the others
through observation of the movement of market prices toward equilibrium); Sanford Gross
man, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where Trades Have Diverse Informa
tion, 31 J. FIN. 573 (1976); John Lintner, The Aggregation ofInvestor's Diverse Judgments and
Preferences in Purely Competitive Securities Markets, 4 J. FIN. & QuANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
347 (1969) (theorizing that prices reflect a weighted average of the views of all investors);
Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. PoL. EcoN. 110, 112
n.10 (1965); Robert E. Verrecchia, Consensus Beliefs, Information Acquisition, and Market
Information Efficiency, 70 AM. EcoN. REv. 874 (1980) (theorizing that prices average the
views of investors in such a way that they are more nearly accurate than the forecasts of any
individual investor); Robert E. Verrecchia, On the Theory of Market Information Efficiency,
1 J. Acer. & EcoN. 77 (1979). These theories vary in terms of the relative roles of different
investors in determining price. Whatever theory one embraces, however, if the view of each
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empirical literature testing the efficient market hypothesis,1s
although it concerns the ability of the market to process a different
kind of information and tests immediate price reaction against
longer-term prices rather than against actual value, is consistent
with the proposition that the market reaction to the absences of
comment by issuers that is discussed here would also be unbiased.76
individual investor is unbiased in the sense that the term is used here, then the price will be
similarly unbiased.

75. See supra note 24.
76. There is a large body of financial economics literature evaluating the market reaction
to the affirmative public announcement of various kinds of events affecting particular issuers.
For a classic review, see KENNETH GARBADE, SECURITIES MARKETS 249-59 (1982). An event
study involves a large number of issuers, each of which has experienced the announcement of
a particular kind of event - for example, a stock split. The typical study shows that the
shares of the affected firms, as a group, experience statistically significant abnormal returns at
the time of the announcement and, starting almost immediately thereafter, normal returns
for the duration of the study, which is sometimes as long as several years. Thus, while some
issuers' share prices go up in the periods following the announcement - compared to the
market as a whole - and others go down, the average change is near zero. Assuming that
longer-term prices are themselves an unbiased measure of actual value, the results of the
studies are thus consistent with the concept that the market's evaluation of the significance of
the event for the actual value of each issuer's shares, while sometimes too high and some
times too low, was unbiased.
Some financial economists, known as noise theorists, have attacked the EMH. They sug
gest that naive speculative traders, activated by fads, fashions, or irrational psychological
predispositions toward things like chasing trends, add cumulative noise to share prices so that
for significant periods of time share prices end up deviating from their fundamental value the efficient market price that would prevail if the market consisted entirely of rational inves
tors who possessed all available information. See, e.g., Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529
(1986). This can happen, in their view, even if there are also smart speculators who trade
with knowledge of a stock's fundamental value. The smart speculators are limited in their
ability to arbitrage away the difference. Unless they have an infinite time horizon, the uncer
tainty created by the possibility of continued noise trading makes taking such a position in
herently risky, even if they knew for certain a stock's actual value. They know at the time
they are contemplating a purchase, for example, that because of noise, price may still deviate
from actual value at the time they plan to sell. See J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader
Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. PoL. EcoN. 703 (1990). Furthermore, smart speculators in
fact do not know a stock's actual value with certainty; they only have a more accurate guess,
and this adds to the risk of arbitrage. See Fox, supra note 25, at 36-43, 55-59; Andrei Shleifer
& Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, J. EcoN. PERSP., Spring
1990, at 19. An excellent survey in the legal literature of the work of the noise theorists,
together with an analysis of its legal implications, is found in Donald C. Langevoort, Theo
ries, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV.

851 (1992).

There is considerable empirical work supporting the noise theorists' position. Robert
Schiller, in a pioneering study, looked at stock prices and dividends over the last 100 years
and found that stock price volatility "appear[s] to be far too high • . . to be attributed to new
information about future real dividends if uncertainty about future dividends is measured by
the sample standard deviations of real dividends around their long-run exponential growth
path." Robert J. Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to Be Justified by Subsequent
Changes in Dividends?, 71 AM. EcoN. REv. 421, 433-34 (1981). Consistent with the idea that
the market overreacts to news, a number of studies suggest that share prices tend to revert
toward the mean - i.e., price upswings tend to be followed by downswings and vice versa.
See, e.g., Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: A Mean-Reverting Walk
Down Wall Street, J. EcoN. PERSP., Winter 1989, at 189; James M. Poterba & Lawrence H.
Summers, Mean Reversion in Stock Prices: Evidence and Implications, 22 J. FIN. EcoN. 27, 53

(1988).
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Empirical work showing that purchasers of new issues occurring af
ter imposition of mandatory disclosure requirements under the Se
curities Act of 1933 did no better in their investments than
purchasers of new issues in the time before mandatory disclosure is
also consistent with the proposition that less information does not
bias prices against the interests of purchasers.77 Other empirical
Noise theory is controversial within the financial economics community. See, e.g., Eugene
F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991); Terry A. Marsh & Robert C.
Merton, Dividend Variability and Variance Bounds Tests for the Rationality of Stock Market
Prices, 76 AM. EcoN. REv. 483 (1986) (critiquing Shiller's dividend study). Even if noise
theory were to become fully accepted, however, it does not undermine the argument in the
text that prices in the market will be fair - i.e., the actual values of the shares that investors
buy are on average at least as great as the price they pay - whether there is much disclosure
or only a little. The fads, fashions, and irrational psychological tendencies that drive the
na"ive speculators are as likely to be negative as positive. Uninformed investors who choose a
diversified portfolio on a random basis - the practice that EMH theorists recommend to
them - thus will gain as often as they lose as a result of the deviations from fundamental
value, which in tum is distributed randomly around actual value.
Noise theory does predict a worse outcome than does the EMH for uninformed or irra
tional investors who choose to speculate - the naive speculators. They will have a tendency
to buy when prices are too high and sell when prices are too low, in the process providing
profits for the smart speculators. It is highly questionable whether the concept of fairness
should be expanded to condemn this wealth transfer, however, given the availability to unin
formed investors of a strategy - a randomly chosen diversified portfolio - that permits
participation in the benefits of equity investing without risking such losses. It would seem
inconsistent for society to permit people to bet at horse races and in state-run lotteries, de
spite the fact that the odds are against them, but to condemn as unfair the result of unin
formed or irrational speculation in the equity markets. See Shleifer & Summers, supra, at 3031.
Even if we were to expand the concept of fairness to condemn the wealth transfer from
naive speculators to smart ones, however, it is difficult to predict whether, in a noise-theory
world, more disclosure would decrease or increase the size of the transfer. On the one hand,
by reducing the uncertainty associated with the smart speculators' assessments of actual
value, more disclosure reduces the risk of engaging in the arbitrage activity that moves
money from naive speculators to smart ones. On the other hand, the higher level of such
activity will narrow the spread between price and actual value and hence the amount of
damage that a naive speculator suffers each time he buys when the price is too high or sells
when it is too low. Thus, even if we wished to reduce the size of the transfer, it is unclear
whether more disclosure would mitigate or exacerbate the problem. Public education against
engaging in naive speculation might, for example, be more effective, as might stricter rules
regulating the advice given by brokers.
77. Stigler, taking two groups of new share issues, one from the period 1923-28 (prior to
the passage of the Securities Act of 1933) and the other from the period 1949-55 (after the
Act's passage), compared their respective five-year post-issue growth in prices as a ratio of
the growth in prices in the market as a whole. The post-Act group did not do better than the
pre-Act group, see George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus.
117, 122-24 (1964) [hereinafter Stigler, Public Regulation], suggesting that mandatory disclo
sure did not eliminate any unfairness that was present in the initial selling price of pre-Act
new issues.
Stigler's study has been criticized for computational errors that understate the perform
ance of the post-Act group. See Irwin Friend & Edward S. Herman, The S.E.C. Through a
Glass Darkly, 37 J. Bus. 382 (1964). After recalculating, however, Stigler still found that the
after-issue price growth for a majority of the five years - including, most importantly, the
fifth year - was still either not as good as the pre-Act group or not sufficiently better than
the pre-Act group to be considered statistically significant. See George J. Stigler, Comment,
37 J. Bus. 414, 418-19 (1964) [hereinafter Stigler, Comment].
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work concerning the pricing of new issues is also consistent with the
proposition.1s
Stigler's study also has been criticized on methodological grounds because of a failure to
account for dividends and for differences among stocks in systematic risk, but research
reveals no adequately conducted study that does take account of such factors and comes up
with a different result from Stigler's, at least with respect to seasoned issuers. Jarrell con
ducted a study making the same comparison as Stigler but without Stigler's methodological
shortcomings and came to the same conclusion as Stigler. See Gregg A. Jarrell, The Eco
nomic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security Issues, 24 J.L. & EcoN.
613 (1981). Jarrell's study, however, has itself been criticized. See Joel Seligman, The Histori
cal Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 11 n.37 (1983); Rod
ney T. Smith, Comments on Jarrell, 24 J.L. & EcoN. 677 (1981). Simon, in another study
using the techniques of modem financial economics to consider the Stigler comparison, also
agrees with Stigler's conclusions with respect to seasoned issuers and initial public issues of
shares to be traded on the New York Stock Exchange, but finds that the pre-Act issues of
shares to be traded on regional exchanges were significantly overpriced and the post-1933
issues were not, suggesting a category of issues in which the mandated information did elimi
nate a price bias that had been leading to unfairness. See Carol J. Simon, The Effect ofthe
1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and the Performance of New Issues, 19 AM.
ECON. REV. 295, 304-08, 313 (1989).
78. There is a prominent related literature that also concerns the performance of new
share issues. This literature investigates whether the shares in these offerings are inefficiently
priced at one point or another during the first several years after the initial offering. This
literature does not include consideration of the effects of the level of mandated disclosure,
and thus does not have clear, direct implications for the proposition in the text that fairness is
unrelated to the amount of disclosure. It touches on issues sufficiently close to this question,
however, to deserve comment.
A large number of studies show that initial public offerings (IPOs) are offered at a "dis
count" in the sense that there is, on average, a significant jump from the offering price to the
price at which they trade in the initial days or weeks after the offering. See James R. Booth &
Lena Chua, Ownership Dispersion, Costly Information, and !PO Underpricing, 41 J. FIN.
ECON. 291, 306-08 (1996) (surveying empirical studies establishing the discount and testing
possible explanations); Roger G. Ibbotson & Jay R. Ritter, Initial Public Offerings, in
NORTH-HOLLAND HANDBOOKS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE:
FINANCE (R.A. Jarrow, V. Maksimovic & W.T. Ziemba eds., 1992) (showing underpricing in
other countries); Roger G. Ibbotson et al., Initial Public Offerings, 1 J, APPLIED CoRP. FIN.
37 (1988) (surveying empirical studies establishing the discount and testing possible explana
tions). A number of explanations have been put forward, but the most recognition has been
given to ones involving information asymmetry. See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit
Avoidance Theory ofWhy Initial Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 6672 (1993); Booth & Chua, supra, at 292-93; Ibbotson et al., supra, at 42-43. Particular atten
tion has been paid in the literature to a model developed by Kevin Rock in which there are
three kinds of actors - issuers (and their underwriters), uninformed investors, and informed
investors - with the informed investors better able to determine the actual value of newly
offered shares than the other two. New shares are allocated in a process in which orders are
placed by investors for a given number of shares at the offering price. If the offering is
oversubscribed, each investor gets a pro rata portion of the offering based on the size of his
order. The uninformed investors suffer from adverse selection because they cannot separate
the good deals from the bad ones and thus order equal amounts of each. They get a larger
portion of the offerings for the bad deals because the informed investors do not place orders
for them. In order to attract capital from the uninformed investors, IPOs need to be under
priced so that despite the adverse selection, these investors will earn a market rate of return
on average. See Kevin Rock, Why New Issues Are Underpriced, 15 J. FIN. EcoN. 187 (1986).
This model, and variants of it working on similar themes, have received considerable empiri
cal support. See Booth & Chua, supra, at 306-07; Jay R. Ritter, The "Hot Issue" Market of
1980, 51 J. Bus. 215 (1984).
There is one study, by Tinic, that compares the size of the offering-price discount relative
to initial trading prices for a sample of IPOs in the period 1923-30, prior to the passage of the
Securities Act of 1933 and its new issue disclosure provisions, with a sample of IPOs in the
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period 1966-71, after the Act's passage. See Seba M. Tmic, Anatomy of Initial Public Offer
ings ofCommon Stock, 43 J. FIN. 789 (1988). Contrary to what would have been predicted by
the information asymmetry theory, Ttnic found that the discount was larger with the 1966-71
sample than the 1923-30 sample. See id. at 804-05 & tbl.3. His explanation is that the Act
created the potential for the issuer and the investment banker to incur considerable litigation
costs and that the larger discount reduces both the probability of litigation and, if it occurs, its
cost. The discount therefore constitutes a form of litigation insurance. See id. at 797-803.
According to this explanation, the additional disclosure required by the Act either does not
have the effect predicted by the information asymmetry theory or its effect is swamped by the
litigation insurance factor. There are obviously severe problems in attributing the increase in
the discount to this one change between the two sample periods when so many other factors
have changed as well. Most of the other tests that Ttnic runs concerning the size of the
discount produce results that are consistent with both his theory and the information asym
metry theory. There are also errors in Tmic's description of the potential litigation costs
created by the Act that diminish the force of this as an explanation of the discount. See
Alexander, supra, at 26 n.28.
The fact that, on average, IPO offering prices are discounted relative to the prices at
which the shares initially trade does not necessarily mean that they are discounted relative to
their actual value. The studies are more mixed on this latter question. Ibbotson, in perhaps
the most frequently cited study establishing the existence of the discount relative to the initial
trading price, looked as well at trading prices thereafter for various periods up to five years
and found returns on a risk-adjusted basis were normal, thereby suggesting that the initial
trading price was efficient and that the offering price was discounted relative to actual value.
See Roger G. Ibbotson, Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues, 2 J. FIN. EcoN. 235,
at 250-58, 265; see also Ttnic, supra, at 815. Loughran and Ritter recently came to a different
conclusion. In a study that matched a large number of firms doing IPOs with comparable
firms that were already publicly traded and had made no offering in several years, they found
that it would, on average, require approximately a 44% larger investment in the IPO at its
initial trading price to end up with the same wealth five years later as with an investment in
the nonoffering matching firm. See Ttm Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, 50
J. FIN. 23, 32 (1995). This inferior return swamped the initial discount of the offering price
relative to the initial trading price, so that one would still have to make a 30% larger invest
ment in the IPO at the offering price to end up with as much wealth in five years. See id. at
32 n.7. The Loughran and Ritter study thus suggests that relative to actual value, IPOs are
not offered at a discount but at a large premium. See also Stigler, Comment, supra note 77, at
421 tbl.Al (comparing, for new issues offered in the periods 1923-1927, before the Securities
Act, and 1949-1955, after the Act, the average ratio of the price of the new issue shares five
years after offering to market prices generally, finding the ratio for the second period is not
better than the first on a statistically significant basis - which result he uses to argue that the
Act led to no improvements - but also finding, without comment or a test for statistical
significance, that in both periods the new issues, five years out, had underperformed the
market as a whole); Hans R. Stoll & Anthony J. Curley, Small Business and the New Issues
Market for Equities, 5 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 309 (1970) (studying issuers regis
tering very small offerings under the SEC's Regulation A - at the time $300,000 or less and finding that the offering prices are on average discounted relative to initial trading prices
but that over the longer run investments in these shares at the offering price underperform,
even without risk adjustment, a portfolio of larger stocks). Loughran and Ritter also find
that SEOs - new equity offerings of "seasoned" issuers where the issuer already has publicly
traded shares outstanding at the time of the offering - are similarly bad buys compared to
IPOs purchased at initial trading prices. See Loughran & Ritter, supra, at 32.
The fact that, on average, IPO offering prices are discounted relative to the prii:es at
which they initially trade is no cause to worry on fairness grounds about the level of disclo
sure required for new offerings because that fact, without more, suggests that the initial pur
chasers are getting an unusually good deal. The empirical work supporting the information
asymmetry explanation of the discount shows that issuers about which more is known can
offer their shares at a lower discount. See, e.g., Ritter, supra, at 215-16, 237. This would
suggest, as discussed in Part III, that, cost aside at least, issuers have an interest in being
under a regime that assures a high level of disclosure. But that is an entirely different basis
for concern about the level of disclosure than investor fairness.
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2. Risk
Just because the amount of information available in the public
domain about X is unrelated to the fairness of its share price does
not mean that it is unrelated to the accuracy of its share price. A
share price can be unbiased - no more likely to be above than
below the share's actual value - but still have a low expected accu
racy in the sense that there is a significant likelihood that it will
deviate a substantial amount one way or the other from actual
value.79
Less information about X will lead to greater uncertainty among
speculators about X's future. As a consequence, X's shares will
have lower expected price accuracy.so Put another way, X's shares
Tue possibility, raised by the Loughran and Ritter study, that both IPOs and SEOs are
offered at prices in excess of actual value does raise fairness concerns, because it suggests the
existence of a market inefficiency that is systematically working to the advantage of issuers
and to the disadvantage of investors. Without a better understanding of why such an ineffi
ciency has arisen, if in fact it has, and why the market has not realized it and corrected for it,
we cannot decide whether the level of disclosure affects the extent of the problem and, if so,
in which direction. Interestingly, Shayne and Soderquist, who recently wrote an article moti
vated by the Loughran and Ritter study, do not list increased disclosure among their variety
of securities law reforms to counteract the reported overpricing. See Jonathan A. Shayne &
Larry D. Soderquist, Inefficiency in the Market for Initial Public Offerings, 48 VAND. L. RBV.
965, 977-86 (1995). It must also be kept in mind that these are the findings of a lone study.
Even if replicated by others, they may represent the pricing of an as-yet-unidentified risk
factor that is less for firms offering new issues than for comparable ones that do not, rather
than an unfairness-creating market inefficiency. In addition, for the last three years of the
study (1988-90), the wealth shortfall from investing in new issues disappears. This could be
consistent with the market having caught onto and corrected for the inefficiency. However,
the authors feel that given the particular features of these three years, this period is too short
to make this conclusion. See Loughran & Ritter, supra, at 49.
79. To put this concept of expected accuracy in statistical terms, consider price to be a
random variable generated by a distribution function with a mean equal to actual value,
reflecting the fact that the price is unbiased. A good measure of the price's expected accu
racy would then be the variance of the distribution - the expected value of the square of the
deviation from actual value. The greater the variance, the lower the price's expected
accuracy.
80. The relationship between information and price accuracy is well captured by Stigler in
his often-cited statement that "[p]rice dispersion is a manifestation - and, indeed, it is the
measure - of ignorance in the market." George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information,
69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 214 (1961).
Results of empirical work, also by Stigler, lend support to the proposition that disclosure
of the particular kinds of information mandated by the U.S. regime for primary offerings
does in fact increase price accuracy. These results come from the same study, discussed supra
in note 77, comparing the post issue growth of prices (relative to the market as a whole) for
two groups of new share issues, one from the period 1923-28 (prior to the passage of the
Securities Act of 1933) and the other from the period 1949-55 (after the Act's passage). The
variance of post issue growth of prices was lower for the second group than the first. See
Stigler, Public Regulation, supra note 77, at 122, 123 tbl.3. Simon comes to the same conclu
sion using the methods of modern finance. She compares various post-Act periods with Stig
ler's pre-Act period and finds that the post-1933 groups had consistently lower variances. See
Simon, supra note 77, at 305-06 & tbl.4. This rules out the "bull market" explanation of
Stigler's results - i.e., that the greater variance in the pre-Act period was due to the fact that
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will have greater risk associated with them81 because there is a
greater likelihood that what an investor receives from holding such
a share - distributions and price at resale (both discounted to pres
ent value) - will deviate substantially from what she pays for it.
This increased risk means that any investor holding shares of X,
unless she is fully diversified by also holding shares of a substantial
number of other issuers, will have a more risky portfolio than would
have been the case if more information had been available about
it was a boom period whereas the post-1933 period he used was not. See Simon supra note
77, at 308-13.
The best explanation of the post-1933 group's lower variance is that additional informa
tion provided to the market from mandated disclosure caused the initial selling prices for the
new issues to be closer to actual value; less correction was necessary as the future unfolded.
See Friend & Herman, supra note 77, at 390-91; Simon, supra note 77, at 311-13. The second
group's lower variance can alternatively be explained as evidence that after passage of the
Act more risky companies were kept out of the market by SEC regulation, see Stigler, Public
Regulation, supra note 77, at 122, but this explanation is less persuasive. It is not clear why
Stigler chose this alternative explanation other than the fact that he is suspicious of regula
tion of all sorts. See George Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. &
MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). He clearly accepts the theoretical proposition that any information that
is of value to investors for predicting the future with greater accuracy will lead to less share
price dispersion. See supra note 80. The results showing that the second group in fact had
less dispersion logically should have led him to the conclusion that the information that the
1933 Act prompted to be disclosed was in fact of such value, unless he had affirmative evi
dence that led him to believe that some other factor was responsible. But in providing his
alternative explanation, Stigler offers no such affirmative evidence. See Stigler, Public Regu
lation, supra note 77, at 122.
The proposition that disclosure of the information mandated by the U.S. regime for peri
odic disclosure - as opposed to the regime for primary offerings - increases price accuracy
is harder to test. When we are forced to look at the market as a whole, it is more difficult to
separate out changes in other factors affecting the market between the period before and the
period after imposition of the regime. Subject to this caveat, however, there is empirical
evidence that imposition of periodic disclosure requirements under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 reduced price dispersion. Benston looked at 483 New York Stock Exchange
firms for a period starting prior to the imposition of the 1934 Act regime and running to a
point 90 months after imposition, using the market model to determine the absolute size of
their month-to-month residuals, a measure of price dispersion. See George J. Benston, Re

quired Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of

63 AM. EcoN. REV. 132 (1973). Of these firms, 290 disclosed sales data before imposi
tion of the 1934 Act regime and 193 did not. After imposition, all disclosed sales data. Ben
ston focused on whether the riskiness of the 193 nondisclosing firms declined compared to
that of the disclosing firms and found no statistically significant evidence that it did. This, of
course, does not prove that it did not: the effect may have simply not have been large enough
to show up as statistically significant given the statistical powers of the test. Cf. Fox, supra
note 24, at 1035-38 (discussing limitations of statistical analysis of another set of findings).
Interestingly, Benston's results are also relevant as to the value of the total package of infor
mation required to be disclosed under the 1934 Act regime: they show that the riskiness of
all 483 firms, as measured by the size of their residuals, was significantly less after imposition
than before. See Irwin Friend & Randolph Westerfield, Required Disclosure and the Stock
Market: Comment, 65 AM. EcoN. REv. 467 (1975). Other factors being equal, this would
indicate that the total mandated package did increase price accuracy.
1934,

81. In statistical terms, the probability distribution generating the difference between the
price of X and its actual value, while still having a zero mean - reflecting a lack of bias will have a larger variance.
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X 82 A significant portion of all buyers of X's shares will conse
quently suffer lower expected utility83 - assuming, as the capital
asset-pricing model suggests, that X's shares will be priced in such a
fashion that their expected return is unaffected by the greater risk
resulting from lack of company-specific information,84
Two points need to be noted concerning this risk reduction ben
efit from greater disclosure. Each will take on particular impor
tance when we consider a world with multiple jurisdictions and
multiple open economies. First, there exists an alternative policy encouraging investors to diversify - that might be at least as effec
tive at increasing investor expected utility. Second, even assuming
no greater diversification, the nature of the lower expected utility

resulting from less information needs to be carefully defined. It is
not correct that X's issuance of the securities without disclosure re

sults in lower expected utility than if X had not issued its securities
at all. Whatever the level of disclosure, each additional investment
opportunity available to investors that a share value maximizing
firm finds worth selling into a market that has unbiased pricing rep
resents an increase in the demand for savings. The issuance there
fore marginally raises the overall market expected rate of return
available to investors.ss Each additional investment opportunity
82. The lack of information increases the likelihood that the actual value of an individual
share of X will substantially differ from price - i.e., increases its riskiness. If an investor's
portfolio of high-risk assets consists entirely of shares of X, such an increase in the risk asso
ciated with X obviously commensurately increases the riskiness of the investor's portfolio as
a whole. However, the impact of such an increase in the riskiness of X on the riskiness of the
investor's portfolio as a whole diminishes and ultimately effectively disappears as the investor
holds a larger and larger number of securities different from shares of X This is because the
kind of information that would be increased by X disclosing more is specific to X Risk due
to lack of company-specific information is unsystematic and can be diversified away. See
supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 17.
84. See supra note 37.
85. This can be seen through an example. Consider a simple world in which all proceeds
from the issuance of securities go for new real investment projects, there is a fixed supply of
savings, and all projects have the same amount of systematic risk, so that project risk is not a
factor in the pricing of securities whose returns are related to the projects. Assume also that
each firm issues a new security only when the security can be sold for more than the cost to it
of funding a real investment opportunity that will provide an expected cash flow equal to the
expected distributions to security holders given the terms of the security. The expected re
turn on the project is determined by the cost of the project and its expected cash flow. The
expected return on the security is determined by its price and the expected distributions to its
holder.
Issuance of a security is essentially a purchase of an investor's savings. A firm pays for
these savings by providing terms that result in the security having some given expected rate
of return. It is advantageous to make such a purchase of savings if the rate of return on the
project funded with the savings is greater than the rate of return on the securities. The de
mand curve for savings, DD in Figure 1, thus will be identical to a curve that takes all projects
being considered by all firms in rank order of their expected rates of return and depicts on
the vertical axis the project's expected rate of return and on the horizontal axis the aggregate
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also has a future return generated by a probability distribution with
presumably at least slightly different variance-covariance characteramount of savings needed to fund both that project and all projects superior to it in expected
rate of return. As can be seen in Figure l, if the supply of savings is S*, the market clearing
rate of return will be r*. If securities are sold into a market with unbiased pricing, projects on
average will be funded in rank order of their expected returns down the list, up to and includ
ing the project that just exhausts the fixed supply of savings. The rate of return on this
marginal project will be designated r*.
Expected return
on firms' proposed
investment projects

D

D

S*

Savings

Consider what adding firm X and its proposed investment project, with an expected re
turn of r, does to the situation. Unless r1 > r*, X will not find it advantageous to issue the
security at all. If r1 > r*, the introduction of X to the market will push the demand curve to
the left for all points at or below r1 by an amount equal to what is necessary to fund X's
project. This will result in an increase in the market-clearing rate of return on securities. The
intersection of supply and demand will now be at a point above r*. X's project has "crowded
out" what would have been the marginal project, the one with a return of r*, resulting in a
new marginal project with a somewhat higher rate of return, r**· Of course, notwithstanding
the exaggerated manner in which it is presented here for purposes of illustration, in a large
economy the introduction of a single additional issue with the project would have a de
minimis effect. This is why the DD is drawn as a smooth curve rather than stepped. But the
exaggeration shows how the rate of return on securities is affected by the inclusion or exclu
sion of a whole class of securities - for example, securities of issuers of country B.
Relaxation of the assumption that savings are in fixed supply will not change the result: a
higher market rate of expected return will still be needed. To the extent that a higher market
rate is not needed to permit the crowding out of the marginal investment project, it is needed
to coax out additional savings. Similarly, differences in systematic risk among projects re
quire compensating adjustments in their expected returns prior to the construction of the
demand curve for savings. The existence of security issues for purposes other than new real
investment is more complex. In general, however, anything that is not used for new real
investment is a refinancing, and the proceeds of such refinancing are returned to the market
so that the supply of savings is not diminished and the marginal real investment project still
determines the market rate of return.
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istics than any existing opportunity. Each additional opportunity
therefore permits investors to compose portfolios with more
favorable trade-offs between risk and return than othenvise would
have been available.86 Any attempt to increase investor expected
utility through risk reduction thus will be counterproductive if re
quiring X to disclose more deters it from offering its shares in the
first place.

3. Efficient Allocation of ResourcesB7
The amount of information available about X - and hence its
share price accuracy - has a second kind of effect on the economy:
allocative efficiency. The securities market monitors and structures
the allocation of scarce resources in the economy. It influences in
important ways which proposed investment projects are imple
mented and how the economy's existing productive capacity is used.
Most of these choices are made, at least in the first instance, by
entrepreneurs setting up new corporations and by the managements
of existing corporations. Security prices and the information used
to establish them are central to the mechanisms that limit the dis
cretion of the entrepreneurs and managers who make these choices.
The three key mechanisms are: the cost of capital to individual cor
porations, the market for corporate control, and share-price-based
management compensation.

a. The Cost of Capital and Project Choice: The Role of Dis
closure at Time of a New Share Offering. To understand how lack of
information and resulting share price inaccuracy can affect which
proposed investment projects are implemented, consider the fol
lowing stylized facts. Suppose that X and Y are new firms, yet to be
capitalized. In each case, the firm is incorporated by proponents of
a proposed .new investment project who hope to attract funds to
implement it. Each firm is considering a new investment project of
equal cost and equal risk. Anyone who knew what the respective
firm proponents know about the details of the projects would con
clude that Y's project has a higher expected cash return than X's.
The proponents of each project investigate the market to determine
the amount they would receive for their equity. Suppose that X's
shares will be overpriced. Proponents of X might find that they can
raise sufficient funds to cover the cost of implementing the project
86. See supra section I.A.2.
Erl. This discussion is substantially based on a more developed discussion concerning
these same issues in a purely domestic context appearing in Fox, supra note 69, at 1018-22.
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without having to offer the public all·of X's equity. The rest of the
equity, which will cost the proponents very little, will be retained by
them. The proponents therefore will be able to enjoy an "en
trepreneurial surplus" - value added to these retained shares be
cause of their pro rata claim on expected positive cash flow
generated by the project.
Suppose, on the other hand, that Y's shares will be underpriced.
Proponents of Y might find that they cannot raise sufficient funds
to cover the cost of implementing the project even by offering to
the public all of Y's equity. Under these circumstances, the X pro
ponents, attracted by the entrepreneurial surplus, will decide to go
ahead, while the Y proponents will decide not to go ahead. Be
cause of inaccurate security prices, scarce resources will be used to
implement X's project, even though Y's project is superior.

If X and Y are instead ongoing corporations, each considering
its project as an additional investment, a similar though more com
plicated story can be told about the results of inaccurate share
prices. Share price is likely to be inversely related to management's
perception of its "cost of capital," the figure that management
weighs against a given investment project's expected benefits when
deciding whether to undertake a given investment project. An
inaccurately high X share price and an inaccurately low Y share
price can therefore lead to implementation of X's project and not
Y's project.88

b. The Market for Corporate Control and Stock Price-based
Incentives: The Role of Ongoing Disclosure After Shares have been
Publicly Sold. When the choices made by the managers of existing
corporations concerning which new projects to implement and how
to use existing capacity maximize shareholder wealth, they are gen
erally presumed also to constitute the most efficient allocation of
resources.89 There is no assurance, however, that the managers of
corporations will make the choices that maximize shareholder
wealth. Management may not be competent, and even if it is, its
best interests sometimes differ from those of the shareholders. A
88. The relationship between share price accuracy and project choice by ongoing corpo
rations is explored in more detail in id. at 1016-18.
89. Conventional economic theory holds that in a competitive economy in which antiso
cial behavior, such as pollution, is properly regulated, management decisions that are best for
existing shareholders also allocate the economy's scarce resources most efficiently. See Wu
LIAM J. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 395-400 (4th ed. 1977);
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); PAUL A. SAMUELSON & Wu...
LIAM P. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 678 (12th ed. 1985).
...
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corporate manager, like anyone, can be expected to value compen
sation, perquisites, respect, power, affection, a sense of rectitude,
and job security. The decisions the manager makes for the firm
may affect the level of all these rewards. The extent to which a
manager makes decisions that are in the best interests of sharehold
ers depends on the structure of incentives in which she operates.
As developed below, the amount that is publicly known about a
corporation can affect these incentives in important ways.

i. The Market for Corporate Control. One obvious way that
shareholders might prevent management decisions that are not in
the best interests of shareholders is for them to replace an unsatis
factory management by electing one more to their liking. But many
large corporations, especially in the United States, are "manage
ment controlled." Share ownership is so dispersed that manage
ment can perpetuate itself indefinitely by controlling the firm's
proxy machinery and nominating as directors its own members and
persons friendly to current management.90 Concerted shareholder
90. See WILUAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS! CASES AND
MATERIALS 241-44 (7th ed. 1995); EDWARD S. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPO·
RATE POWER 54 (1981). Herman estimates that 78 of the largest 100 industrial corporations
and 165 of the largest 200 nonfinancial corporations are management controlled. See id. at
58-61; see also John P. Palmer, The Separation of Ownership From Control in Large US In
dustrial Corporations, Q. REV. EcoN. & Bus., Autumn 1972, at 55-57 (finding that in 1965,
101 of the largest 125 firms and 176 of the largest 250 firms were management controlled, and
in 1969 management controlled 99 and 171, respectively). A sense of the share of the econ
omy's allocation decisions that are made by the managements of these management con
trolled firms comes from the congressional testimony of Michael Pertschuk, former
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. He estimated that in 1977 the largest 200 manu
facturing corporations held 60% of all manufacturing assets and that in 1976, 451 firms con
trolled 70% of all manufacturing assets. See Mergers and Industrial Concentration: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong.
155 (1978) (statement of Michael Pertschuk).
Some American legal scholars have suggested that the increasing percentage of share
ownership by institutional investors creates the potential for more concerted shareholder
action. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. RBv. 520
(1990); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate
Monitor, 91 CoLuM. L. RBv. 1277 (1991); Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor
Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 117 (1988); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman,
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. RBv.
863 (1991); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 CoLUM. L.
RBv. 10 (1991). Reports concerning management changes at a number of the largest U.S.
corporations in the last several years suggest that institutional investors are in fact beginning
to play a greater role. See, e.g., Brett D. Fromson, American Express: Anatomy of a Coup,
WASH. PoST, Feb. 11, 1993, at Al; Doron P. Levin, Stempel Quits Job as Top G.M. Officer in
Rift with Board, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1992, at Al; Steve Lohr, Big Business in Turmoil:
Upheavals at LB.M., Sears and Elsewhere Underline Fundamental Shifts in Economy, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 28, 1993, at Al; Steve Lohr, LB.M. to Replace Its Top Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
27, 1993, at Al.
Even if institutional investors are playing a larger role in corporate governance, their
likely impact is enhanced by greater public disclosure. Institutional investors are hampered
in obtaining needed information through private contacts with corporate officials by the con-

August 1997]

Securities Regulation

2547

action to vote management of such companies out of office is diffi
cult. On the other hand, if an existing shareholder or an outsider
can purchase enough shares of the corporation to obtain a control
ling interest, he can replace incumbent management on his own.91
The existence of such a market for corporate control results in take
overs that terminate incompetent or self-interested management.
Equally important, the fear of a takeover will motivate incumbent
management to make decisions more in accord with the best inter
ests of shareholders than it might otherwise make.
The effectiveness of the market for corporate control in restrict
ing management discretion depends on the accuracy of the price of
a firm's shares and the quality of information available to the mar
ket concerning the firm's operations, both of which are enhanced
by greater disclosure. To see the relevance of the accuracy of a
firm's share price, consider the following example.
Suppose that the incumbent management of a firm (the target)
is making decisions that are not in the best interests of its share
holders. An outsider is aware of this mismanagement and thinks
that it could do a better job. Assume for a moment that the out
sider is certain of how much the target will be worth in its hands.92
If the target's share price accurately states the value of the firm
assuming the continuation of incumbent management, the outsider
will find a takeover worthwhile. The price it must pay to acquire
the shares necessary to effect the takeover will be less than what the
shares will be worth once it is in control. But if the price is inaccu
rate and the inaccuracy sufficiently overstates actual value, the
takeover will not be worthwhile, notwithstanding the poor quality
of incumbent management's decisions and the outsider's certainty
as to the greater worth of the target in its hands. The more inaccu
rate share prices are generally, the more cases there will be where
cern that they will end up with material nonpublic information, the possession of which will
prevent them from legally trading in the issuers' shares. Also, their willingness to incur costs
to ferret out information is still limited by information's public-good nature: each institu
tional investor receives only a small portion of the total shareholder gain when the informa
tion obtained leads, through shareholder pressure, to better corporate decisions. See Merritt
B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance 4-6 (May 16, 1997) (unpublished
paper, presented at the Symposium on Comparative Governance, Max-Planck-Institut,
Hamburg, Germany, on file with author).
91. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Por..
EcoN. 110 (1965). A brief survey of the work in this area is found in F.M. SCliERER &
DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 42-43 (3d
ed. 1990).
92. This assumption of certainty is unrealistic, and its unrealism makes the market for
corporate control appear more effective on average than it really is in restricting manage
ment discretion.
·
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the takeover mechanism will fail because the target's share price is
too high.
To see the relevance of the quality of information available to
the market, consider a variation on the example above. Assume,
more realistically, that the outsider's assessment of the value of the
target in its hands, though unbiased, is uncertain. The outsider is
not perfectly informed about the future. Thus, the outsider knows
that in any particular case its assessment is equally likely to be too
high or too low and is unlikely to be exactly right. In this situation,
even if both the price of the shares and the assessment are correct,
the outsider cannot be confident of these facts. If risk averse, the
outsider may not undertake the takeover, despite the expected gain
from doing so.
The outsider's fear results from the all-or-nothing aspect of a
takeover. The outsider must acquire a certain number of shares or
it will be unable to effect the transfer of control on which its expec
tation of gain is based. For a target corporation of any significance,
this minimum number of shares would constitute a large investment
relative to the size of the typical outsider's portfolio. Altering the
portfolio to include these shares would add to its riskiness because
the unsystematic component of the risk could not be fully diversi
fied away. The outsider's expected gain from the transfer of control
may not be sufficient to compensate for the added risk. When more
information about a potential target is available to the market, less
unsystematic risk will be involved in an outsider's assessment of
what the firm would be worth in its hands, and less expected gain
will be necessary to motivate the outsider to undertake the
takeover.
ii. Share-Price-Based Compensation. The role of share price
not confined to the operation of the market for corporate control.
A number of management compensation devices - stock options,
stock appreciation rights, warrants, and employee-stock-ownership
plans - depend on share price to determine the magnitude of the
reward given the recipient.93
Everything else being equal, the compensation scheme that
would most effectively align management interests with those of
shareholders, and hence the most efficient allocation of resources,
would be entirely stock price based. In recent years this point has
been given increasing attention in the discussion of how to improve
is

93. See SCHERER & Ross, supra note 91, at 45-46.
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the performance of U.S. corporations.94 It would be the most at
tractive package to shareholders and management alike because a
portion of the gains from more efficient allocation would be avail
able to each. At the beginning of the year, management would re
ceive a compensation package with a higher expected yield than if
the package were not stock price based, but not so much higher that
shareholders would receive none of the benefits from the resulting
improvement in management decisions.9s
Everything is not equal, however, and the problem again is risk.
Compensation based on share price might end up well above or
well below what is expected. For the typical manager, job compen
sation is a large part of annual income, so this risk cannot be diver94. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives - It's Not How
Much You Pay, but How, HARv. Bus. REv., May-June 1990, at 138. A critical review of the
literature advocating greater share-price-based compensation for management can be found
in Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory
of Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV. 2088, 2096-106 (1994). The superiority of a stock-price
based compensation scheme can be seen in terms of the shortcomings of its alternatives. The
promise of year-end bonuses and future salary increases based on merit are devices by which
top management, as a group, can reward those members who have made decisions contribut
ing to the group's goals. Incentives awarded by a management group, however, will protect
shareholders only if there is a way to align the interests of the group with those of the share
holders. A profit-sharing arrangement may work to align management and shareholder in
terests to some extent. A defect in those plans is that "profit" is an accounting figure that at
best captures only imprecisely many of the gains and losses experienced by a firm. For exam
ple, research and development expenditures generally cannot be capitalized and must be
treated as a current expense, even though they may enhance the future revenues of the firm
as much as capital expenditures for bricks and mortar. See FINANCIAL AccoUNTING STAN
DARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 2: ACCOUNTING
FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS 6 (1974). Thus, profit-sharing arrangements
often create incentives to make decisions that emphasize a firm's short-run performance over
its long-run performance. In contrast, when a manager, in choosing among the alternative
courses of action, chooses the option that most benefits the firm, that choice will on average
have the most positive immediate effect on share price, even if the benefit will not be realized
until some point in the future.
There is evidence that a compensation package that emphasizes stock returns results in
management decisions more in the interests of shareholders. See Robert Tempest Masson,
Executive Motivations, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance, 79 J. Poi.. EcoN. 1278,
1289 (1971) (finding that firms that tie executive compensation to stock returns perform bet
ter than those that do not); Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate Performance and Managerial Remu
neration, 7 J. Accr. & EcoN. 7, 25-37 (1985) (showing a similar correlation for salary and
bonus even before adding in employee stock options and stock appreciation rights). The fact
that compensation is structured in a way that creates incentives for increasing shareholder
wealth does not necessarily mean that it is the incentives that made the better-performing
managers perform the way they did; correlation does not establish causation. It is possible
that the typical manager in the study was unaffected by the incentive structure under which
he worked, but that the board, which at the beginning of the manager's tenure was not sure
of his abilities, observed firm performance over time and then began paying him what he was
worth. For an example of this kind of "learning" theory of compensation, see Milton Harris
& Bengt Holmstrom, A Theory of Wage Dynamics, 49 REv. EcoN. STUD. 315 (1982).
95. The concept that it can be in the interests of both shareholders and management to
develop an incentive structure that limits management discretion derives from agency theory.
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).

Michigan Law Review

2550

[Vol. 95:2498

sified away. A manager thus will want at least part of his total
compensation scheme to include less risky elements, such as
straight salary. The higher the expected accuracy of a firm's share
price, however, the less risky stock-price-based compensation and
the larger the portion of the total package he will be willing to ac
cept in this form.96 Greater disclosure, therefore, will enhance the
efficient allocation of resources in this fashion as well.
B.

Costs of Greater Disclosure

Disclosure involves costs as well as benefits. The easiest way of
identifying these costs is first to consider the private costs of the
individual issuer in making additional disclosure, and then to con
sider disclosure's costs in terms of larger groups: issuers as a class
and the economy at large.

1. Private Costs of Disclosure to the Individual Issuer
a. Operational Costs. The most obvious costs of greater disclo
sure to an individual issuer are the operational costs. The issuer
must gather and evaluate the necessary information, and then com
pose and disseminate a message to the public. These operational
costs inevitably involve the time of the issuer's officers and employ
ees. They may also involve fees for lawyers, accountants and other
experts, and for printing, particularly in the case of disclosure that is
legally mandated and required to be in a particular form. Man
dated disclosure is also likely to involve governmental "user" fees
intended in some fashion to recompense the administering agency
for its expenses.97
b. Interfirm Costs. Disclosure is likely to involve nonopera
tional costs as well, which I shall refer to as "interfirm" costs. For
96. There is empirical evidence to support the proposition that a reduction in the riski
ness of an issuer's stock will increase the proportion of compensation a manager will be
willing to take in stock price based form. Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan compare the
percentage of shares owned by officers and directors in a representative sample of exchange
listed U.S. firms in 1935 and one in 1995 and finds that it increased from 13% to 22%. They
find that the relationship between ownership and performance is very similar in the two
periods. The most promising explanation of the change is the reduction in stock price volatil
ity between the first and second periods. See Clifford G. Holderness et al., Were the Good
Old Days that Good? Evolution of Corporate Ownership and Governance since the Great
Depression (Oct. 8, 1996) (unpublished paper presented at the University of Michigan De
partment of Economics Economic History Seminar, on file with author).
97. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission charges initial issuers a filing
fee of one-fiftieth of 1 percent (0.02%) of the maximum offering price of the securities being
sold. See Sec. Act Rule 457, 17 C.F.R. § 230.457 (1996); see also Loss & SELIGMAN, supra
note 3, at 339.
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an individual firm, being forced to disclose certain information can,
looked at in isolation, increase its costs or decrease its revenues be
cause of use of the information by competitors, major suppliers, or
major customers. Competitors can act in ways that reduce the is
suer's rents, if they know the issuer's lines of business that are un
usually profitable or the kinds of products or activities that the
issuer's research suggests will be unusually profitable in the future.
Suppliers and customers who deal with the issuer on a negotiated
basis can strike bargains more favorable to themselves when armed
with this kind of information. The information enhances suppliers'
and customers' bargaining positions because it gives them a better
idea of the size of the potential surplus created by their deals with
the issuer.

2. Costs of Disclosure to Issuers as a Class and to the Economy
as a Whole
It would be misleading, however, to stop the analysis at the level
of the individual firm. A widespread disclosure practice, whether
prompted by a mandatory regime or other pressures, involves the
issuer's competitors, suppliers, and customers providing informa
tion comparable to what the issuer provides. The information pro
vided by these other firms can be useful to the issuer. Depending
on the particular issuer, these countervailing gains may equal or ex
ceed the nonoperational, "interfirm" costs that the issuer incurs as a
result of the practice. Looking at the questj.on across the whole
economy, the average issuer will gain as many advantages from
knowing more about its competitors, suppliers, and customers as
these firms will gain from knowing about the issuer. Thus, the pri
vate, individual firm cost of disclosure, which includes both opera
tional costs and interfirm costs, will be greater than the social costs
of that disclosure, which will approximately equal the operational
costs alone. As a result, absent regulation, firms can be expected to
disclose less than is socially optimal.9s
We cannot, however, stop quite here. The effects of greater dis
closure on the level and distribution of rents in the economy has
implications for its static and dynamic efficiency in ways that go
beyond the ordinary domain of financial economics and of the de
bate on the virtues and vices of mandatory disclosure.99 The effect
98. See sources cited infra note 143.
99. Static efficiency refers to enhancing economic welfare through reallocation of the ex
isting fixed supply of productive resources in a world with a given technology. Static effi
ciency is maximized when these resources are allocated in a Pareto-optimal fashion - that is,
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on static efficiency is positive: increased disclosure will lead to
more effective competition and hence a reduction in the allocative
distortions associated with monopoly rents. The effect on dynamic
efficiency is negative: increased disclosure reduces the rewards for
developing knowledge that identifies new markets and new prod
ucts in any area unprotected by patents or copyrights. It in essence
reduces the scope of what is considered proprietary information. 100
Thus, a proper calculation of the welfare effects of greater disclo
sure must include not only balancing its benefits for the finance
process against its operational costs but also considering these static
and dynamic efficiency effects.
III. THE STAKES OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES IN THE
DISCLOSURE OF TRANSNATIONALLY TRADED ISSUERS
How are the benefits and costs of increased disclosure distrib
uted among multiple countries? In the world of the near- and
medium-term future, transnational transactions will be becoming
increasingly important, but most issuers will still have clear national
identities and disclosure regulation will still be undertaken by na
tional authorities. In assessing the stakes of each of the countries
involved, this article confines itself to transactions in which the
place of the transaction is either the issuer's country or the buyer's
country of residence and, in the case of secondary transactions, in
which the buyer and seller are of the same country of residence.
This greatly simplifies the analysis without significantly reducing
understanding.101
when no one's welfare can be further improved by a resource reallocation without some
other person's welfare being diminished. Perfect competition among profit maximizing
firms, when combined with the satisfaction of certain other conditions, will result in a Pareto
optimal allocation of resources. See JAMES M. HENDERSON & RICHARD E. QUANDT,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 255-64 (2d ed. 1971).
Dynamic efficiency refers to enhancing economic welfare through implementation of
technological change that permits, from the existing fixed supply of productive resources,
either a larger output of existing products or the output of new products more valued by
consumers than what was produced before. The conditions, if any, under which competition
promotes dynamic efficiency and the ones, if any, under which monopoly encourages it are a
matter of intense debate among industrial organization economists. I have given a critical
overview of this debate elsewhere. See Fox, supra note 25, at 199-202.
100. Edmund Kitch takes note of this rent-reducing feature of disclosure to argue that
issuers have an interest in not complying with mandatory disclosure rules and to question the
practicality of the regime. See Kitch, supra note 69, at 846-74. The other way of looking at
this, of course, is to conclude that this rent-reducing feature of disclosure is exactly why we
cannot count on disclosure being provided voluntarily, even in circumstances in which its
social benefits exceed its social costs. This is why we need a mandatory regime.
101. Given that three dimensions of transnational transaction nationality are being con
sidered here, such a transaction can involve as many as three countries. Including three
country transactions in the analysis, however, would add considerably to the complexity of
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So confined, all transnational transactions fall into one of three
general categories. The first is the "standard" transaction. Here
the investor buys or sells the securities involved in the securities
market of his country of residence, but the issuer is of a different
country. The second category is the "transplant" transaction. The
investor buying or selling the security and the issuer are of the same
country, but the transaction is effected in another country. The
third category is the "issuer country" transaction. Like the stan
dard transaction, the buyer is of a different country than the issuer,
but, unlike the standard transaction, the transaction is effected in
the issuer's country.
TYPES OF TRANSACTIONS lNvOLVING SHARES OF B ISSUERS
Buyer's Residence
A
B
Place of
Transaction

A

Standard

Transplant

B

Issuer Country

Domestic

The discussion below is organized around these three categories
of transactions. For each category, it considers the stakes of the
associated countries in the disclosure practices of the issuers of the
shares involved. The focus is on two countries, A and B. The
issuers involved are "nationals" of B, meaning that the residences
of the entrepreneurs who founded them, the issuers' principal
places of business, and the largest portions of their operations are in
country B.102 The discussion of each of the three categories
assumes that there are no public transactions, including purely
domestic ones, in the shares of the issuers involved outside of the
category being considered. Despite being generally at odds with
reality, this simplifying assumption is helpful because it sets up the
most extreme set of facts against which to test the propositions
made. As a result, by the end of the discussions of the three
the presentation without a significant gain in elucidating the underlying principles. Three
country transactions are also probably much less common than two country ones. Where the
buyer and issuer are of different nationalities, the buyer is likely to buy either in his home
market, where his transactions costs are lowest, or, if the security is not available there, in the
home market of the issuer, which would typically be the most developed market for the
issuer's securities. Thus, typically only two countries will be involved because the place of the
transaction is either the same country as the issuer or as the buyer.
102. The following discussions of the three categories are obviously equally applicable to
the other possible standard, transplant and issuer country transactions involving A and B,
where the issuer is from A; all that is necessary is a reversal of all the country names.
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categories, a clear understanding will emerge of how, whatever the
actual overall mix, the residence of the investor, the nationality of
the issuer, and the place of any given transaction give rise to distinct
stakes in the disclosure practices of the issuer involved.
A.

1.

The Standard Transaction: Buyer From A; Transaction
Occurs in A; Issuer From B
The Stakes for Country A, the Country of the Buyer

In the "standard" transnational transaction, the investor buys
the securities involved in the securities market of his country of res
idence. The transaction is transnational because the issuer is of a
different country. Such a transaction is "standard" because, given
the investor's desire to minimize transaction costs, he would natu
rally choose to purchase the security in his home market if it was
available there. The issuer will naturally promote such availability,
if the potential volume of transactions in the investor's home coun
try were sufficient to support a market for the security and the is
suer were not deterred by securities law considerations. As a result
of these factors, transnational transactions in the standard category
have occasioned the most frequent legal consideration and are
therefore the subject of the most developed jurisprudence.
We will use as our example standard transnational transactions
in the shares of issuers X and Y, nationals of country B. We will
thus focus on sales in country A of X and Y shares to residents of A
and trades in such shares among such residents. Remember that we
assume that these transactions are not accompanied by any public
sales to, or trades among, B residents. In essence X and Y are pub
lic companies only abroad. We will explore the respective stakes of
countries A and B in X's and Y's disclosure practices by identifying
the consequences for each country if X or Y reveals less rather than
more about itself.

a. Fairness and Risk. First, observe that country A has no
stake in the disclosure practices of X and Y based on concerns
about fairness for its investors. Greater fairness is simply not a ben
efit generated by greater disclosure. As we saw in Part II, reducing
the amount of publicly available information about issuers like X
and Y may increase the uncertainty that the share price reflects its
actual value, but it will not bias the share price. Regardless of the
level of disclosure by X and Y, investors in A will not be buying the
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shares of these issuers at prices that are, on average, greater than
their actual values.103
Risk, as we have seen, is a different matter. If X or Y discloses
less about itself, its share price will be less accurate. Investors hold
ing its shares in less than fully diversified portfolios will face in
creased risk and hence lower expected utility. Because all public
investors in X and Y are residents of country A, A will be the coun
try that receives this benefit from any increased disclosure by X or

Y. As we have also seen, however, this observation is subject to
two caveats. First, the same benefit may be obtainable, probably at
less cost, by persuading investors in A to diversify more. Second,
investors in A are better off having shares in X and Y available to
them, even with minimal disclosure, than not available to them at
all. Country A would be hurting, not helping its investors, if a pol
icy of extending its mandatory disclosure regime to foreign issuers
103. This statement needs some elaboration to the extent that the world more closely
resembles the one described by the noise theorists than the one described the EMH theorists.
See supra note 76 (discussing, in the context of a closed economy, disclosure's effect on fair
ness in a noise-theory world).
First, consider secondary trading. Under the assumptions of the analysis in the text, all
public trading of X and Y shares is among investors in A. Whatever the level of B issuer
disclosure, such trading cannot effect any kind of wealth transfer between country A and
country B. For investors within A buying B issuer shares, price, as in the closed-economy
discussion, will be fair in the sense that on average it will equal actual value. This guarantees
that uninformed A investors who choose a diversified portfolio of B issuers' shares, on a
random basis, are likely to be unaffected by the disclosure level. Noise theory predicts a
wealth transfer between the other two groups in A investing in B issuers' shares - the smart
speculators and the naive speculators - as the former profit in their arbitrage activities at
the expense of the latter. As in the closed economy discussion, expanding the concept of
fairness to condemn such a transfer is highly questionable. Even if fairness were so ex
panded, it is unclear whether more disclosure would exacerbate or mitigate the problem.
If we relax the assumption in the text that all public secondary trading of X and Y shares
is among investors in A, and if the proportion of transactions by smart B speculators versus
naive B investors differs from the comparable proportion of A investor transactions, noise
theory predicts a transfer of wealth to the country with the higher proportion of smart specu
lator transactions. Again, however, the direction of the effect of greater disclosure on the
size of this transfer is unclear.
A primary offering, with or without such a relaxation of the assumption in the text, in
volves at least indirect transactions between residents of A, as purchasers, and a resident of
B, the issuer - usually with an investment banker acting as an intermediary. However, as
discussed previously, the empirical literature comparing new issues in the United States
before and after passage of the Securities Act of 1933 does not show that the resulting in
crease in disclosure improved the fortunes of the purchasers. See supra notes 77-78. This
suggests that the level of disclosure had no effect on the fairness of initial-offering prices. So,
at least as a general matter, country A has no fairness stake in the disclosure level of issuers
from B engaging in even primary offerings of securities. The possible exception to the con
clusion that disclosure has no effect on average offering price relates to initial public offerings
of shares that were to be traded only on a regional stock exchange rather than on the New
York Stock Exchange. Simon found that these issues were on average overpriced. See Si
mon, supra note 77, at 304-08. Simon's findings suggest that country A might have a stake in
the disclosure level of those issuers from country B that engage in initial public offerings that
will not then be traded on one of the world's major exchanges.
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resulted in X and Y shares not being available to these investors in
the first place.

b.

Efficient Allocation of Resources and Cost. We saw in Part

II that less disclosure at the time that new shares are offered to the
public leads to allocational inefficiencies because of its effect on
which real investment projects are implemented. Less ongoing dis
closure also lessens allocational efficiency because it reduces the ef
fectiveness of the market for control and share-price-based
compensation as devices for limiting managerial discretion. On the
other hand, less disclosure of either kind also reduces costs. The
question to be addressed here is the extent, if any, to which resi
dents of A experience either of these effects.

i.

A Simplified World of Only Initially Capitalizing Firms. We

will start with a simplified world in which all the B issuers are firms
seeking capital just once. Each invests in a single project. Project
return is determined only by the quality of the project idea, not the
quality of management. Thus the only time a firm discloses is at the
time it seeks its capital. The only allocational gain from greater
disclosure is improved project choice.
Assume, as in the example in Part II, that firms X and Y are
each offering shares to fund equally expensive proposed projects.
Anyone who knew what the respective firm entrepreneurs knew
about the projects would conclude that Y's project has the higher
expected cash return. Remember that less accurate share prices in
crease the likelihood that X's project will be implemented and Y's
project will not be. Less disclosure results in less accurate prices.
In a market in which there are many X-type and Y-type firms, a
general practice of less disclosure by such firms will thus mean a
higher number of such misallocations.
Three groups share in the returns generated by the activities of
these firms: the suppliers of the entrepreneurial talent, the public
suppliers of capital, and the suppliers of the other factors of produc
tion. The first and third groups consist entirely of B residents, the
second entirely of A residents. The losses from misallocation can
only come from one or more of these three groups. As shown be
low, because of capital's mobility the suppliers of capital will not be
hurt. Nor will suppliers of capital bear any of the costs of whatever
level of disclosure is provided. Thus country A has no stake, based
on resource allocation or cost concerns, in the disclosure practices
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of country B issuers, even those that raise their public capital exclu
sively through stock sales to A residents.

This conclusion is derived as follows. The greater the ignorance
in the market and, hence, share price inaccuracy, the greater the
misallocation of capital. For any given amount of capital flowing
from A to B,104 there will be more instances of inferior projects
being implemented and superior ones not. This will reduce the im
plemented projects' average cash return. Since country A's inves
tors can make unbiased, though not fully accurate, evaluations of
what each project's cash return will be, their awareness of the mar
ket's greater ignorance will lead them to discount their expectations
concerning the project cash returns of all B issuers. They know that
greater ignorance will lead to more misallocations, but they do not
know which issuers' projects are inferior.
Cash return on a firm's initial project is the ultimate source of
all cash distributions to shareholders.10s Lower project cash return

will mean lower cash distributions to shareholders. These cash dis
tributions are divided between two groups of shareholders: the
public shareholders in A, who exchange the capital necessary for
the project for shares representing whatever percentage of the is
suer's total equity they demand to provide that amount of funds,
and the entrepreneurs, who receive whatever equity remains. Re
gardless of whether the levels of expected cash returns on the
projects of country B issuers and their consequent expected total
cash distributions to these two groups of shareholders are high or
low, investors in country A will demand the same level of expected
cash distributions. Investors in A have a large supply of alternative
investment opportunities.106 Lower total expected shareholder
104. The analysis that follows shows that, everything being equal - including the amount
of funds flowing out of A to purchase shares of B issuers such as X and Y the misalloca
tions from lower disclosure will reduce returns to entrepreneurs in B and leave investors in A
unaffected. The actual amount of capital flowing from A to B in fact will be lower because
the reduction in entrepreneurial surplus will reduce the number of investment opportunities
from B supplied to the market.
105. This is true on a discounted basis whether the project cash return is paid out at the
time received or is retained and reinvested with the distributions to shareholders coming
instead from the cash return on the reinvestment.
106. The proposition in the text treats country B as a producer of investment opportuni
ties - rights to receive a return at a given point in the future with given risk characteristics
and an expected value at the time of payout of one dollar. It assumes that investors in A face
a market in which each such opportunity, whether from B or elsewhere, will be priced the
same and that the price will not change materially depending on whether B offers fewer such
opportunities - that is, B issuers have low expected total cash distributions to shareholders
- or more - that is, B issuers have higher expected distributions. The proposition thus
analogizes B to a firm selling a product in a perfectly competitive market in which, according
to standard microeconomic theory, its level of production will have no material effect on
price.
-
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cash distributions of B issuers will simply result in investors in A
demanding a right to receive a commensurately larger proportion
of distributions before they provide the capital necessary to imple
ment B issuer projects. In other words, investors in A will receive a
larger proportion of total equity, and the entrepreneurs in B will get
a smaller proportion. Between the two groups of shareholders, the
harm to project choice from lower disclosure thus will fall entirely
upon entrepreneurs in B. For the same reasons, these entrepre
neurs will also bear the costs involved in whatever disclosure is
provided.
A World With Ongoing Issuers and Ongoing Disclosure.
Now enlarge the world to include issuers that have an ongoing
existence. The managers of these issuers from time to time decide
to implement new projects. Once a project is implemented, manag
ers make decisions on how it is run. In this world, as we saw in Part
II, disclosure is important to efficient resource allocation in two

ii.

The proposition in the text would clearly hold if (i) the market for corporate equities was
fully global along the price dimension, see supra Part I, and (ii) and B's economy was not a
large portion of the total global economy. In this case, there would be one global-risk
adjusted expected rate of return that would be unaffected by project return in B. The shares
of country B issuers such as X and Y would be priced to provide investors with that expected
rate. The proposition will also hold under less stringent conditions. Consider, for example, a
lack of perfect global integration due to a general reluctance among investors in A to invest
in foreign equities. The only condition needed for the proposition to hold would be that the
value of the shares of country B issuers being offered in A does not form a substantial portion
of the value of all the foreign equities that investors in A are willing to consider. Even when
this condition is not met, the likely reasons why it would not be met suggest that A would not
have the kind of stake that should give it the power to regulate the disclosure practices of
these B issuers. One possible reason that shares of B issuers could form a substantial portion
of all the foreign investments that investors in A would be willing to consider would be that
B's economy constitutes a substantial portion of the whole global economy - for example, if
B were the United States. Then poorer project choice in B, through its effect on the supply
of investment opportunities globally, would reduce the rate of return investors in every coun
try expect on investments in the shares of foreign issuers. This would not, however, be a
situation that forms a sound basis for giving A the power to regulate the disclosure of B
issuers. A residents have no more stake in the disclosure practices of B issuers than have
investors in all third countries.
A second possible reason that shares of B issuers could form a substantial portion of all
the foreign investments that investors in A would be willing to consider would be that inves
tors in A feel significantly more comfortable with purchases of B issuer shares than with the
purchase of most other foreign issuer shares - for example, if A were the United States and
B were Canada. This situation, however, suggests a situation of sufficiently intense interac
tion between these two particular economies that their regulation should, and as a practical
matter can, best be handled by bilateral agreements between the two countries establishing a
joint regime, rather than general rules parceling out authority between the two countries as
to which national regime should govern. The United States and Canada are working toward
such an arrangement by undertaking a degree of coordination of their two regimes and then
providing for reciprocal recognition for qualified issuers that register under the other coun
try's regime. See Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registra
tion and Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 33,6902, 56 Fed.
Reg. 30,036 (1991).
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ways. First, just as in the simplified world, in cases in which firms
finance their projects through the public sale of shares, less accurate
prices lead to an inferior choice of projects to be implemented.
Second, once firms have their initial injections of publicly held eq
uity, self-interest may lead their managers, when making both pro
ject choice and operating decisions, to deviate from what is in the
existing shareholders' best interests. The market for corporate con
trol and share-price-based compensation schemes help to limit devi
ations, but, as we saw in Part II, the effectiveness of these
mechanisms depends on the ongoing level of available information
and share-price accuracy over the rest of the life of the firm. Re
source allocation efficiency thus depends both on the level of dis
closure at the time that firms sell shares to the public and on the
ongoing level of firm disclosure thereafter.

(a)

Initial Public Offering Disclosure. A has no resource allo

cation or cost-based stake in the level of B issuer disclosure at the
time of initial public offering. The analysis here directly parallels
the analysis in the simplified world. Suppose that B issuers do not
disclose very much. Less disclosure means less share-price accuracy
and hence more misallocations and a lower expected cash return.
Again, this will not affect investors in A. The prices of B-issuer
shares will be discounted to reflect this lower expected cash return,
guaranteeing that A investors will get the same expected rate of
return despite the lower level of disclosure. Entrepreneurs in B
bear the discount, because a lower offering price will result in
greater dilution of their holdings,107 and they are the ones who
would enjoy the cost savings.

(b) Ongoing Periodic Disclosure. In one sense, the same can
be said of A's resource allocation and cost-based stakes in the ongo
ing periodic disclosure practices of B issuers. At the time that an
issuer from B offers its shares to investors in A, the investors have
an expectation concerning the firm's level of ongoing disclosure in
the future. They thus have an expectation concerning the effective
ness with which, over the rest of the issuer's life, the market for
corporate control and share-price-based compensation schemes will
107. The empirical literature supporting information asymmetry explanations of the dis
count of IPO offering prices relative to their initial trading prices, see supra note 78, suggests
that the less that is known about an issuer, the greater the discount. See, e.g., Ibbotson et al.,
supra note 78, at 41-42; Ritter, supra note 78, at 222-31, 237. This literature thus also tends to
support the proposition that entrepreneurs bear the cost of suboptimal levels of disclosure.
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limit managerial deviations from optimal project choice and operat
ing decisions.

An expectation of less disclosure, for example, will lead to an
expectation of greater deviations, and a resulting smaller cash flow
available to shareholders. The offering price of the issuer's shares
will be discounted to reflect this smaller expected available cash
flow. The expectation of accompanying cost savings would affect
the offering price in the opposite direction. Investors in A thus
again will receive the same expected rate of return, regardless of B
issuers' expected level of ongoing disclosure over time, and entre
preneurs in B will bear the effects of the expected disclosure prac
tices of B issuers.
In a second sense, however, A's allocation efficiency and cost
based stakes in the ongoing disclosure practices of B issuers are real
and quite different from its stakes in initial public issue disclosure.
From the point of an initial public offering by a B issuer onward, A
residents hold all of its publicly traded shares. For these A share
holders, the optimal level of disclosure is the one whereby the is
suer discloses just up to the point where the marginal costs of any
additional disclosure would start to exceed the resulting further
marginal reduction in managerial deviations. A shareholders are
worse off to the extent that disclosure is not at this leve1.10s The
ongoing interest of the A shareholders in the issuer adhering to this
optimal level of disclosure does not perfectly coincide with the
ongoing interest of the managers, who are residents of B. Even if
the managers are the issuer's founding entrepreneurs, or are other
wise significant shareholders, their gains from the managerial devia
tions permitted by a suboptimal level of disclosure may be greater
than their losses as holders of only part of the issuer's shares.

(c)

Subsequent Public Offering Disclosure. An analysis of A's

resource allocation and cost-based stakes in the level of disclosure
at public offerings subsequent to initial offerings requires identify
ing the multiple functions played by such disclosure. One function
for subsequent public-offering disclosure is the same as for initial
public-offering disclosure: to guide funds to the firms that can
make the best use of them. A now needs to be concerned about
two groups with regard to this function: the new investors from A
who are considering the offering and the issuer's existing A share
holders. The level of disclosure required of B issuers does not af108. To the extent that it was expected that the disclosure level was not going to be opti
mal, the A investors are, of course, compensated in advance by a discounted purchase price.
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feet the new investors from A. Again, less disclosure means less
price accuracy and hence more cases of funds going to firms that
are not the ones that can make the best use of them. Again, the
share prices of B issuers engaging in these public offerings will be
discounted to reflect this fact. So, as with the initial public offering,
the new investors from A will get the same level of return regard
less of the level of disclosure. Now, however, this discount and the
costs of disclosure are borne by the existing shareholders from A as
well as the entrepreneurs from B. A lower offering price will result
in a greater dilution of the holdings of both. This effect of the dis
closure level on the existing A shareholders, however, does not
form the kind of stake in the subsequent public offering disclosure
practices of B issuers that, by itself, is likely to generate a desire by
A to regulate those practices. This is because the interests of the A
investors exactly parallel the interests of entrepreneurs in B.
The second function served by subsequent public-offering dis
closure is the same as that of ongoing disclosure: to assist in the
functioning of the market for corporate control and share-price
based compensation schemes to limit managerial deviations from
optimal project choice and operating decisions.109 With regard to
this function, A's stakes are real. The existing A shareholders have
the same interests in the B issuer's subsequent public offering dis
closure as they do in their periodic disclosure practices. As in ongo
ing disclosure, these interests do not perfectly coincide with those
of the issuers' managers who are from B.

2.

The Stakes for B, the Country of the Issuer

Now let us consider the consequences to country B if firms such
as X and Y reveal less rather than more about themselves. Investor
fairness and risk are not concerns, because of our assumption that
these firms have no B residents among their public shareholders.
Our concern instead exclusively focuses on country B's stakes in the
allocation-of-resources effects of issuer disclosure and its costs.

a.

Entrepreneurs. From the discussion immediately above,

we already know a great deal about the distribution of disclosure's
resource-allocation benefits and costs. In the simplified world of
only initially capitalizing firms, we saw that the level of disclosure
109. The suggestion that subsequent public-offering disclosure regulation can have this
second, agency-cost-reducing function is not new. See Fox, supra note 25, at 138-39, 339-67;
Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. EcoN REv. 650
(1984); Fox, supra note 69, at 1018-22.
.
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determines the proportion of superior to inferior projects chosen to
be implemented and the consequent expected cash return. Entre
preneurs in B fully bear this effect on expected cash return and on
the costs of disclosure. In the more complex world where issuers
have an ongoing existence, the level of ongoing disclosure expected
at the time of an issuer's public offering creates expectations con
cerning the level of managerial deviations and disclosure costs and hence the level of cash flow available to shareholders. As the
market price discounts for this, entrepreneurs fully bear the effects.
Thereafter, however, if an issuer discloses at less than an optimal
level, its entrepreneurs only feel part of the effect on the firm's net
cash flow. They no longer own all the equity; the firm's sharehold
ers in A bear the remainder of the effects. If these entrepreneurs
continue in a managerial capacity, they can enjoy all of the benefits
from the managerial deviations permitted by the suboptimal
disclosure.

b.

Labor. We have not yet considered the other group that

can be affected by the choice as to which investment projects are
implemented and how they are operated - the suppliers of the
other factors of production, most importantly, labor. For the
projects of B issuers, these suppliers will be concentrated in B. The
analysis below shows that they too are almost certain to be benefi
ciaries of the improved allocation of resources that results from
both greater new public issue disclosure and greater ongoing disclo
sure. This is a very important conclusion because it underscores the
importance of country B's stake in the disclosure practices of its
issuers, even in the artificially extreme case of issuers whose public
shares are offered to, and traded by, investors residing in country A
exclusively. This conclusion will be demonstrated in terms of the
effects of greater new public issue disclosure on project choice in
the simplified world of initially capitalizing firms. The reasoning is
equally applicable, however, to the effect of ongoing disclosure on
the way that the market for corporate control and share-price
based compensation disciplines managers of ongoing firms in their
project choice and operating decisions.110

i.

Labor's Absolute Share and the Technical Change Analogy.

Analyzing the effect of the quality of project choice on labor in B is
a complex task. The analysis requires us to determine what would
happen to labor's absolute share of B 's national product if issuers
110. See infra note 119.
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such as X and Y disclosed more. Does labor gain or lose from the
better allocation of capital that results from improved share-price
accuracy?
In a competitive economy, each unit of labor is paid the value of
the marginal physical product of labor (mppl) - the value of the
increased output resulting from the addition of the marginal unit of
labor.111 Labor's absolute share of B 's national product conse
quently equals the total number of units of labor, L, multiplied by
mppl. Assuming that L stays constant, the effect of better alloca
tion on labor's absolute share of B 's national product depends on
the effect of better allocation on labor's marginal physical product.
To get a feel of the effect of better allocation on the demand for
labor, consider first the single reallocation from X's project to Y's
project, which by itself would be too insignificant within the work
ings of B 's whole economy to have a perceptible effect on the price
of labor or its availability to other projects. By definition, Y's
higher expected cash return means that the spread between the
value of output and the cost of inputs for Y's project exceeds that
for X's project. Assuming constant returns to scale, this greater
spread can only be explained by one or more of the following three
things being true of Y's and X's production functions:112 (i) Y, us111. In models of an economy of this sort, each unit of labor is typically assumed to be
interchangeable with each other unit In other words, there is no recognition that workers
differ in their skills and effort. In equilibrium, the value of mppl is equal across all industries.
112. A firm's production function states the maximum output that the firm can obtain for
each possible combination of capital and labor. The two projects have different production
functions because the managers possess different technical information about how to trans
form the inputs into output or, in this particular model, because the managers, for reasons
other than profit maximization, constrain themselves from utilizing a method of transforma
tion about which they do possess the technical information. Thus, somewhat unusually, the
issues of competency or skill on the one hand and nonprofit-maximizing managerial behavior
on the other are, in this part of the discussion� collapsed into the firm's production function.
With the production function so stated, firms are assumed to seek to maximize profits.
This treatment of agency costs bears a resemblance to the approach of Jensen and
Meckling. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 95. One of their cardinal contributions was to
reintegrate important observations of the managerial theory of the firm into the larger neo
classical framework of profit maximization. They saw that there were economic advantages
to the separation of ownership from control - i.e., having finance and risk bearing provided
by passive investors and managerial skills provided by professional managers - but that
there were costs as well - both the costs to shareholders of managerial deviations from
maximizing shareholder value and the costs of combating this behavior. Maximizing eco
nomic welfare means minimizing these total costs rather than the impossible task of eliminat
ing managerial deviations entirely.
To isolate out the effects of disclosure on the quality of project choice, I am in essence
treating the agency costs of a given issuer as fixed. The same kind of analysis also can show
that the effects of ongoing disclosure on the disciplining mechanisms of the market for corpo
rate control and share-price-based compensation will also very likely lead to an increase in
labor's absolute share of B's national income. Greater discipline increases the expected cash
returns of all firms. Again, it can only do so by changing the firms' production functions in
one or more of the three ways listed in the text.
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ing the same amount of each input as would X, can produce an
output that sells for more than that of X;

(ii)

Y can produce an

output of the same value as that of X using the same amount of
labor as would X but less capital; or (iii) Y can produce an output of
the same value as that of X using the same amount of capital as X
but less labor.
Stated this way, one can see a close analogy between better cap
ital allocation and technical change. Each describes a phenomenon
by which an economy produces a more valuable output from a
given fixed set of inputs. The difference is that the study of techni
cal change starts out with all the economy's firms having one set of
production functions and looks at the effects of a change in those
production functions as a result of new technical knowledge. It as
sumes the occurrence of the appropriate welfare-maximizing input
reallocations in response to these changes in production functions.
In contrast, the study of better allocation assumes that a variety of

firms already exist, each possessing its own production function and
the change involves one set of firms receiving capital instead of an
other. What the phenomena of technical change and better capital
allocation share in common is that the firms that are receiving capi
tal after the change have different production functions than the
firms receiving capital before the change and economic welfare is
enhanced as a result. The analogy between technical change and
reallocation is important because the effect of technical change on
labor's share of national income has been the subject of considera
ble study by economists.113
To employ this analogy to trace the effect of better capital allo
cation on labor's share, we will begin with the assumption, subse
quently to be relaxed, that all firms in the economy produce the
same product. We will also assume that the level of disclosure by B
issuers does not affect the aggregate amount of capital flowing from
A to B, just to which firms it goes.114
113. See, e.g., J.R. HICKS, THE THEORY OF WAGES 89-135 (1963); KJ. Arrow et al., Capi·
tal-Labor Substitution and Economic Efficiency, 43 REV. EcoN. & STAT. 225, 244-246 (1961);
Irving B. Kravis, Relative Income Shares in Fact and Theory, 49 AM. EcoN. REv. 917 (1959).
114. This second assumption helps segment the analysis into tractable parts and, though
inaccurate, is harmless. It is inaccurate because it ignores the effects of poorer disclosure
{when not cost justified) on the demand in B for capital from A. As explained above, see
supra note 104, the expectation of lower project cash return will diminish the returns to
entrepreneurs and hence diminish the amount of capital being demanded. The assumption is
harmless because the larger amount of capital flowing from A to B when B's issuers increase
disclosure will by itself increase the mppl in B and hence simply supplement the increase in
mppl from better allocation that the analysis in the text suggests is likely.
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ii. A ll Firms Produce the Same Product - Neutral Impact on
Factor Effectiveness. The first explanation of Y's greater expected
cash return, where both projects would use the same amounts of
labor and capital but the value of Y's output would be greater than
X's, can be analogized to factor-neutral process innovation. Using
the factors in Y is equivalent to using in X a proportionally larger
number of units of each factor. It is as though their use in Y pro
portionally increases the number of "effective" units of each factor.
Suppose for a moment that the differences in expected cash return
among all proposed projects seeking foreign capital is due to this
first cause. What would be the effect of greater disclosure by the B
issuers seeking capital in A, so that more of the better projects like
Y and fewer of the worse projects like X are chosen? If the produc
tion functions involved conform to standard assumptions, the mar
ginal pro ducts of labor and of capital will each grow
proportionally.115 Labor and capital divide in the same proportions
a larger pie so that labor's absolute share of national product
increases.
m.

Same Product - Capital-Saving Impact. The second ex

planation of Y's higher expected cash return, that Y has a produc
tion function that permits it to produce the same amount of output
as X using the same amount of labor but less capital, can be analo
gized to capital-saving process innovation. Using a given amount of
capital in Y is equivalent to using a larger number of units of capital
in X It is like increasing the number of "effective" units of capital.
115. X's production function can be stated as Qr = X(L,K), where Qr is X's output and Lr
and Kr are the inputs of labor and capital, respectively. Y's production function can be stated
as Q, = Y(L,K), with Q» L» and K1 having parallel meanings. According to the description
of the production functions in the text, Q1 = X(kL,kK) (where k is a constant greater than 1).
Because of the assumption of constant returns to scale, Q1 also equals kX(L,K). Thus
dQ/dL = kdQrldL and dQ1/dK = kdQrldK.
Assume for a moment a "pure case" in which all capital comes from abroad, high issuer
disclosure means that all Y-type projects and no X-type projects will be implemented, and
low issuer disclosure means the opposite. The total amount of capital and labor is fixed, and
thus, if capital goes to the Y projects instead of the X projects, each Y project would receive
the same amount of each input as the X projects otherwise would have. Thus, with better
allocation, the mppl and mppk would each be just k times their values with worse allocation.
It is more realistic to assume that only some of B's firms seek capital from abroad and
that more disclosure by these firms only results in the implementation of some Y projects
instead of X ones. As long as the proposed projects seeking foreign capital are representa
tive of the economy as a whole in terms of their factor intensities, the mppl will with more
disclosure still increase in competitive equilibrium, but not by a factor of k. This is because if
only as much labor was used in the Y projects as would have been used in the X projects, the
mppl in the Y projects would be greater than the mppl in all the other projects and hence
greater than the wage rate. Thus, the Y project managers would seek more labor, lowering
their mppls and raising those of all other projects to a point where the mppls in the Y projects
and in the others would all be equal.
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Now suppose for a moment that the differences in expected cash
return among all proposed projects seeking foreign capital are due
to this second cause. What, this time, would be the effect of more
disclosure by the B issuers seeking capital in A so that more of the
better projects like Y and fewer of the worse projects like X are
chosen? If the production functions involved conform to standard
assumptions, the marginal product of labor would increase.116 This
is because the number of units of labor stays fixed, but the number
of effective units of capital increases, thereby giving each unit of
labor more effective capital to work with. Labor's absolute share,
the total amount of labor times its marginal physical product, would
thus again increase.

iv. Same Product - Labor-Saving Impact. The third expla
nation of Y's higher expected cash return, Y having a production
function that would permit it to produce the same amount of output
as X using the same amount of capital but less labor, can be analo
gized to labor-saving process innovation. Using a given amount of
labor in Y is equivalent to using a larger number of units of labor in
X; it is as though the number of "effective" units of labor increased.
Momentarily assume that the differences in expected cash return
among all proposed projects seeking foreign capital are due to this
third cause. What now would be the effect of more disclosure by
B 's issuers so that more of the better projects like Y are chosen and
fewer of the worse projects like X? This time, there is no unambig
uous answer to derive from standard assumptions about production
functions generally. The answer instead depends on their more spe
cific characteristics.
116. X's and Y's production functions can be as stated in supra note 115. According to
the description of the production functions in the text, Qy X(L,EkK), where Ek is a constant
greater than 1. Adopting the common assumption that both production functions are linear
homogenous - the isoquants all have the same shape and there are constant returns to scale
- it can be shown that dQ,ldLdK will then be positive. That is, for any given amount of
labor, mmpl increases as K increases. See HENDERSON & QUANDT, supra note 99, at 79·85.
Thus dQyldL will exceed dQ,ldL for any given actual amounts of capital and labor allocated
to a firm utilizing one production function or the other.
Assume first a "pure case" in which all capital comes from abroad, and assume that high
issuer disclosure means that all Y-type projects and no X-type projects will be implemented
and low issuer disclosure means the opposite. Again, with the total amount of capital and
labor fixed, each Y project would with high disclosure receive the same amount of each input
as each X project otherwise would have. Under these circumstances, as discussed in the
paragraph above, the mppl will be greater.
Now, more realistically, assume that only some of B's firms seek capital from abroad and
that more disclosure by these firms only results in the implementation of some Y projects
instead of X ones. For the same reasons as with the explanation analogized to factor-neutral
technical change, the mppl will still be greater but not by as much as in the "pure case." See
supra note 115.
=
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Two contradictory forces are at work in this case, each a result
of the fact that one actual unit of labor stands for more than one
effective unit. On the one hand, for any given total number of ac
tual units of labor used in Y, a greater number of effective units are
being used. Reflecting the law of diminishing returns, the marginal

effective unit thus will be lower. On the
actual unit of labor used in Y, when added to

product of an additional
other hand, one more

any given number of effective units of labor, will add more to out
put than will adding one more effective unit. Given a fixed number
of actual units of labor, whether the second force dominates the
first depends on the ease with which labor and capital can be substi
tuted for each other in X's production function - that is, the elas
ticity of substitution between labor and capital.117 The greater the
ease of substitution, the less that an increase in the aggregate
number of effective units of labor drives down the product of the
marginal effective unit of labor and hence the less important the
first force.
Empirical study of the U.S. economy strongly suggests that this
second force in fact does dominate. As set out in the Appendix, the

U.S. economy's production functions display an ease of substitution
such that better allocation would increase the marginal product of
an actual unit of labor. Hence labor's absolute share of national
product would increase, even under the highly artificial assumption
that differences in expected cash return among all proposed
projects seeking foreign capital are due solely to this third explana
tion. The same is likely to be true of other developed countries as

well.

v.

Same Product - the Likely Balance of Impacts.
mppl is

probability that better allocation would increase B's

The
even

greater if differences between the projects that receive capital with
better allocation and those that receive it with worse allocation are,
as in the real world, due, to one extent or another, to all three ex
planations. The most plausible assumption about the mix of these

projects is that it will show no overall bias toward capital saving or
labor saving projects.118 In that event, even if, despite the contrary
117. See Appendix.
118. The reason why X-type projects rather than Y-type projects are more likely to be
chosen with less disclosure is greater ignorance. Assuming that among all the projects pro
posed, there is no labor-saving bias in the reasons why the better projects are better, plain
ignorance should not result in missing more Y projects that were superior to the X ones
because of their labor-saving potential than Y projects that were superior to X ones because
of their capital-saving potential.
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indications of the empirical studies, the elasticity of substitution is
sufficiently low that labor-saving better allocations alone would
lower the mppl, their effect would be more than canceled out by the
equal number of capital-saving better allocations.119 Factor-neutral
better allocations, which enhance the marginal products of both fac
tors, would simply add to the improvement in labor's marginal
product.

vi. Firms Produce Different Products - the Likely Balance of
Impacts. Relaxing the assumption that the economy produces only
one product should not alter the general conclusion that better cap
ital allocation will enhance labor's absolute share of national in
come. This is obvious where Y's production function, despite
involving a different product, bears a linear relationship to that of
X For every given combination of labor and capital, the amount of
Y product that would be produced will be the same multiple of the
An assumption of no bias seems plausible: each entrepreneur had every incentive to have
its firm have the most productive production function possible, one that for each possible
amount of labor requires the least capital for any given output and vice versa. The propo
nents of the X-type firms simply have not done as well in pursuing this goal. There is no
reason why, when they fall short, they are more likely to miss opportunities to save labor
than capital.
It is true that innovation is a major spur for proposing new investment projects and that
economists generally believe that there is a labor-saving bias to innovation. See, e.g., HICKS,
supra note 113, at 123-24; Kravis, supra note 113, at 941-42. But this does not necessarily
undermine the plausibility of the neutrality assumption: more of both the X-type and Y-type
projects might be spurred by labor-saving ideas than capital-saving ideas, but the difference
between them might reflect a balance of missed opportunities to save inputs. Even if this
does not hold true, however, it is important to note that a substantial portion of all proposed
projects, X-type and Y-type, will be spurred by the need to replace existing capacity, to meet
new demand, or to provide new products, rather than by the potential of new input-saving
production innovation.

119. Assuming, as we have, linear homogeneous production functions, the marginal prod
ucts depend only on the ratio of the inputs. A better allocation that saves a given proportion
of the economy's total amount of capital clearly increases the marginal product of an actual
unit of labor by giving each unit of labor more effective units of capital with which to work.
A better allocation that saves the same proportion of the economy's total amount of labor
has two opposing effects on the marginal product of an actual unit of labor. First, it decreases
the marginal product of labor by the same amount as the capital-saving better allocation
increases it because the increase in the effective number of units of labor decreases the
amount of capital available to each effective unit of labor by the same amount that the capi
tal-saving better allocation increases the amount of capital available to each unit of labor.
Second, the labor-saving better allocation raises the marginal product of labor because each
actual unit now stands for more than one effective unit of labor. If the elasticity of substitu
tion is much lower than the empirical studies indicate, the first effect would dominate the
second and labor-saving better allocations would lower mppl. However, with an equal
number of Y projects being capital saving and labor saving, an increase in the adoption rate
of Y projects will still increase mppl: the increase in mppl from the capital-saving projects
would just cancel out the decrease from the first effect of the labor-saving projects, leaving
the second effect to raise mppL
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amount of X product that would be produced.izo If one combina
tion of inputs produces 10 0 units of X's product and 150 units of Y's
product and another combination would produce 200 units of X's
product, that second combination thus would produce 30 0 units of
Y's product. What makes Y's project superior is that for each of the
given combinations of inputs, Y's output sells for more than X's
output. In this situation, allocation of capital to Y instead of X is
again _analogous to factor-neutral process innovation. Using any
given combination of inputs in Y is equivalent, in terms of the value
of the output, to using a proportionally greater number of units of

each factor in X Again, in terms of value produced, it is as though·

their use in Y proportionally increases the number of effective units
of each factor. Analogous to the reasoning above, if the differences
between the Y-type projects and X-type projects were all of this
kind and more disclosure by B issuers seeking capital in A would
lead to more Y.projects and fewer X projects, the marginal products
of labor and of capital will each grow proportionally.121 Obviously,
in reality the production function of Y will not bear a linear rela
tionship to that of X But the assumption that it does is adequate
for looking at aggregate consequences of better allocation.
Relaxing the single-product assumption introduces the issue of
consumer preference among products. Considering consumer pref
erence among products creates the possibility that a Y project will
be superior to an X one because, at the margin and given the prices
of inputs reflecting their opportunity costs, Y-project proponents

are better able to sense consumer preferences. There is no reason

to believe that the products that the proponents of such Y projects
choose would on average be more or less labor intensive than the
products that the proponents of the X projects would choose. Both
groups of proponents are competing for funds and both are trying
their best to gauge consumer preferences. The only difference is
that the Y proponents are more successful at it.
Like factor-neutral process innovation, the aggregate effect of
product innovation thus should be to increase labor's marginal
product and hence its absolute share of national income.

120. In more technical terms, the production functions of X and Y differ only by a scalar.
If Q,,(L,K) is the production function for X, and Qy(L,K) is the production function of Y,
then Q,,(L,K) kQy(L,K), where k is a constant positive real number. Given our continuing
assumption that they are homogeneous, all the isoquants of both production functions will be
the same shape. Thus, while X and Y would produce different products, their respective
production functions are such that, given the market prices of labor and capital, the managers
of each will use capital and labor in the same proportions. See HENDERSON & QUANDT,
supra note 99, at 79·81.
121. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
=
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The Relevance of the Place in Which the Transaction
Is Executed

The last dimension of nationality - the place the transaction is
effected - has not played a role in this analysis of standard transac
tions. It is the central focus of the discussion of transplant transac
tions that follows where place is the unique factor that makes the
transactions transnational. The relevance of place to the stakes of
the two countries in standard-transaction disclosure will be post
poned until the discussion of issuer-country transactions; because
the place of the transaction is the sole factor that distinguishes stan
dard transactions from issuer-country transactions. Its relevance
thus is most easily seen through a comparison of the stakes of the
two countries in the two kinds of transactions.
B.

The Transplant Transaction: Buyer From
Transaction Occurs in A

B;

Issuer From

B;

In the "transplant" transnational transaction, the issuer and the
investor buying or selling the security are of the same country. It is
essentially a domestic transaction except for the fact that it is ef
fected in the securities market of another country. Transplant
transactions have historically been rare for a large, developed coun
try such as the United States. Investors want to minimize transac
tion costs by engaging in transactions in their home countries and
issuers will tend to promote a market for their securities first do
mestically, where there would naturally tend to be the largest inter
est in them. Other forces related to differences between countries
in their mandatory disclosure regimes or the execution efficiency of
their exchanges, however, may create incentives for such issuers to
promote transplant transactions. With the cost differential between
effecting a transaction on a foreign market and on a domestic mar
ket declining, transplant transactions are likely to become more im
portant in the future.
Remember again that we are assuming an extreme set of facts in
which the shares of the issuers on which we focus will only be sold
and traded in transplant transactions. There are no public sales to
or trades among residents of A in the shares of these issuers, nor
are there any sales or trades effected in B.

1.

The Different Nature of the Stakes

In a transplant transaction, all the benefits and costs from dis
closure discussed so far are experienced exclusively by residents of
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B. They are the investors, the entrepreneurs, and the suppliers of
the other factors of production. They are the ones who enjoy the
risk reduction and better allocation resulting from increased disclo
sure and who bear its added costs, however these benefits and costs
are distributed among them. The situation is no different than if the
initial offering and subsequent trading in the shares were entirely
domestic. In terms of these interests, B is the only country that has
a stake in the disclosure practices of its transplant-transaction issu
ers. Even though transactions in their shares are being effected in
A, A has no stake.
There is another interest that we have not yet considered: the
volume of securities transactions effected within a country's bor
ders. Serving as the location for securities transactions economi
cally benefits the residents who provide the services necessary to

effect these transactions. If the level of disclosure that accompanies
transplant transactions in A differs from that which accompanies

domestic transactions in B, the difference can affect the quantity of
these transplant transactions and hence the total volume of securi
ties transactions effected in each country. A has an interest in the
existence of a difference if the difference is one that would increase
country B issuer-transplant transactions. Because most transplant
transactions likely are substitutes for purely domestic transactions,
B would have a volume-related countervailing interest of similar
strength in removing any difference - that is, in place being irrele
vant to the level of disclosure by B issuers.
The likely source of any difference between the disclosure that
accompanies transplant transactions and that which accompanies
purely domestic ones would be a difference in the rigor of each
country's mandatory disclosure regime. The stakes of countries A
and B in the transplant transaction disclosure of B issuers thus
translate into their respective stakes in whether or not the applica
tion of A's regime to such transactions substitutes for the applica
tion of B's regime.

2. Country A's Regime Is the More Rigorous: The Market
Reputation and Cost Deterrence Effects
a.

The Market-Reputation Effect.

Suppose that A's disclosure

regime, at least when applied to its purely domestic transactions, is
more rigorous than B's. Thus, A might be the United States, and B

might be Germany. If A applies the same regime to transplant
transactions, issuers from B that promote transplant transactions in
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A will have to disclose more than if they promote purely domestic
transactions.
This difference can attract certain transactions to A. Consistent
application of A 's regime creates a reputation that any issuer whose
shares are sold or traded in A has disclosure practices that meet A 's
higher standard. Given such a reputation, the mere fact that an
issuer's shares are sold or traded in A economically communicates
to investors that the issuer, even if it is from B, meets A's standards.
An issuer would want to make such a communication if it deter
mines that the benefits of meeting this higher standard exceed the
costs. An issuer making such a determination has an incentive to
promote the public sale or trading of its securities in A. In order to
establish or preserve the reputation that creates this incentive, A
has a stake in the issuer actually meeting the standard.

If A 's regime is the more rigorous and market reputation is the
only factor that draws transplant transactions to A, A has a stake in
B issuers disclosing more when transactions in their shares occur
within A's borders than when they occur at home in B. A wants
location to matter and wants to apply its regime. B has a counter
vailing volume-related interest in removing any difference, so that
location does not matter.122

b.

Other Attractions to A and the Cost-Deterrence Effect.

Some issuers in B, however, may have reasons other than A's repu
tation for high disclosure standards to promote transplant transac
tions. For example, A may have a stock market that executes
transactions more efficiently than do the markets in B. If this is the
case, it becomes ambiguous whether A has a volume-related stake
in the existence of a disclosure difference for transplant-transaction
B issuers. One group of B issuers is, as just described, attracted by
the difference and without it would not promote transplant transac
tions in their shares even given A 's superior execution efficiency.
Another group of B issuers, however, might find A 's execution effi
ciency, if that were all that was involved, to be a sufficient induce
ment to promote transplant transactions of their shares in A, but
might find that the costs of complying with A's regime exceed the
122. Of course, other considerations, unrelated to volume, may point in the opposite di
rection. Suppose that some B issuers that find the benefits of meeting A's standards exceed
the costs are correct in terms of social benefits exceeding social costs. Because all the entre
preneurs, investors, and suppliers of other factors of production associated with these issuers
are B residents, it is B's residents who gain if the issuers can find a mechanism to assure
investors that they in fact will meet these higher standards. If B's government is unable to
provide such a mechanism and views these gains to its residents as outweighing the negative
effect on share transaction volume in B, it would on balance favor application by A.
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benefits by such an amount that they would decide not to come to
A. The second group is likely to be larger than the first because the
managers of most B issuers would probably prefer not to disclose at
B's required level, let alone A 's.123
When these additional considerations are added in, A 's more
rigorous standard may lead it to want the place of the transaction
not to matter in how much a B issuer discloses. A would not have a
stake in transplant-transaction B issuers disclosing more than do
mestic-transaction B issuers unless the number of transactions
drawn in by reputation exceeds the number deterred by the costs of
disclosure. B would have exactly the opposite volume-related
stakes.

B would want location to matter unless the market

reputation effect outweighed the cost-deterrence effect.

3.

Country B's Regime Is the More Rigorous: The Regulatory
Evasion Effect
Suppose instead that A 's domestic disclosure regime is less rig

orous than B's. Thus, A might be the United Kingdom, and B
might be Canada. If A applies its regime to transplant transactions
in B issuer shares and this results in B's regime not being applied to
these issuers, B issuers will not have to disclose as much in trans
plant transactions as they would have to disclose in domestic trans
actions. This difference too will attract certain transactions to A.
For some entrepreneurs and managers in B, the costs of meeting
B's disclosure standards exceed the benefits to them. They will
123. B issuer managers decide where their shares are traded and offered. For most of
them, the costs of complying even with B's regime likely exceed the reputational benefit of
doing so. Absent regulation, an issuer voluntarily chooses to disclose at the level where the
reputational benefits in the market from disclosing at that level just equal the costs as per
ceived by management. As we saw in Part II, supra, strong theoretical reasons exist for
believing that the level so chosen is lower than the level that is socially optimal. The cost of
disclosure in the manager's eyes includes harm to the issuer resulting from information given
to competitors, major suppliers, and customers. This harm, however, is not a social cost of
disclosure, because these recipients of the information enjoy commensurate benefits.
Assuming that B's required disclosure level is not set below B's social optimum level from
a risk reduction and resource allocation efficiency point of view, most B issuers thus would
prefer to disclose less than that and would certainly not be attracted to A's even stricter
regime. This is an appropriate assumption. Admittedly, political structures within some
countries, particularly developing ones, may result in disclosure standards below the social
optimum. However, where, as here, the issue under study is regulation with respect to be
havior with cross-border effects, it is conventional to assume, as a reasonable first approxima
tion of reality, that the countries involved act in their own best interests when regulating
entirely domestic versions of the same behaviors. This, for example, is a fundamental as
sumption behind the governmental-interest method for identifying "true conflicts" of law.
See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1963);
Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1990).
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have an incentive to promote transplant transactions in place of do
mestic ones.
This time, however, the existence of other reasons for B issuers
to be attracted to A, such as execution efficiency, will not cut signif
icantly against A 's preference for the difference. Some of the issu
ers attracted by such other reasons might well be concerned with
B 's lesser-market reputation, but this concern is unlikely to deter
them from promoting transplant transactions in A. As B issuers,
they presumably can choose not to opt out of B's regime, even if all
selling and trading of their shares occur in A. This would communi
cate to investors that the issuer, despite being sold and traded in A,
will comply with B 's higher disclosure standards.124 The regulatory
evasion effect will dominate the reputation effect. When A's re
gime is the less rigorous, therefore, A has a clear volume-related
stake in transplant-transaction B issuers not disclosing as much as
they would need to if the transactions were effected at home. B has
the same clear countervailing volume related stake in the issuer dis
closing the larger amount of information required by its regime
even though the place of the transaction is abroad. A wants the
level of disclosure to depend on location; B does not.

4. Increased Investor Willingness to Trade on a Country's Market
Is Not a Sound Basis for Imposing Its Regime on
Transplant Transactions
This analysis focuses on the decisions of B issuers as to where to
promote the sale or trading of their shares and not on the decisions
of investors. This is because the financial economics models em
ployed in this analysis suggest that a country's reputation concern
ing the disclosure practices of issuers whose shares are sold or
traded within its borders will not affect investor willingness to trade
124. 1\vo objections might be raised here. First, unlike the fact that A is the place where
a particular B issuer's shares are being sold or traded, the fact that the issuer nevertheless
chooses to register its securities in B when it does not need to will not be known to all
investors. Not all investors will know that the issuer is in effect voluntarily binding itself to
conform to B's higher standard. But not all investors need to know of the issuer's registra
tion in B for the price to reflect that fact. It is the price effect of the disclosure choice that
attracts the issuer to register its securities in the first place.
Second, and somewhat more serious, if B's regime is not automatically applied to trans
plant issuers from B, the issuer that originally announces it will nevertheless comply with B's
regime could presumably deregister at some later point. Registration in B is not needed for
continued trading of the issuer's shares the way it would be if the issuer had gone public at
home, and thus the issuer cannot provide investors with the same degree of assurance of
continued high disclosure. To that extent, B issuers with market-reputation concerns might
stay home and avoid A if A's regime applies to transplant transactions in substitution for B's
regime.
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in that market one way or the other. If investors expect an issuer to
provide less disclosure, they will expect that the cash returns from
the issuer's projects will be lower because of poorer project choice
and weaker managerial discipline. This results in a sufficiently
lower share price to provide investors with an expected return
equal to the competitive rate, but not in any reduced investor will
ingness to trade in the issuer's shares.

An important regulatory implication flows from this conclusion:
When a country has the more rigorous disclosure regime, imposi
tion of its regime on the basis that the transaction was effected
within its territory can only be justified to the extent that such im
position attracts issuers of other countries voluntarily to promote
such trading, not that it will make investors generally more willing
to trade on the regulating country's markets.125
C.

Issuer-Country Transactions: Buyer From A ; Issuer From B ;
Transaction Occurs in B

1.

The Nature of Issuer-Country Transactions

"Issuer-country" transnational transactions, like standard trans
actions, involve situations in which the buyer or seller of a security
is of a different country than the issuer. Unlike the standard trans
action, the transaction is effected in a securities market of the is125. An alternative story can be told that suggests that the reputations for disclosure of
the issuers traded in a market could affect the general level of investor participation in that
market. Under this story, investors perceive that securities about which little is known are
likely to be unfairly priced. Many investors, for example, believe that insider trading results
in unfairness and less extensive issuer disclosure increases the opportunities for insider trad
ing. Investors may also believe that primary offerings by issuers about which little is known
are likely to be at unfair prices. Even if, as most financial economists would argue, investors
are wrong in these beliefs, the perception could lead some investors to be unwilling to buy
and sell such shares at any price. Suppose that some investors do behave this way and that
A's regime is the more rigorous but is not imposed on transplant transactions in shares of B
issuers. Then A would have a stake in the disclosure level of these issuers. A lower level of
investor participation in the market for these securities would reduce the volume of secon
dary trading occurring in A, and hence the demand for the services of A's securities industry.
Even if correct, however, this story does not make a compelling case for the imposition of
country A's regime, rather than country B's regime, on B issuers promoting transplant trans
actions in A. Country B also has an additional stake, not previously considered, in the disclo
sure practices of its transplant-transaction issuers. Lower participation in the trading of the
shares of such issuers will also hurt B's residents. B's investors would trade less, and the
shares of B's issuers are involved. Reduced participation increases the aggregate amount of
undiversifiable market risk in B's economy and reduces liquidity. Both effects result in a
combination of higher capital costs and lower investor welfare, both of which are, in the case
of transplant transactions, experienced exclusively by residents of country B. The effect of
any reduced investor participation from lower disclosure by transplant transaction B issuers,
furthermore, should be limited to B investors buying shares of B issuers. It is unlikely that
investors would be so unsophisticated as not to know that A's issuers must disclose more,
particularly if securities industry participants were legally required to highlight the fact.
For an elaboration of these points, see Fox, supra note 68, at 274-77.
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suer's country. Like transplant transactions, issuer-country
transnational transactions have historically been relatively unim
portant. Effecting a securities transaction abroad has been signifi
cantly more costly and inconvenient to an investor than effecting a
domestic securities transaction. This factor has generally kept the
level of issuer-country transactions to a de minimis level - in terms
of triggering disclosure regulations - for securities of most issuers,
whether or not investors in any one or more other countries have a
substantial interest in those securities. Where there is such substan
tial interest, the issuer will find worthwhile the set-up costs of pro
moting a market for its securities in the investors' home market.
Any issuer-country transactions that would otherwise have oc
curred will then be displaced by cheaper standard transnational
transactions. In the more typical situation in which no substantial
interest among investors of another country existed, the issuer has
not found the set-up costs worthwhile. The absence of a market in
the investors' home country combined with the expense of effecting
transactions abroad has meant that, although all transnational
transactions in such an issuer's shares have been issuer-country
transactions, there have been very few of them. With the cost dif
ferential between effecting a transaction on a foreign market and
effecting one on a domestic market declining, and interest in invest
ing in issuers abroad increasing issuer-country transactions, like
transplant transactions, are likely, however, to become more impor
tant in the future.
In our examples of issuer-country transactions, the issuers are
again nationals of country B. The sales and trades of their shares
are to and among residents of A. All that differentiates these is
suer-country transactions from standard transactions is that they
are effected in country B rather than in country A. Again, in order
to focus our inquiry on the special issues raised by issuer-country
transactions, we will assume an extreme set of facts: these sales to
and trades among A residents in shares of these issuers are not ac
companied by any public sales to or trades among residents of B
(domestic transactions) or public transactions effected in A (stan
dard transactions).

2.

The Stakes of Countries A and B: A Comparison Between
Issuer-Country and Standard Transactions

It is critical at the outset to observe that the distribution of the
benefits and costs of the disclosure practices of X and Y discussed
in Part II - risk reduction and allocation of resources - is identi-
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cal whether the issuer's shares involve issuer-country or standard
transactions. Differences in the stakes of countries A and B be
tween issuer-country issuers and standard issuers must result from
the factors just considered in the discussion of transplant transac
tion issuers, ones relating to the general volume of securities trans
actions effected within their borders. To get a picture of the total
stakes of each country in the disclosure practices of the two kinds of
issuers, we simply superimpose their respective volume-related in
terests, analyzed for transplant transactions, on their respective risk
reduction, resource allocation, and cost interests, analyzed for stan
dard transactions.
The volume issue with transplant transactions, as we have seen,
comes from the fact that transplant and purely domestic transac
tions are potential substitutes for each other. Similarly, the volume
issue with standard transactions comes from the fact that standard
and issuer country transactions are substitutes for each other. We
must identify the volume-related stakes for each country in the
existence of a difference in the disclosure practices of issuers in
volved in one kind of transaction versus the other.
a.

A's Regime Is the More Rigorous. First, consider the situa

tion in which A's disclosure regime is the more rigorous. Thus, A
again might be the United States and B again might be Germany.
Some B issuers would, through the market reputation effect, be at
tracted to make A the place of share sales to and trading among A
investors if, as a result, they had to disdose more than if their
shares were sold and traded in B. In other words, some B issuers
would be attracted to A if A's more rigorous standards applied to
standard transactions and B's less rigorous standards applied to is
suer-country transactions.
There would also be B issuers that would be attracted to make
A the place to buy and trade their shares for other reasons. One
powerful new reason, not present with transplant transactions, is
that investors from A would be able to buy and trade their B issuer
shares more cheaply in A than in B. 126 Some members of this
group of issuers attracted by reasons other than market reputation
would be deterred from coming to A if they had to meet A's more
rigorous disclosure standards. These are the issuers that would find
126. This local-trading attraction exists in addition to any superiority in execution effi
ciency in A, the example of an alternative attraction given in the discussion of transplant
transactions. In the real world, the local trading attraction is likely to be the more powerful
one.
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their costs of compliance to exceed their benefits, even after count
ing the worth to them of their investors in A being able to buy and
trade more cheaply.
A, therefore, will not have a volume-related stake in standard
transaction B issuers disclosing more than issuer-country B issuers,
unless the transactions attracted by the reputation effect exceed
those deterred by the compliance-cost effect, something that is even
less likely than with transplant transactions.127 Thus, with A's re
gime the more rigorous, absent domination by the reputation effect,
A will not want, and B will want, location to matter in determining
which country's regime is applied.

b.

B 's Regime Is the More Rigorous. Now consider the situa
tion in which B's disclosure regime is the more rigorous. Thus, A
again might be the United Kingdom, and B again might be Canada.
Some B issuers will find their costs of compliance with B's regime
to exceed their benefits. These B issuers will make A the place
where their share sales to and trades among A residents occur to
avoid B's heightened disclosure requirements. In other words,
some B issuers will be attracted to A if A 's less rigorous standards
are applied to standard transactions and B's more rigorous stan
dards to issuer-country transactions.
Some B issuers also will want to make A the place for their A
investors to buy and trade their shares for other reasons, most im
portant, the savings it will confer on those investors. Some of these
issuers will be concerned with A 's lower market reputation. But, as
with issuers attracted in the transplant-transaction example by A 's
greater execution efficiency, the issuers concerned with market rep
utation can presumably choose not to opt out of B's regime, while
still making A the place to buy and trade their shares.
A therefore will have a relatively unambiguous volume-related
stake in reducing the level of disclosure required of standard
transaction B issuers below that required of issuer-country B issu
ers. Thus, with B's regime the more rigorous, A will want, and B
will not want, location to matter in determining which regime is
applied.

3. Reflections on the Role of Place
The discussion concerning transplant and issuer-country trans
actions suggests a basic rule: The country with the less rigorous
127. See supra note 123.
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regime wants location to matter in deciding which regime should
apply and the country with the more rigorous regime does not. The
only exception is where the country with the more rigorous regime
believes that the reputation effect will outweigh the cost-of
compliance effect and even then only if the issuer is not its own
national. At this point in the article, two things are worth noting
about the role of location, each of which will be important in the
next discussion concerning the appropria.te apportionment of regu
latory authority between countries A and B, and later, when we
seek to identify the best U.S. policy.
First, there is only one reason a country associated with a trans
national transaction has any interest, based on where the transac
tion has occurred, in how much the issuer discloses. The reason for
this is that differences in disclosure levels based on transaction loca
tion can affect the aggregate volume of transactions effected within
the country's borders. These national stakes are essentially a zero
sum game: The volume of transactions that one country gains from
location-based disclosure rules is counterbalanced by the volume
lost by the other country.
Second, as we have just seen, it is generally the country whose
regime is less rigorous that wants location to matter. This means
that if there are no international constraints on the behavior of
states in the application of their disclosure regimes, and each state
comes genuinely to understand and act on its own interests, in the
future, location is unlikely to play a role in how much an issuer
discloses. Where the issuer's country has the more rigorous regime,
it will be the state that will not want place to matter. It has the
power to enforce this preference by requiring its issuers to meet its
higher standards wherever their shares are sold or traded. Where
the issuer's country has the less rigorous regime, it will be the state
that will want place to matter. As a practical matter, however, it is
powerless to force those of its issuers whose shares are sold or
traded abroad to meet the higher standards of the other country if
the other country does not so require. Thus, when it is the other
country that wants location to matter, the issuer's country has the
power to prevent location from mattering; when the issuer's coun
try is the one wanting location to matter, it is powerless to make
that happen.
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WHICH COUNTRY'S RESIDENTS FEEL
EFFECTS OF B ISSUER DISCLOSURE

THE

Transaction 'fype
Issuer
Standard 1iranso:1ant Counrtrv D omesf1c
Cost of
Disclosure
Type of
Effect

B*

B

B*

B

Resource
Allocation
Efficiency

B*

B

B*

B

Undiversified
Investor
Risk

A

B

A

B

0-sum
between
A and B

0-sum
between
A and B

Trading
Volume

0-sum
0-sum
between between
A and B A and B

* Any change in the level of ongoing disclosure from what was expected at the time of initial
sale by the issuer would instead be felt by A residents.

IV.

THE

OPTIMAL APPORTIONMENT OF REGULATORY
AUTHORITY

Each country associated with a transnational securities transac
tion has particular interests in the issuer's disclosure practices that
are related to resource allocation, risk reduction, and trading
volume effects. Having examined these interests, we are now in a
position to demonstrate the apportionment of regulatory authority
among these countries that would maximize global economic
welfare.
At the outset, assume a few fundamental features of issuer dis
closure that are true today and are likely to continue to characterize
the world in the short- and medium-term future. First, regulation of
issuer disclosure will continue to be made at the national, rather
than global, level and that most of the world's economic activity will
continue to be Undertaken by issuers having a distinct national
identity.128 As the real economies of nations within certain regions
such as the European Community become increasingly integrated,
issuers may take on more of a regional identity and regional regula
tory regimes may develop. But a world of regional regimes poses
the same problems as a world of national ones, and any movement
in that direction can be easily accommodated within the analysis of
128. See supra note 9.
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this article simply by substituting, where appropriate, regional is
suer identities and regimes for national ones.129
Second, the level of disclosure that

will

maximize global eco

nomic welfare is likely to differ among issuers. These differences
are related both to the nationality of an issuer itself and the nation
ality or nationalities of its shareholders. The differences related to
the issuer's nationality arise from differences among countries in
their institutional structures of corporate governance. In particular,
the effectiveness of disclosure in aligning managerial interests with
those of shareholders depends on both the structure of share own
ership and applicable corporate law. For example, more disclosure
might be called for in Britain and the United States, where hostile
tender offers are an important factor, than in Germany, where they
have not been. The influence of share price on the quality of pro
ject choice will also vary from one country to another, depending
on how managers make capital-spending decisions. The differences
related to shareholder nationality arise because of differences
among countries in terms of the risk aversion of their typical inves
tors and the extent to which they diversify their portfolios. These
investor-related differences among countries, while in their com
bined effect are probably not as important as corporate governance
structure differences, could also influence the optimal amount of
disclosure for an issuer.
Finally, even if issuers around the world did not differ in their
optimal level of disclosure, what that optimal level is would still be
unclear.

Some commentators find even the most rudimentary

mandatory disclosure to be on balance harmful, and probably
would hold this view whatever the nationality of an issuer or its
investors.130 Others consider mandatory disclosure a necessary cor
rective to a clear case of market failure.131 Even those who find
mandatory disclosure helpful disagree as to how helpful and how
129. Trends toward transnational economic integration will not extend to the global level
with sufficient intensity to require a change in the analysis for at least the medium-term
future. Transnational economic integration will require much greater transnational flow of
goods, entrepreneurial talent, and noncapital factors of production than is the case today.
For reasons discussed briefly in Part V, until a high level of global integration is obtained, an
agreement on a global disclosure regime is also unlikely.
130. See GEORGE J. BENSTON, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE IN THE UK AND THE
USA 189 (1976); Benston, supra note 80; Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obso
lescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L.
REv. 909, 922 (1994).
131. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HAR.v. L. REv. 1435, 1490-91 (1992); John C. Cof
fee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 10 VA. L.
REV. 717 (1984).
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costly it is, and hence what the optimal level is.132 We simply do not
know the answers to these questions for certain.
These fundamental features - the continuation of nationally
based disclosure regulation and issuers with distinct national identi
ties, the likely differences among issuers in optimal levels of disclo
sure, and the difficulty in knowing exactly what that optimal level is
- suggest two prime criteria for assigning regulatory authority.
The first is the criterion of expertise. Everything else being equal,
for each of the world's issuers, the country whose officials are likely
to be best informed on the relationship between the issuer's level of
disclosure and the interests affected thereby should be apportioned
regulatory authority. The second criterion is proper political incen
tive and feedback, which I shall refer to in shorthand simply as feed
back. Everything else being equal, for each of the world's issuers,
the country whose residents will be most positively affected if the
level of disclosure required of the issuer is close to what is globally
optimal and will be most negatively affected if it deviates substan
tially from that goal should exercise regulatory authority. When
this is the case, the officials making the decision have the greatest
incentive to get the required level right. If, despite this incentive,
they fail because they do not fully understand the phenomena in
volved, they receive the most accurate negative feedback.
A.

The Recommended Approach

My recommendation is easy to state: When a transnational
transaction occurs, the issuer's country should be the exclusive de
terminant of what, if anything, the issuer should be required to dis
close. Assuming that the issuer's country imposes at least as
stringent requirements on the issuer as it would have if the transac
tion had been entirely domestic, all other countries associated with
the transaction should refrain from imposing their regimes on the
issuer.
Two examples· in terms of U.S. practice help show how this ap
proach, if adopted, would differ from today's.133 The United States,
unlike today, would apply the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities
132. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984) (assessing mandatory disclosure as a

method to ameliorate the underproduction of issuer disclosure because of its positive exter
nalities) with Coffee, supra note 131 (identifying additional reasons for mandatory disclosure
that are discounted by Easterbrook and Fischel).
133. See infra Part V for a more general discussion of current U.S. practices.
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Act")134 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act")135 mandatory disclosure requirements, even to a U.S. corpo
ration that decides to go public abroad through an offering in the
Euroequity market and even when the issuer imposes restrictions
on the offering designed to deter its flowback into the United
States. The United States, unlike today, would not apply these
mandatory disclosure requirements to an offering in the United
States to U.S. residents by a French issuer as long as the issuer pro
vides, pursuant to the French regime, the same disclosure as it
would have had it made a purely domestic public offering in France.
Applying the proposed approach to purely domestic transac
tions and to each of the three general categories of transnational
transactions considered in Part ill
transplant transactions, stan
dard transactions, and issuer-country transactions - demonstrates
that the approach represents the optimal assignment of regulatory
authority. In each case we will continue the frequently artificial as
sumption that the issuer's shares are not offered or traded in any of
the other categories of transactions. In the examples the issuer will
continue to be from country B and, where the transaction is trans
national, the residence of the buyer or the place of the transaction
-

- and sometimes both - will continue to be country A. If, for
each of the categories, the recommended approach is the optimal
assignment under this artificial assumption, it also will be the opti
mal allocation in the real world, in which many issuers' shares are
offered and traded in some combination of purely domestic transac
tions and one or more types of transnational transactions.
This discussion models issuer disclosure as a linear phenome
non: if one country's regime requires a higher level than the other,
the stricter country requires an issuer to disclose everything that the
more lenient country requires and more. Concurrent regulation is
thus equivalent to giving exclusive regulatory authority to the coun
try with the stricter regime, and so, within the model, is a meaning
less concept. In the real world, of course, the country that most
observers would consider more lenient may still require disclosure
of certain information of which the stricter country does not require
disclosure. Concurrent regulation is therefore not meaningless, and
is in fact a common occurrence. But, as I briefly will argue in the
last section of this Part, if the stricter regime is generally superior to
the lenient regime, the information lost by not applying the more
134. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa (West 1981 & Supp. 1997); see infra Part V for a more
general discussion of current U.S. practices.
135. 15 U.S.C.A §§ 78a-78mm (West 1981 & Supp. 1997).
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lenient regime as well is not likely to be important enough to justify
the many problems that accompany forcing the issuer to comply
with the goals of two regulators instead of one.
WHICH COUNTRY'S REGIME WOULD REGULATE B ISSUERS
Approach to Regulatory Reach
Investor
Market
Issuer
Protection Protection Nationality
Standard
Buyer from A
Occurs in A

A

A

B

'fype of
Transplant
Transaction Buyer from B
Occurs in A

B

A

B

Issuer Country
Buyer from A
Occurs in B

A

B

B

Domestic
Buyer from B
Occurs in B

B

B

B

B.

Purely Domestic and Transplant Transactions

The superiority of allocating regulatory responsibility exclu
sively to the issuer's home country is most easily demonstrated in
the cases of issuers whose shares are offered and traded either en
tirely in purely domestic transactions or entirely in transplant
transactions.

1. Risk-Reduction and Resource-Allocation Effects
In purely domestic transactions and transplant transactions, the
investors and the issuers are from the same country - in our exam
ple, B. The risk reduction and resource allocation effects of such
issuers' disclosure behavior thus are felt exclusively by B's resi
dents. B's officials are obviously more likely than the officials of
any other country to know the benefits and costs of disclosure that
affect only its residents. They are also the officials with the political
incentives to choose the disclosure level that maximizes global wel
fare, because, where there are no effects abroad, maximizing the
welfare of B's residents maximizes global welfare. B's officials also
will feel the negative feedback if, despite these incentives, they fail
at first to find the welfare-maximizing level. If we look only at risk
reduction and resource allocation effects of disclosure regulation,
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the expertise-feedback criteria unambiguously argue for assigning
to B's government exclusive regulatory responsibility for the disclo
sure behavior of B's issuers.
This conclusion is hardly surprising when it comes to B's purely
domestic issuers, whose shares are offered and traded exclusively at

home. It is equally compelling, however, for its transplant issuers,
whose shares are offered and traded exclusively in A.

2. Adding in Trading-Volume Effects - First Analysis
What will happen when we add the trading-volume effects of
disclosure regulation into the analysis? Will we still want to treat
transplant issuers the same way as purely domestic issuers? As
sume preliminarily that the choice of which country
A or B has regulatory authority over transplant issuers from B has no ef
fect on the levels of disclosure required by their respective regimes
-

on purely domestic issuers. As discussed in Part III, the volume
related stakes of countries A and B in the choice of which country
governs B's transplant issuers are a zero-sum game: any gain in the
volume of transactions for one country will be exactly counterbal
anced by the loss in volume by the other country. There will be no
net effect on global welfare. Adding trading-volume effects into the
calculations thus does not affect the conclusion that B should regu
late both its purely domestic and transplant issuers.

3. Adding in Trading-Volume Effects - Accounting for
Intercountry Competition's Impact on Regulatory
Content136
This preliminary assumption may, however, be incorrect. Ap
portioning regulatory authority over B's transplant issuers to the
country where the transactions occur - in our example, A
gen
erates regulatory competition. With apportionment to A, B issuers
will be choosing the disclosure regime by which they will be gov
erned when they choose where their shares are going to be offered
and traded. Each country wishes to maximize the volume of B is
suer transactions effected in its own market, because that would in
crease rents earned by its residents. Each would thus endeavor,
everything else being equal, to set its level of required disclosure to
-

136. A more extended version of this discussion appears in Merritt B. Fox, The Political
Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing Market for Securities
45-52, app. II (Apr. 5, 1997) (unpublished paper presented at the Conference on the
Regulation of Interactional Economic Activity, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., on file with
author).
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attract as many B issuers as possible. Apportioning authority to the
issuers' home country, B, does not generate such regulatory
competition.
We initially concluded that regulatory authority over transplant
issuers from B should be apportioned to B, a choice which we have
seen forecloses any regulatory competition. This initial conclusion
was based on the fact that B's officials have greater expertise and
are politically responsible to the people affected by the issuers' dis
closure practices. This conclusion should only be changed if the
competition that would arise by apportionment instead to A would,
despite the advantages of home-country regulation, move A's and
B's required levels of disclosure closer to what is optimal in global
welfare terms for the respective sets of issuers that each, in the end,
regulates.

a. Preliminary Considerations. Note two considerations at
the outset. First, regulatory competition is desirable only if, in the
absence of regulatory disclosure, A and B would each require too
much disclosure rather than too little. Remember that for competi
tion to arise, A must exert regulatory authority over transplant issu
ers from B. Part III showed that with authority apportioned in this
way, if A has the lower disclosure requirements, more B issuers are
likely to abandon their home country's market and promote the
sale and trading of their shares in A than would do so if A had the
higher ones.137 In other words, the regulatory-evasion effect of
lower standards dominates the reputation effect of higher stan
dards. Regulatory competition thus creates pressure to lower each
country's required level of disclosure. B, in order to retain its own
issuers, will want a lower level than it would othenvise. The same
will be true for A in order to attract these B issuers.
Second, including the effects of regulatory competition in the
analysis should not change the conclusion that purely domestic and
transplant-transaction issuers should be treated alike. If one be
lieves that such regulatory competition on balance would improve
global welfare through its pressures on each country to lower its
required level of disclosure, there is no reason to require an issuer
to go to the inconvenience of having its shares offered and traded
only abroad in order to be governed by a different regime. The
location of the transaction still should not matter. For a B issuer
whose shares are sold and traded entirely domestically but whose
137. See supra section III.B.3.
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entrepreneurs or managers prefer that it be governed by A's regime
rather than B's regime, that option should be available as long as
investors are fully aware of the choice that is made. The fact that
no country's domestic regime currently permits its purely domestic
issuers this option, however, suggests that the claim that competi
tion in securities regulation would be beneficial is highly
controversial.138

b. The Starting Presumption: For Regulating Each State's En
tirely Domestic Activities, Its Rules Are Superior to Those of Any
Other State. Where, as here, the issue under study is how to regu
late a given kind of behavior with transborder effects, it is conven
tional to presume, as a reasonable first approximation of reality,
that the countries involved. act in their own best interests when reg
ulating entirely domestic versions of the same behaviors.139 Tb.is
conclusion seems a reasonable starting presumption in the construc
tion of a positive theory of such behavior and its regulation. Under
this assumption, it would be undesirable to apportion to A regula
tory authority over transplant issuers from B. The resulting regula
tory competition would cause the disclosure required by each
country's regime to be lowered from a presumptively optimal level
to a suboptimal one.
What would be the implications, though, of incorporating a
more complicated theory of governmental behavior - public
choice theory - into the analysis?140 Public choice theory suggests
that concentrated interest group action will cause a country to regu138. The absence of this option in the securities law context is in stark contrast with the
corporate law context. A corporation is free to choose its jurisdiction of incorporation. It is
free to do business not only there, but in all other jurisdictions as well. Under choice-of-law's
internal affairs doctrine, each of these other jurisdictions will respect the law of the corpora
tion's jurisdiction of incorporation as the corporation's governing law for matters pertinent to
a corporation's "internal affairs." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 301-302 (1971)� see also P. John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice ofLaw, 1985 DUKE
L.J. 1, 15-18 {discussing modern trend of how internal affairs doctrine dominates, despite
ensuing choice of law "revolution"). These factors, in combination, allow a firm, wherever it
operates, to be governed by the corporate law of its choice.
Professor Roberta Romano, who favors such competition, has recently suggested giving
even purely domestic issuers such an option. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors:
A Market Approach to Securities Regulation (Apr. 28, 1997) (unpublished paper, presented
at the Symposium on Comparative Corporate Governance, Max-Planck-lnstitut, Hamburg,
Germany, on file with author).
139. See sources cited supra note 123.
140. For examples of public choice theory see JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GoRDON TUL

LOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CoNSENT: LoGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONS1ITUTIONAL DEMOC.
RACY (1965); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
{1971); Richard A. Posner, Theories ofEconomic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Ser.
335 {1974); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, supra note 80.
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late more than is in its national interest. Some commentators have
used public choice theory applied within a purely domestic context
to suggest that mandated disclosure represents overregulation at
the behest of the securities industry,141 so that the required level of
disclosure is suboptimally high. If so, regulatory competition might
be a useful counteracting force. This may suggest that regulatory
authority over transplant issuers from B should, contrary to my ini
tial conclusions, be apportioned to A, the country where the trans
actions take place.
The advocate of such an approach, however, must establish two
things to overcome the conventional and reasonable starting pre
sumption that states act in their own best interests. First, she needs
to show that within a purely domestic context, cnncentrated interest
group action results in an excessive level of mandated disclosure.
Second, she needs to show that regulatory competition at the inter
national level would be a helpful antidote to the problem. Neither
will be easy to show.

c.

The Public Choice Critique in the Purely Domestic Context.

Several factors cast doubt on the claim that within a purely domes
tic context concentrated interest group actions result in an excessive
level of mandated disclosure. To start, the effectiveness of public
choice theory in explaining regulation generally is the subject of
much debate; there is hardly consensus that most political action
consists of self-interested rent seeking.142 Moreover, even if one
believes that public choice theory has considerable explanatory
value generally, the story may err when applied to securities disclo
sure. Those who use public choice theory to argue that the domes
tically mandated level of disclosure is excessively high may not
correctly identify all of the interests of the securities industry. They
may be correct that some members desire a high level of mandatory
disclosure in order to reduce their costs of collecting information.
1
Other securities-industry members, however, might prefer a low
level, so that, for example, more firms would be willing to be public
companies, thereby resulting in more fee-generating initial public
offerings and secondary trades. They also omit consideration of
141. See SusAN M. PmLLIPs & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND nra PUBLIC INTER
EST 22-23 (1981); Macey, supra note 130.
142. For reactions to public choice theory, see Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibility Factor:
The Limits of Public Choice Theory and Public Institutions, 14 WASH. U. L.Q. 179 (1996);
Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice
Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 CoLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
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concentrated interest groups outside of the securities industry, such
as the managements of established public corporations, whose in
terests are likely to favor low levels of required disclosure. Finally,
they do not account for the possibility that the interests favoring
more disclosure attributed to persons in the securities industry may
serendipitously coincide with correction of important market fail
ures in issuer disclosure due to the public goods nature of informa
tion and agency problems between the managements of established
issuers and their stockholders.143

d. Even If the Public Choice Critique Is Valid in the Purely
Domestic Context, Regulatory Competition Is Not Necessarily a
Helpfel Antidote. Assume now that the public choice story is cor
rect and that within a purely domestic context the forces it identi
fies result in an excessively high required level of disclosure. This
does not necessarily imply that promoting regulatory competition
- assigning regulatory responsibility for B's transplant issuers to A
- is a helpful antidote to the problem. Issuer entrepreneurs and
managers are the ones who will determine where their shares will
be offered and traded. Full-fledged regulatory competition thus is
likely to result in some small country, with little in the way of do
mestic issuers, offering a disclosure regime that requires no more
disclosure than these entrepreneurs and managers find to be in
their individual best interests. In other words, some country is
likely to become in its disclosure laws the equivalent of Luxem
bourg in its banking laws.144 In essence, as a result of regulatory
competition, issuer entrepreneurs and managers are likely to have
the option of disclosing no more than if there were no regulation at
all.14s
Whether it is desirable to provide these individuals with this op
tion depends on a comparison of two ways of coming to a decision
on the proper level of issuer disclosure. Our goal is that the level
chosen is the one where, at the margin, social costs of issuer disclo
sure just equal social benefits. One way is to rely on the decisions
of issuer entrepreneurs and managers, which are based on their cal143. See Coffee, supra note 131; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 132, at 684-85.
144. In fact, Luxembourg itself is already reputed to provide only a "nods and winks"
review of offers and sales of new issues of securities listed on the Luxembourg Stock Ex
change. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Regulatory Harmony in the European Communi
ties: The Common Market Prospectus, 16 BROOK. J. INTL. L. 19, 41 (1990).
145. Even if a securities law equivalent to Luxembourg does not develop, regulatory
competition is likely to create larger pressures for all countries with major stock exchanges to
lower their regulations significantly. See Fox, supra note 136.
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culations of the benefits and costs privately experienced by them.
The other is to rely on the decisions of the government of the coun
try whose residents exclusively experience the actual benefits and
costs of their issuers' disclosures.
As Part II demonstrates, the entrepreneurs' and managers' cal
culations of private benefit and cost are unlikely to correspond
closely to the social benefits and costs. Private benefits are prone
to be less than social benefits and private costs are prone to be
larger than social costs.146 The calculations of entrepreneurs and
managers thus will be biased: they will want to disclose less than is
socially optimal.
Public choice asserts that the government has biases running in
the opposite direction. One would not want to promote regulatory
competition by apportioning authority to A, however, unless one
believes that the level chosen by the government is even more bi
ased than the level chosen by legally unconstrained private entre
preneurs and managers. Few legal commentators, including those
with a law and economics orientation, appear implicitly to hold that
belief; few find the domestic regime of even the most rigorous
country, the United States, sufficiently flawed such that a total
abandonment of regulation - and hence reliance on issuers' calcu
lations of private cost and benefit - would be preferable to main
tenance of the current system.141
Some of these commentators, while favoring some disclosure
regulation to none, still might prefer the less rigorous regimes of the
other major capitalist countries to that of the United States. Ap
portioning the regulation of transplant issuer disclosure to the
country where the transaction takes place, however, might well,
over time, result in a race-to-the-bottom among the countries with
major stock exchanges rather than toward a state in which issuers
146. See supra section 11.B.
147. See supra note 143. For example, Easterbrook and Fischel conclude, after explicitly
considering public choice theory, that the U.S. mandatory disclosure regime ought to be re
tained. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 132, at 714-15. Addressing a somewhat analo
gous problem within our domestic federal system of corporate and securities lawmaking,
Lucian Bebchuk has argued that placing the regulation of corporate disclosure under the
authority of state corporate law rather than federal securities law would, because of regula
tory competition, result in a suboptimally low level of disclosure. See Bebchuk, supra note
131, at 1490-91. Jonathan Macey, on the other hand, finds that "[a]s markets have become
more efficient, society's need to devote resources to support a statutory regime of mandatory
disclosure designed and enforced by the SEC has disappeared. Any information that was
supplied by the force of law now is supplied by the marketplace." Macey, supra note 130, at
928. The issue of the efficiency with which markets impound the information that issuers
choose to release, however, differs from the question of whether issuers will choose to release
as much information as is socially optimal. See Fox, supra note 69, at 1015-25.
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disclose at the level currently required by the other major capitalist
countries.
e. Public Choice Arguments for Not Promoting Regulatory
Competition. Adding a public choice component to the analysis of
what country should exercise regulatory authority over transplant
transactions may actually add to the overall strength of my conclu
sion that regulatory authority should be apportioned to the issuer's
home country. With regulatory competition, persons who receive
rents dependent on the volume of transactions effected in a given
country would enjoy gains from a relaxation of their country's dis
closure standards. Public choice theory would suggest that the re
laxation may occur even if these gains are less than the welfare
losses to the country's residents from its issuers disclosing at a
lower-than-optimal level in resource allocation and risk reduction
terms. The gainers are more concentrated and more capable of
political action than the losers, who are many but diffuse. No in
consistency thus necessarily exists between a belief in public choice
theory and the conclusion that, in the context of a globalizing secur
ities market, regulatory competition will result in each country hav
ing a too-low level of mandated disclosure.

f. Conclusion. Assigning regulatory authority over the disclo
sure practices of transplant issuers to their home country has clear
advantages. Compared to the country where the sales or trades oc
cur, the home country's governmental authorities have greater ex
pertise concerning the resource allocation and risk reduction effects
of such disclosure. They have greater political incentives to choose
the right level and they receive more direct negative feedback if
they get it wrong.
The argument that regulatory competition is sufficiently desira
ble that the country where the trades occur nevertheless should ex
ercise regulatory authority is not persuasive. This argument is
based on the claim that domestic disclosure regimes tend to require
excessive disclosure and that regulatory competition will counteract
this tendency. Such a claim runs contrary to the conventional and
reasonable starting presumption utilized in studies concerning the
regulation of behavior with transnational effects that countries' do
mestic regulations represent their own best interests. Moreover, a
number of factors cast doubt on the proposition that in the particu
lar area of disclosure, countries tend to overregulate.
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The conclusion that the issuer's home country is the better regu
lator would not change even if, for the sake of argument, we were
to accept the claim that domestic disclosure regimes require too
much disclosure. To be successful, the argument for regulatory
competition requires a political theory akin to second best theory in
welfare economics.148 As just noted, regulatory competition creates
its own imperfection resulting from the increasing political pressure
from members of the securities industry concerned with the volume
of transactions effected in their home market. The political theory
would need to show that this imperfection is optimal given the
assumed imperfection that domestic disclosure standards are
currently too high. Unless a proponent of regulatory competition
can provide such a theory, there is no reason to believe these
competition-induced political pressures will represent an appropri
ate antidote to the assumed problem of excessive disclosure
regulation.
C.

Standard and Issuer-Country Transactions

Now consider standard transnational transactions and issuer
country transnational transactions. In each case the buyer is from
one country - in our example, A - and the issuer from another in our example, B. Standard transactions are effected in the buyer's
home country, and issuer-country transactions are effected in the
issuer's home country.
Should this difference in where the transaction is effected affect
which country is apportioned regulatory authority over the issuers
involved? The answer is no, unless one so distrusts domestic disclo
sure regulation and is so persuaded of the corrective benefits of reg
ulatory competition that one favors giving country A regulatory
responsibility over the disclosure practices of both transplant B is
suers and B issuers whose shares are sold and traded only domesti
cally but would prefer A 's regime.149 The discussion above suggests
148. The theory of second best in welfare economics concerns the circumstance where,
because of institutional restrictions, one condition necessary for Pareto optimality - the
situation where there are no possible reallocations that can make any person better off that
would not make some other person worse off - cannot be met. The theory says that if such
a constraint exists, economic welfare will not generally be maximized by still trying to satisfy
all the other conditions for Pareto optimality. Rather, welfare will be maximized when some
other counteracting imperfection, specified by the theory, is present. See HENDERSON &
QUANDT, supra note 99, at 286-88.
149. If one does so distrust domestic disclosure regulation that one wishes to give country
A regulatory responsibility over the disclosure practices of those B issuers whose shares are
sold and traded only domestically but who would prefer to be regulated by A 's regime, then,
a fortior� one would also want to give that option as well to B issuers whose shares are
involved in any kind of transnational transaction.
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the unsoundness of such beliefs. Assuming that one does not hold
such beliefs, one then also should view the argument for assigning
regulatory responsibility to country A in the case of standard trans
actions issuers as no stronger than the argument for assigning it to
A in the case of issuer-country transactions issuers.
The fact that standard transactions are effected in A and issuer
country transactions are effected in B should not matter, because
the only difference between standard and issuer-country issuers that their shares are sold and traded in A rather than B - is irrele
vant to the determination of what apportionment of regulatory au
thority would maximize global welfare. This reasoning follows
closely from the prior discussion of transplant transactions. The
only way that this difference between the two kinds of issuers could
matter to A and B, in terms of their stakes in how regulatory au
thority is apportioned, concerns the volume effects of disclosure
regulation. If A were assigned standard-transaction issuers because
of the additional contact to A, and B assigned issuer-country issu
ers, issuers would have an incentive to have their shares offered and
traded in the market of the country with the lower level of required
disclosure. If both kinds of issuers were assigned to the same coun

try, whichever that might be, there would be no such incentive. The
country with the lower required disclosure thus would benefit from
assigning standard i�suers to A and issuer-country issuers to B, and
the one with the higher level would benefit from assigning both
kinds of issuers to the same country. This sort of benefit should be
irrelevant to our choice of which country should exercise regulatory
authority over each category of issuer because the effects of the

choice on volume of trading in each country is a zero-sum game
from a global welfare point. Assigning standard issuers to A and
issuer-country issuers to B would also, unlike assigning both groups
to the same country, promote regulatory competition. For the rea
sons discussed above, this is not an affirmative reason for treating
differently two groups of issuers, the effects of whose disclosure is
otherwise identical.1so
150. However we resolve the tension between A determining that one level of disclosure
is needed to give its non-fully diversified investors adequate risk reduction and B determin
ing that a different level is necessary in terms of resource-allocation efficiency and cost, in
cluding the place where the transaction occurs as a factor provides issuers with a method of
evading that resolution. Consider the two extremes. At one extreme, we always resolve in
favor of the determination of the issuer's country, B, because it has the resource allocation
and cost stakes. In our example, if A's regime is less rigorous, taking location into account
still permits evasion of B's calculations of disclosure's contribution to an efficient allocation
of resources versus its costs. If B has the less rigorous regime, as with transplant transactions,
location will be irrelevant anyway. At the other extreme, we always resolve in favor of the
determination of the investors' country, A, because it has the risk-reduction stakes. If B's
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But, determining that the same country should exercise regula
tory authority over both issuer-country issuers and standard issuers
does not identify which country should exercise the regulatory au
thority. As we saw in Part III, with standard and issuer-country
transactions, each country has non-volume-related interests in the
disclosure practices of the issuers involved. This section applies the
expertness and feedback criteria in seeking to determine, for B issu
ers whose shares are involved in these types of transactions, which
country, if it were the regulator, would require disclosure at a level
closer to what would be optimal for global economic welfare. It
concll,!des, consistent with my proposed approach, that B, the is
suer's home country, would be the better choice.

1.

The Simplified Case: Risk Reduction and Project Choice
Efficiency Gains With Initially Capitalizing Firms

Start with the simplified case in which the B issuers whose
shares are involved in standard or issuer-country transactions are
new firms seeking capital for their initial project. Assume also that
only the quality of the idea, and not the quality of management,
affects future return in this world. Improved project choice is thus
the only improved resource allocation efficiency gain to be
considered.
First, consider expertness. Country A residents exclusively en
joy the reduced risk for less than fully diversified investors resulting
from greater disclosure. A 's authorities know their own investors
- the persons buying and trading these shares - better than B 's
authorities know them. They thus have more expertise concerning
the extent to which these investors benefit from a reduction in risk.
B 's authorities know better their own real-investment opportuni
ties. They therefore have more expertise concerning the extent to
which more disclosure will lead to better project choice. They also
have more expertise concerning the costs of requiring their issuers
to reveal more.
Next, consider incentives and feedback. If A is the country reg
ulating transnational B issuers, its officials will feel - through ordi
nary political processes - all of the risk reduction benefits from the
level of disclosure that they choose. They thus will have the polit
ical incentives to take these benefits into account. If at any point
they misestimate the extent of these benefits, they will receive carregime is less rigorous, taking location into account permits evasion of A's calculation of the
optimal amount of risk reduction. If A's regime is the less rigorous, place is again irrelevant.
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rective negative feedback. On the other hand, these processes will
not give these officials any feeling for the benefits from improved
resource allocation efficiency due to the disclosure level they
choose. Nor will they receive any feeling of the costs of the chosen
level. They have no direct incentives to take these factors into ac
count. To the extent that they nevertheless try to do so but incor
rectly estimate their magnitudes, they will receive no direct
feedback.151
If instead B is the country regulating B issuers, its officials feel
both the costs of the level they choose and its resource-allocation
efficiency benefits, but do not feel its risk-reduction benefits.
Country B residents - the entrepreneurs who propose real invest
ment projects and the suppliers of labor - exclusively enjoy the
benefits of greater disclosure's improvements in project choice.
The pattern of incentives and feedback with B is thus just the mir
ror image of what it is if A is the regulating country. But what do
these respective patterns of expertise, incentives, and feedback im
ply about which country would be the better regulator?

A Count of Categories of Superiority Points to B. The ex
pertise factor is divided on the benefits of disclosure and clearly
favors B for the costs. Incentives and feedback are distorted for
both countries. Therefore, absent the difficult, if not impossible,
quantification of these various factors, application of the expertise
and feedback criteria cannot unambiguously point to one country
over the other as the more appropriate regulator. A crude counting
of each country's categories of superiority, however, points toward
B as the better regulator. Several more refined considerations rein
force this conclusion.

a.

b. B's Domestic Regime's Required Level of Disclosure Is
Likely to Be Closer Than A's to What Is Globally Optimal for Stan
dard and Issuer-country Transnational Issuers From B. The country
that regulates the disclosure of standard and issuer-country issuers
from B is likely to apply to these B issuers either its own domestic
regime or some modified regime that uses its own domestic regime
as a starting point.152 This observation suggests assigning regula
tory authority over standard and issuer-country issuers to the coun151. Country B may, of course, put diplomatic pressures on A concerning these matters.
Such pressures, however, are institutionally crude and unrefined substitutes for the incentives
and feedback that arise within a domestic political system.
152. See, e.g., infra notes 170-71 (concerning the rules that the United States has chosen
to apply to transnational issuers).
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try whose domestic regime's required level of disclosure is closer to
what would be optimal for these transnational issuers. As we will
see, the issuer's home country - in our example, B - rather than
the investor's home country - in our example, A - more likely fits
this profile.
B's required level of disclosure is assumed to be optimal for
purely domestic B issuers.153 This means that for such an issuer, the
social marginal costs of disclosing at its required level just equal the
social marginal benefits. A's required level of disclosure similarly is
assumed to be optimal for purely domestic A issuers. In deciding
which country's domestic regime is closer to what would be optimal
for standard and issuer-country issuers from B ("transnational B
issuers") we thus need to look at the costs and benefits of requiring
different levels of disclosure from these issuers and see whether
their situation more closely resembles purely domestic B issuers or
purely domestic A issuers.
Suppose that whichever country is assigned regulatory authority
over transnational B issuers, it will require of them the same level
of disclosure that it requires of its own purely domestic issuers. The
costs and benefits of requiring this level of disclosure from transna
tional B issuers are identical to those of requiring it of entirely do
mestic B issuers, except to the extent, if any, that investors in A
differ from those in B in the amount by which disclosure reduces
their disutility from the riskiness of their portfolios. Similarly, the
costs and benefits of requiring A's domestic level of disclosure from
transnational B issuers are identical to those of requiring it of
purely domestic A issuers, except to the extent, if any, that issuers
from B differ from those in A in the costs of, and improved re
source-allocation efficiency benefits from, greater disclosure. The
country whose purely domestic issuers' disclosure costs and benefits
most closely match those of transnational B issuers will be the
country for which the factor or factors constituting the exception
differ less between the two countries. That appears to be country
B, as detailed below.
Issuers from different countries likely differ more in the costs of,
and resource-allocation improvements from, greater disclosure than
would investors from different countries differ in terms of the risk
reduction benefits of greater disclosure. The costs of, and resource
allocation benefits from, greater disclosure depend on a complex of
institutional factors that will have a uniquely national :flavor. These
153. See supra section IV.B.3.
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include the role of banks versus public equity issues in funding new
companies and the ratio of institutional to individual share purchas
ers. In contrast, the amount by which an individual investor's risk is
reduced by a given increase in disclosure depends on the extent of
her nondiversification, regardless of nationality. The

benefit to

her

from risk reduction depends on her level of risk aversion. It is quite
possible that investors in one country are, on average, more risk
averse than in another. At first blush, this would suggest differ
ences among countries in the typical risk-reduction gain from
greater disclosure. Reflection, however, suggests a counterbalanc
ing factor. If one country's investors are more risk averse than
those of another, they

will

be more diversified and less leveraged,

and so they would experience less risk reduction for an increase in
disclosure.

c. B Has Greater Expertise, Incentives, and Feedback With Re
spect to Disclosure's Costs and Allocational Benefits - the Factors
That Differ More Between the Countries. Suppose instead that it is
anticipated that the regulating country, rather than simply using its
domestic rules, tailors special disclosure rules to apply to issuers
from B involved in transnational transactions. The regulating coun
try would make such special rules to account for differences be
tween the interests of residents of the other country associated with
these transnational transactions and the interests of the equivalent
persons in purely domestic transactions.154 In an interactive world,
countries will often make such accommodations because, with reci
procity, they both can benefit.
This likely pattern of differences between countries still points
to B as the better regulator. The argument varies only slightly from
that set out just above. As we have seen, the interests of each coun
try's residents in the disclosure behavior of

B

issuers relate to par

ticular factors. The interests of B residents relate to costs and
allocational benefits; the interests of A residents relate to risk re
duction. Everything else being equal, it is better to assign regula
tory authority to the country whose residents' interests relate to the
factors that differ more between A and B. This country's officials
are in a better position to take account of the interests of the resi
dents of the other country. They are relatively more familiar with

154. If B was the regulating country, the nonresidents with an interest in the disclosure
behavior of B issuers whose shares are involved in standard and issuer-country transnational
transactions would be the investors in A who buy or trade these shares. If A was the regulat
ing country, it would be the entrepreneurs and suppliers of other factors of production in B.
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such interests because they vary less from the interests of their own
residents. Applying the analysis to the problem at hand, the cost
and resource allocation effects of disclosure differ more between
country A and country B. Because B residents have an interest in
these factors, B 's officials will be better at tailoring special rules.
That is, they are in a better position to understand disclosure's risk
reduction effects on residents of A, whose situation is more similar
to that of some B residents, than are A 's officials to understand
disclosure's cost and resource allocation effects on residents of B.
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the factor that differs
more - the cost to the issuer of disclosure and the allocational ben
efits - is probably inherently more difficult to understand, and
hence more difficult to get right from afar, than the risk-reduction
benefits from disclosure.

d. Risk Reduction Through Greater Disclosure Is a Subsidiary
National Interest. Finally, one additional consideration significantly
reinforces the choice of B as the better regulator: the nature of risk
reduction as an interest. Only when A 's regime is more rigorous
than B 's regime does country A have a risk-reduction interest in
applying its regime - rather than that of B - to transnational issu
ers from B.155 In such a situation, A's government has available an
alternative policy instrument to reduce the risk associated with in
vesting in B issuers that does not conflict with B's determination of
the proper level of disclosure: a program of education and institu
tional reform to encourage its investors who invest in B issuers to
diversify more. The only reason B's disclosure level determination
might not be optimal is if the typical A investor is, relative to his
risk aversion, less diversified than the typical B investor. For pas
sive investors, at least, being anything less than fully diversified is
clearly undesirable in any event.156
155. If A's regime is less rigorous than B's, an inability to apply its regime means that A's
investors get more risk reduction than would otherwise be the case. That in itself cannot be a
cause for complaint. The larger amount of disclosure costs the issuer more, but those costs
are borne by entrepreneurs in B.
156. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. A speculative investor, who trades on the
basis of information that suggests to her the possibility of profit, faces a trade-off when she
diversifies more. On the one hand, because fewer shares will be bought or sold on its basis, a
given piece of information creates less expected profit. On the other, the investor enjoys
reduced risk. If global economic welfare is the goal, however, declining to encourage diversi
fication to enhance the opportunities of A investors to make speculative profits trading in B
shares is not a justification for applying A's regime. Such trading is a zero-sum game among
the players; the only potential gains to society come from more accurate prices. Entrepre
neurs and laborers in B, who enjoy the efficiency benefits, gain the only benefits from more
accurate prices. The expertise and feedback criteria therefore suggest that making the mar
ket safer for speculation in B issuer shares is better handled by B's authorities.
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The advantage of a program of education and institutional re
form is that it addresses the purely domestic problem of inadequate
diversification directly, rather than trying to compensate for it with
a disclosure policy that negatively affects the interests of residents
of another country.157 Because of this, the allocational benefits and
cost interests - which B has the political incentives to pursue, as
well as superior expertise and feedback - deserve more recogni
tion in the apportionment of regulatory authority than the risk-re
duction interests with respect to which A is the better-positioned
country.

2. Ongoing Corporations With Ongoing Disclosure
Now enlarge the world we are considering to include issuers that
have an ongoing existence. The managers of these issuers from
time to time decide to implement new projects. Once a project is
implemented, they make decisions on how it is run. Two kinds of
disclosure affect the efficient allocation of resources in this world.
First, a firm may make

new public issue disclosure.

Where firms

finance their projects by such share sales, less accurate prices lead
to an inferior choice of projects to be implemented, just as in the
simplified world. Second, a firm may make

ongoing disclosure after

it has received its initial injections of publicly held equity. As we

saw in Part II, increasing the amount of ongoing disclosure in

creases the effectiveness of the market for corporate control and
share-price-based compensation in limiting managers from making
both project choice and operating decisions that deviate from what
is optimal.

In this more complex world, we need to determine which coun
try would be the better regulator with respect to each kind of dis
closure. As to new public issue disclosure, the analysis is identical
to that of the simplified world. Country B, the issuer's country, is
the better choice. Ongoing disclosure is more complicated. It is
most easily understood by first thinking of an artificial world in
which there is just one B issuer that makes a single offering to A
investors and then enlarging the inquiry to account for multiple B
issuers, resulting in a stream of such offerings over time.

157. The substitution of A's regime for B's in regulating transnational B issuers will hurt
the interests of entrepreneurs and labor in B to the extent that the costs and allocational
benefits of disclosure differ between the countries. A's regime will reflect calculations of
these factors with respect to issuers in A, but not with respect to the B issuers that are being
regulated.
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a. The Regulation of Ongoing Disclosure in the Case of a
Single B Issuer Making a Single Offering to A Investors.
i. The Rules Governing Ongoing Disclosure in Force at the
Time of the Offering. One way of looking at the question of which
country would be the better regulator of an issuer's ongoing disclo
sure is to ask which country, if it were chosen to regulate, would at
the time of the offering have the rules requiring ongoing disclosure
at a level closer to what would be globally optimal.
Investors in A will know at the time of the offering which coun
try will be the regulator of the issuer's ongoing disclosure and what
the country's current rules are. Since the current rules are generally
the best available predictor of what the rules in the future will be,
the investors will use the current rules to form expectations con
cerning the firm's disclosure practices in the future. As we saw in
Part m, this in turn will lead to expectations concerning both the
extent to which management will deviate from optimal project
choice and operating decisions over the rest of the issuer's life and
the issuer's future disclosure costs. The share price will reflect
these combined expectations. Entrepreneurs in B will thus bear the
entire expected allocational and cost consequences of the regulating
country's ongoing disclosure rules, whether good or bad. Less than
fully diversified country A residents, in future sales and purchases
of shares on the secondary market, will exclusively enjoy the ex
pected level of disclosure's reduction in risk. This distribution of
stakes in disclosure means that for each country, the patterns of
expertise and feedback are identical to those present with disclo
sure for new public issues in the simplified case, already considered,
where there are only initially capitalizing firms. Consequently, the
analysis of which country would, at the time of the offering, better
regulate the issuer's ongoing disclosure is, as a formal matter, iden
tical to the analysis of which country would come up with better
new public issue disclosure rules. Again, the analysis points to
country B.
When one looks at the magnitudes of the important factors
identified in the formal analysis, one can see that the case here for
B is even stronger than the case for B with respect to new issue
disclosure rules. It was suggested in the discussion of the simplified
world that issuers from different countries differ more from one an
other in the costs of, and allocational improvements from, greater
disclosure than investors from different countries differ from one
another in the risk reduction benefits they enjoy from greater dis-
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closure. In the case of ongoing disclosure, the divergence between
countries in terms of costs and allocational benefits is likely to be
even more pronounced. This is because disclosure's effects on the
ongoing project choice and operational decisions of management
and on the firm's costs are more likely to be determined by institu
tional features that are uniquely national - the way that a particu
lar country's issuers operate as organizations, for example - than
would be disclosure's effects on the way the market in each country
would choose among potential initially capitalizing firms. The same
is likely to be true in terms of the costs of disclosure for ongoing
firms compared to the costs of ones just starting up. Since differ
ences between the countries in terms of the risk-reduction benefits
of greater disclosure are the same whether we are talking about
trading in the primary or the secondary market, this more pro
nounced divergence in terms of costs and allocational benefits
means that the factors that are more different between the coun
tries are even more different than in the former cases.

ii. Accounting for Regulatory Change: Which Country Would
Make Better Modifications? The country that is the regulator has
not written its rules for ongoing disclosure in force at the time of
the offering in stone; they can change. It is the level of disclosure
actually prevailing at the time that the issuer's managers consider
any particular decision, not the level that was expected at the time
the shares were publicly offered, that determines how much man
agement is constrained in deviating from the shareholders' best in
terest. The same is true of costs. A determination of which country
would be the better regulator depends not only on which one would
come up with the better rules at the time of offering - according to
my analysis, country B - but also on which country would be bet
ter at making modifications over time.
The case for B as the better modifier of disclosure rules is
weaker than the case for B as the initial rulemaker. Compared to

A, B still has

superior expertise with respect to the factors that dif

fer more between the countries. The argument that risk reduction
is a subsidiary national interest is just as applicable as before. Feed
back concerning the resource-allocation effects of disclosure, how
ever, carries more ambiguous implications.

All of the public shareholders of the B issuer are residents of A
and will be among the persons bearing ongoing disclosure's costs
and enjoying its disciplining effects on management. Suppose A
were the regulator instead of B. At the time of the offering, A 's
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officials would be totally indifferent to what kind of ongoing
transnational B issuer disclosure rules they promulgate. Any defi
ciencies would be fully discounted in the price A 's residents pay for
the shares. Thereafter, however, these officials begin to face incen
tives to make modifications to their rules that would move disclo
sure toward the level that is in the shareholders' best interests. If in
doing so they erred in their assessment, they would receive correc
tive negative feedback.
Now suppose instead B were the regulator. The issuer's entre
preneurs, who provided the incentives for B 's officials to account
properly for disclosure's costs and allocational benefits at the time
of offering, would now regard the sale of their shares simply as his
tory. At least as to those shares, these entrepreneurs would be in
different as to any modifications in the ongoing disclosure rules. In
fact, to the extent that they continue in their role as managers, these
entrepreneurs might even lobby B's officials to lower disclosure be
low what is optimal in order to make it easier to benefit themselves
at the expense of shareholders.

iii.

Combining the Inquiries.

Despite the weaker case for B in

the modifications inquiry than in the rules at the time of offering
inquiry, a variety of considerations suggest that overall B is still the
better choice as the regulator of the ongoing disclosure of the B
issuer.
To start, the fact that at the time of the offering B would pre
scribe the better set of rules for ongoing disclosure is important.
Regulation has its own inertia, and small changes are generally
more likely than large ones. Any modifications that B would make
subsequent to the offering would likely just fine tune a set of rules
that regulatory authorities had incentives to get right initially. In
contrast, if country A were the regulator, its modifications might be
starting on a base that is far from optimal. Also, B is the better
regulator of new public issue disclosure and, everything else being
equal, it is better to have the same authorities regulate both new
issue and ongoing disclosure. It is less costly for the issuer to an

swer questions in ongoing disclosure that resemble the questions
asked in connection with the public offering than to have to transi
tion to a different set of questions.
Second, the other major group with a stake in the level of the
issuer's disclosure - owners of the other factors of production, par
ticularly labor - still are B residents. They would continue to pro
vide B officials with incentives and feedback in support of a
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Third, at least initially, residents of B will continue to hold all of
the issuer's shares representing the entrepreneurial surplus at the
time of the public offering. To the extent that the holders continue
to be managers, their holdings will buffer their tendency to lobby
for changes in disclosure that would lower the value of their shares.
To the extent that the holders of these shares are not current man
agers, they could provide incentives and feedback for B officials
that are as balanced as what A shareholders would provide for its
officials. In fact, the existence of a public market in A into which
these shares held by B residents can be sold means that there are B
residents who will provide B officials with incentives and feedback
concerning the risk-reduction features of disclosure.
Even more important, B's officials will also continue to receive
strong feedback from investors in B concerning the effects of its
choice of disclosure level for entirely domestic B issuers. Because
entirely domestic B issuers should have institutionally similar struc
tures, the costs and allocational benefits resulting from their greater
disclosure should be the same as from greater disclosure by issuer
country and standard-transaction B issuers. Feedback concerning
the choice of disclosure level for entirely domestic issuers therefore
should provide information about the standard and issuer-country
levels, whether or not the level of disclosure chosen for the transna
tional issuers is the same.
Also, the importance of the incentives and feedback that offi
cials in A would receive from their investors if A were the regulator
should not be exaggerated. If A were the regulator of ongoing dis
closure, its initial rules would likely be identical to the rules it ap
plies to its own issuers involved in entirely domestic transactions. A
might make modifications for the transnational B issuers, but if it
did, it is unlikely that they would be great enough to cover com
pletely the gap between what is best for A's domestic issuers and
what would be globally optimal for transnational B issuers. Modifi
cations this extensive are even more unlikely if, as in the real world,
there are issuers from several foreign countries, not just B, whose
shares are publicly traded among residents of A. It would be an
administrative nightmare for A to have a specially tailored set of
ongoing disclosure rules for each such foreign country.

b. The Regulation of Ongoing Disclosure in the Case of a
Stream of Offerings by B Issuers. In fact there is not, of course,
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A by a single B issuer. Over

time a stream of B issuers will engage in offerings of their securities
in A. The country that regulates the ongoing disclosure of transna
tional B issuers, whichever it is, will presumably apply its current
rules to all issuers, new and old. In the single-issue model, with B
as the regulating country, B's officials, when considering any modi
fications to the rules governing the transnational B issuer that had
previously offered its shares in A, would receive no pressure from
the issuer's entrepreneurs to account for the modification's alloca
tional benefits or costs. In fact, the issuer's entrepreneurs, if they
were still managers, might lobby these officials for a reduction in
disclosure to a suboptimal level so that they could profit at the ex

pense of the shareholders. The existence of a stream of issuers and
the need to treat new and old alike will have a disciplining effect
that reduces this concern. Where there is a pool of entrepreneurs
in B contemplating offerings in A in the future, they will pressure
the authorities to continue to strive for a rule mandating the opti
mal level of ongoing disclosure. Anything else would reduce the
entrepreneurial surplus they will receive at the time of their
offerings.158
D.

Additional Considerations Favoring Country B as the
Exclusive Regulator of the Disclosure of Its Issuers

Beyond preventing a regulatory "race to the bottom" and con
cerns for expertise and proper incentives and feedback, additional
considerations favor country B as the exclusive regulator of the dis
closure practices of all B issuers.

1. Special Costs of Different Disclosure Levels for Different
Issuers From the Same Country
If B issuers whose shares are offered to and traded among inves
tors residing in A must disclose more than B issuers whose shares
158. The existence of a stream of offerings would also reduce the concerns expressed
above with giving A regulatory authority. In the single-issue model with A as the regulating
country, we saw that the officials producing the regulations that would be in effect at the time
of the B issuer's offering have no incentive to account for either the costs or the allocational
benefits of disclosure and therefore may act irresponsibly. In contrast, where there is a
stream of B issuer offerings over time, the A officials who are responsible for the rules in
force at the time of any given new issue would be subject to pressures by the A shareholders
of all the B issuers who had previously offered their shares in A. These residents of A enjoy
the rules' allocational benefits and suffer their costs.
This observation should not, however, change the overall conclusion that B is the better
regulator. With the possibility of irresponsible behavior reduced on both sides of the ledger,
the single-issue model's overall conclusion that B would be the better choice remains valid
when we take account of the fact that there will be a stream of offerings.
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are offered and traded entirely domestically, two special kinds of
costs arise. To understand the first of these costs, suppose for a
moment that B had a financially closed economy. No issuers have

shares offered or traded in transnational transactions. All issuers

are subject to the same purely domestic disclosure regime. As we
saw in Part II, for the average issuer, the commercial and competi
tive benefits from legally mandated disclosure - the benefits that
arise from acquiring information disclosed by suppliers, customers,
and competitors - will cancel out the costs from the issuer's suppli
ers, customers, and competitors acquiring the information disclosed
by the issuer. Thus, the only harm to the average issuer from re
quiring all issuers to reveal more is the increase in its operating
costs of disclosure. The increase in commercial and competitive
costs will be counterbalanced by a corresponding increase in
benefits.
This discussion has assumed throughout, however, that in fact
there is a subgroup of all B issuers whose shares are offered and
traded in transnational transactions. Problems arise if members of

this subgroup are subject instead to A 's regime. If A's regime re
quires a higher level of disclosure than B's, then transnational B

issuers would be providing more information to, than they would be
receiving from, suppliers, purchasers, and competitors that are not
in the transnationally traded subgroup. The fact that not all B issu
ers are covered by a more rigorous disclosure regime means that
the imposition of the regime on those who are covered increases
their costs disproportionately. The distribution of the costs of dis
closure, whether operating costs or these extra commercial and
competitive costs, was analyzed earlier in discussing the stakes of
country A. Those who do bear the disclosure costs of B issuers
whose shares are transnationally traded - on an expected basis,
residents of country B - will bear these extra costs. Suppose in
stead that A's regime requires less disclosure than does B's. Similar
problems arise, this time with B's purely domestic issuers facing
higher costs. Either way, these differences in costs create inefficient
distortions in the issuers' decisions as to which markets they will sell
and promote trading of their securities in.
The second cost of requiring a different level of disclosure from
transnational B issuers exists even if all B issuers join the group. As
Part II discussed, country B determined the appropriate level of
disclosure for B issuers in a way that may well have reflected,
among other things, B's calculation for its economy of the balance
between disclosure's beneficial effects on static efficiency and its
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harmful effects on dynamic efficiency. Imposition of a different re
gime overrides this determination.

2.

The Reality That Most Transnational Issuers Will Also Have
Public Shareholders at Home

We have assumed throughout Part III and Part IV that for any
given B issuer, all public transactions in its shares fall exclusively
into one of four categories: standard, transplant, issuer country, or
purely domestic. This assumption sets up the most extreme set of
facts against which to test the propositions that I have made. In the
real world, however, almost all issuers whose shares are involved in
one of the three transnational types of transactions are publicly
traded at home as well. Indeed, in most cases, the majority of their
shares are held by residents of the issuer's nationality.
This reality only further strengthens the case for apportioning
regulatory authority over transnational B issuers to B. With B resi
dents holding a significant portion of the shares of most transna
tional B issuers, officials in B will continue to receive feedback from
B residents concerning ongoing disclosure rules. Also, as to the
shares of these issuers held domestically, officials in B will have su
perior expertise and feedback with respect to disclosure's risk
reduction features.
E.

The Case Against Concurrent Regulation

The argument thus far has focused on demonstrating that if just
one country is to regulate the disclosure of all B issuers, B should be
that country. But with B issuers whose shares are involved in trans
national transactions, why designate just one regulating country?
Why not allow concurrent regulation, as often happens today?
If B's regime is more lenient than A's regime, answering this
question is easy. Concurrent regulation effectively overrides the
policy determination of country B that less rather more disclosure is
optimal. This outcome is undesirable because B has a stronger case
for being the regulator than does A.
If B's regime is stricter, the answer to the question is more com
plex but the conclusion is the same. As noted earlier, in the real
world, A 's regime, though it might generally be regarded as more
lenient, may still require disclosure of certain information not re
quired by B's regime. While there is probably a great deal of over
lap, A's regime may well try to reach somewhat different types of
information. Even where A's regime tries to reach the same type of
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information, it will ask questions in a somewhat different way and
so the resulting answers will contain somewhat different facts.
But if B has already demonstrated its preference for more
rather than less information, one might ask why not permit concur
rent jurisdiction and get even more information? The benefits from
concurrent regulation where A's regime is more lenient are at best
unclear. The fact that B prefers more disclosure to less disclosure
does not mean that it prefers even more disclosure than its regime
requires. If B had wanted even more disclosure, it would have re
quired it. B presumably concluded that the extra costs of more dis
closure were not worth the additional benefits. Also, A is unlikely
to have a special stake in the particular additional information that
concurrent application of its regime would reveal, because A's pri
mary stake is risk reduction. No particular kind of information is
necessary for risk reduction as long as it assists in predicting future
income streams with greater certainty. B's regime already requires
more information to be disclosed by its issuers - and hence per
mits more certain predictions - than A's regime requires to be dis
closed by A's own domestic issuers. As for project choice and
constraining managerial deviations from shareholders' best inter
ests, the differences between what A asks and what B asks are likely
to be the result of differences in their domestic institutional struc
tures. For issuers from B, the additional information revealed by
getting answers to A's questions is unlikely to yield particularly sub
stantial allocational and managerial discretion reduction benefits in
B.
The costs of permitting concurrent regulation are substantial. B
issuers whose shares are involved in both domestic and transna
tional transactions must incur significant administrative costs in
providing similar information asked for in somewhat different ways
by multiple authorities. B issuers whose shares are currently only
involved in domestic transactions but who perceive that investors
residing in A would be interested in their shares would be deterred
by the additional administrative costs of concurrent regulation from
developing that market. This distortion results in a loss of eco
nomic welfare to residents of both countries. Finally, permitting
the possibility of concurrent regulation raises the question of when
it should be permitted: What mix of domestic and different kinds of
transnational transactions would imply sufficient involvement by
A? Creation and application of rules concerning this question in
volve an increase in legal complexity that both consumes considera-
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ble legal and:: administrative resources and creates uncertainty
among economic actors.
The argument for exclusive regulation by B is strong. Concur
rent regulation is clearly unjustified when B's regime is more leni
ent than A's. Where A 's is more lenient than B 's, the benefits of
adding A 's regime are at best uncertain, while the costs are
substantial.

V.

APPLICATION TO U.S. POLICY

What are the implications of the foregoing analysis for setting
the appropriate reach of U.S. mandatory securities disclosure rules?
There are 36,000 issuers of publicly traded securities in the world. 1s9
As we have seen, the barriers to a truly global market for the shares
of these issuers continue to decline: financial information is becom
ing increasingly globalized and effecting share transactions abroad
is becoming less expensive and more easy. With this trend toward
globalization, an ever-larger portion of issuers will face securities
transactions in their shares that have a least one U.S. dimension whether it be the nationality of the buyer, the nationality of the
issuer, or the place of transaction. On which of these issuers is it in
the enlightened best interest of the United States to impose its dis
closure regime? In this final Part, I briefly survey the existing U.S.
approach to deciding whether to impose its regime on an issuer and
sketch out the need for change.160
Imposition of the U.S. disclosure regime is triggered by the pub
lic offering of, or indices of public trading in, an issuer's shares. 161
As we will see, the U.S. approach to statutory reach has in practice
put some weight on each of the three national dimensions of such
transactions - buyer, issuer, and place of transaction. The articu
lated goal, however, has traditionally focused on the first of these
factors: the need to protect United States investors from making
damaging securities choices as a result of being poorly informed. 162
This "investor protection" approach suggests that the only transac
tions associated with an issuer that should trigger imposition of U.S.
disclosure regulation are those involving U.S. investors. Given this
159. According to the International Fmance Corporation's annual survey of world stock
exchanges, the total number of listed domestic companies worldwide in 1994 was 36,176. See
INTERNATIONAL FIN. CoRP., EMERGING STOCK MARKETS FACTBOOK 1995, at 21 (1995).
160. I deal with these issues much more extensively in a companion piece. See Fox, supra
note 136.
161. See infra section V.A.
162. See infra section V.A.1.a.
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goal, the rationale for including the nationality of the issuer and the
place of the transaction in the determination of whether to apply
the U.S. regime is presumably that they act as proxies for the prob
able nationality of the buyers. Information about the nationality of

buyers is difficult to acquire. The fact that transactions in an is
suer's shares occur in the United States or that the issuer is from
the United States makes it more likely that buyers are from the
United States than if this were not the fact.

In 1988, the SEC, in proposing its subsequently adopted Regula

tion S,163 articulated a different, "capital market protection" goal
for the U.S. approach to statutory reach. The new goal still looks to
protect certain investors from being poorly informed but reformu

lates the class of persons protected to be all investors, wherever

resident, but only if they purchase in the U.S. market.164 While this

change in the articulated goal suggests that the place of transaction
should weigh more heavily -in the calculations of whether to apply
the U.S. regime, U.S. practice has not, at least to date, changed
dramatically.16s
The traditional SEC goal of investor protection and its more re
cently articulated goal of market protection are both misguided.
The goal of U.S. securities regulation should be to maximize, to the
extent that it is cost effective, the benefits enjoyed by U.S. residents

from disclosure's capital allocation and managerial-agency-cost
reduction effects. Accordingly, U.S. practice should change so that
the United States imposes its regime only on issuers of U.S. nation
ality166 but does so regardless of where transactions in the issuer's
shares occur or the nationality of the buyers. It is therefore in the
enlightened self-interest of the United States to conform to the ap
proach to statutory reach that I showed earlier will maximize global
economic welfare. This is the case even if other countries do not
follow suit.
There are two reasons for this recommended change in the U.S.
approach. First, this approach discriminates among the world's is-

163. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.904 (1996).
164. See infra section V.A.1.b.
165. See Securities Act Release No. 6779, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 'lI 84,242 at 89,123 (June 10, 1988) [hereinafter Reg. S Proposing Release]; infra sec
tion V.A.1.b.
166. Under this approach, the nationality of an issuer, it will be remembered, is deter
mined by where the issuer has its center of gravity as a firm. Important factors include the
locations of the entrepreneurs who formed the enterprise, the current headquarters, and
where the bulk of its operations are conducted. Nationality is not determined by jurisdiction
of incorporation or where the issuer's shareholders reside.
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suers more precisely than the other approaches in selecting which
issuers' disclosure practices most affect the welfare of U.S. resi
dents. Second, it prevents political pressures from developing that
might otherwise lower the U.S. requirements to a suboptimal level.
A.

The Current U.S. Approach

Two basic components of U.S. securities law link transactions in
securities with regulations requiring issuers to disclose information
about themselves. First, certain sections of the Securities Act of
1933 ("Securities Act") regulate the primary market for securi
ties,167 imposing a set of disclosure obligations upon the offering
and sale by the issuer of a new block of securities. Second, certain
sections of the Securities Exchange Act of

1934

("Exchange Act")

regulate the secondary market for securities. Exchange Act disclo
sure obligations are triggered by indices - a listing of the issuer's
shares o� a securities exchange or the existence of more than a

given number of shareholders - that suggest that already-issued
shares of an issuer will be traded frequently.16s

1. Issuer Disclosure Triggered by Primary Market Transactions
a. The SEC's Traditional Approach. Section 5 of the Securi
ties Act prohibits the offer or sale of any security by any person
unless the security is registered under the Act or the security or
transaction is subject to an exemption.169 By its terms, section 5
makes no distinctions between foreign offerees or purchasers and
domestic ones, or between transactions occurring abroad and trans
actions occurring at home.170 The SEC has always made clear that
it interprets section 5 to cover public offerings in the United States
by foreign issuers.171 This interpretation appears to be based on the
SEC's traditional position that the registration requirements of sec167. See infra section V.A.1.
168. See infra section V.A.2.
169. See 1933 Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994).
170. Application of § 5 requires only that an instrument of "interstate commerce," which
is defined under § 2(7) to include "trade or commerce in securities or any transportation or
communications relating thereto . . . between any foreign country and any State," 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(7) (1994), at some point be used in connection with the transaction, see 15 U.S.C. § 77e
(1994).
171. Traditionally, foreign issuers wishing to offer publicly securities in the United States
were required to register them on the same Form S-1 required of all domestic issuers not
qualifying for one of the SEC's abridged forms. See Harold S. Bloomenthal, 1980 Securities
Law Handbook 231 (1980). In 1982, the SEC, in an extension of the integrated disclosure
system, adopted three registration forms exclusively for foreign issuers: the F-1, F-2 and F-3.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 239.31-.33 (1996).
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tion 5 are primarily intended to protect U.S. investors.172 A large
portion of the purchasers of any public offering made in the United
States would obviously be U.S. investors. The SEC's only special
concern in the case of foreign issuers has been, given the public
interest in attracting them to make public offerings in the U.S. mar
ket, how much it should relax the ordinary disclosure standards ap
plicable to domestic issuers because of the special hardships the
ordinary standards create for foreign issuers.173
According to the traditional rationale, the U.S. disclosure re
gime should not be applied to the public offering to persons abroad
of shares newly issued by a U.S issuer even if some activities in
connection with the offering occur in the United States. In fact, the
position of the SEC for over 30 years has been not to take action
against U.S. issuers for failure to register securities that have been
distributed abroad to foreign nationals if the distribution is effected
in a manner that will result in the securities coming to rest
abroad.174

b. Regulation S. In 1988, the SEC issued a release first pro
posing its subsequently adopted Regulation S rules concerning Se
curities Act registration exemptions for offers and sales abroad.175
In this release, the SEC articulated a shift in rationale concerning
the appropriate reach of the entire U.S. disclosure regime:
[T]he registration of securities is intended to protect the U.S. capital
markets and all investors purchasing in the U.S. market, whether U.S.
or foreign nationals. Principles of comity and reasonable expectations
of participants in the global markets justify reliance on laws applicable
in jurisdictions outside the United States to define disclosure require
ments for transactions effected offshore. .
As investors choose their
.

.

markets, they would choose the disclosure requirements applicable to
such markets.176

Concern with where the transaction is effected, which in the past
had been simply a proxy for the likely residency of the person buy
ing the security, thus becomes an end in itself.
This articulated change in goal has not, so far, resulted in a ma
jor change in practice. The rules actually adopted do not provide a
wholesale exemption for every transaction effected abroad.
172. See Securities Act Release No. 4708, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'l[ 1361, at 2124 (July
9, 1964) [hereinafter Release No. 4708].
173. See Securities Act Release No. 6437, SEC Docket (CCH), at 964 (Nov. 19, 1982);
Fanto, supra note 5.
174. See Release No. 4708, supra note 172, at 2124.
175. See Reg. S Proposing Release, supra note 165.
176. Id. at 89,128 (emphasis added) (footnotes deleted).
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Rather, the focus is on two concerns. The first is preventing
directed-selling efforts in the United States of unregistered shares
nominally offered only abroad. The second is preventing the
"fiowback" into the United States of unregistered shares initially
sold abroad, particularly where the issuer is also not providing peri
odic disclosure under the U.S. regime.177 Regulation S applies to
both U.S. and foreign issuers, but with somewhat different results.

i. U. S. Issuers. A U.S. issuer that scrupulously offers its
shares only to persons residing abroad and lists them only abroad is,
even with Regulation S, still ultimately likely to have to comply
with U.S. disclosure requirements. This is true even though pur
chasers of the shares would have chosen to acquire their shares in a

market outside the United States and hence, according to the SEC's
newly articulated goal of market protection, have chosen foreign
disclosure requirements as well. It would be difficult or impossible
for such an issuer to construct a practical scheme to market its
shares that would qualify for the Regulation S exemption from Se
curities Act disclosure. Even if it succeeds in doing so, its victory is
likely to be pyrrhic: soon after, it would be likely to have to provide
177. Regulation S was proposed by the SEC in June 1988. See id. at 89,123. It was repro
posed in 1989. See Securities Act Release No. 6838, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 'll 84,426, at 80,209 (July 11, 1989) [hereinafter Reg. S Reproposing Release]. The
Commission adopted Regulation S on April 19, 1990. See Securities Act Release No. 6863,
[1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'll 84, 524, at 80,661 (Apr. 24, 1990)
[hereinafter Reg. S Adopting Release]; 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.904 (1996).
Regulation S, which consists of rules governing offers and sales of securities made outside
the United States, covers both U.S. issuers and foreign issuers. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903
(1996). Rule 901 provides that § 5 of the Securities Act does not cover "offers and sales that
occur outside the United States." 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (1996). Regulation S also contains, in
rule 903, a safe harbor from registration for offers and sales by issuers, underwriters, and
dealers involved in the distribution of securities. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903 (1996). To qualify
under this safe harbor, the offer must be made only to persons outside the United States, it
must be reasonably believed that the purchasers are outside the United States when they
place their orders, and there must be no directed selling efforts in the United States. Under
rule 903(c), qualification may also require meeting additional conditions designed to discour
age fiowback to the United States of securities offered and sold in this fashion. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.903(c). The need to meet these additional considerations, and their severity, depends
on factors suggesting the likelihood of such fiowback and the extent of damage if it does
occur. Such factors include the nationality of the issuer, the nature of the security, the loca
tion where the issuer's currently outstanding securities trade, and whether the issuer provides
periodic disclosure under the 1934 Act.
For an overall description and analysis of Regulation S, see RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET
AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 519-21, 1594-612 (7th ed. 1992); Loss
& SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 792; Don Berger, Offshore Distribution of Securities: The Im·
pact ofRegulation S, 3 TRANSNAT1. LAW. 575 (1990); John Regis Coogan & Thomas C. Kim
brough, Regulation S Safe Harbors for Offshore Offers, Sales and Resales, INSIGIITS, Aug.
1990, at 3; Samuel Wolff, Offshore Distributions Under the Securities Act of1993: An Analy
sis ofRegulation S, 23 LAw & PoLY. INTI. Bus. 101 (1991-92).
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the same information under the Exchange Act periodic disclosure
requirements.178

ii. Foreign Issuers. A foreign issuer that offers its securities
only to persons residing abroad is likely to avoid the need to com
ply with U.S. disclosure requirements. Foreign issuers will find it
easier to qualify under Regulation S. The apparent intention of
Regulation S is to exempt public offerings by foreign issuers where
the sale is effected abroad, there are no efforts directed at United
States residents to sell shares of the new issue, and the likelihood ex
ante is that the securities will come to rest abroad - even if some,
ex post, do ultimately come to rest in the United States.179 A for-

178. Consider a privately held issuer whose operations and management are predomi
nantly in the United States and whose initial shareholders are primarily U.S. residents. It
decides to go public only abroad. Even if the issuer is incorporated (or reincorporated)
abroad, such an issuer would not qualify as a "foreign issuer" under rule 902(f). At the time
of the offering, more than 50% of its shares would be U.S.-held and it would have an eco
nomic center of gravity in the United States. Thus, the only safe harbor for which the offer
ing could qualify would be rule 903(c)(3), which imposes the most severe conditions to
prevent flowback to the United States. See supra note 177. Under rule 903(c)(3), the offer
ing must be constructed in such a way that the purchasers are non-U.S. residents who agree,
for a year, only to resell to non-U.S. residents who themselves agree to similar restrictions.
These restrictions prevent the shares for a year from being listed to trade in an ordinary
fashion on even a foreign stock exchange and, because of the consequent reduction in liquid
ity, greatly reduces their marketability.
A previously privately held issuer able and willing to market its securities to the non-U.S.
public under these difficult circumstances would still not, because of the Exchange Act's
periodic disclosure requirements, escape the U.S. disclosure regime for long unless the offer
ing resulted in a majority of its shares being held abroad. See infra section V.A.2.
Now consider a public offer abroad by an issuer with the same U.S. connections but
whose shares are already publicly traded in the United States. It would be providing Ex
change Act periodic disclosure at the time of the offering abroad. Because of this, it could
qualify for rule 902(c)(2)'s safe harbor. The conditions designed to discourage flowback
under rule 902(c)(2) would not create the same roadblocks to the shares being traded on a
foreign exchange immediately after the offering. But ultimately the already publicly traded
U.S. issuer will find it no easier than the previously privately held issuer to avoid continued
imposition of the Exchange Act periodic· disclosure requirements, even if the foreign offering
is so large that it leads to a majority of the issuer's shares being held by non-U.S. residents.
There are only two exemptions from Exchange Act periodic disclosure based on an issuer's
foreign aspects: rule 12g3-2(a) and rule 12g3-2(b). See infra notes 185-87 and accompanying
text. Neither is likely to be available to the issuer being considered here. A rule 12g3-2(a)
exemption would be unavailable because the issuer would still presumably have more than
300 U.S. resident shareholders. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(a) (1997). A rule 12g3-2(b) ex
emption would be unavailable because of rule 12g3-2(d)(l), which denies the exemption to
issuers whose shares are already Exchange Act registered. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(d)(l)
(1997).
179. The only tricky question here is whether publicity abroad that ends up reaching both
investors abroad and investors in the United States - something happening with greater
frequency as the financial media become increasingly international - could constitute a
directed-selling effort in the United States. Under rule 901, offers and sales "that occur
outside the United States" are deemed not covered by § 5 of the Securities Act and hence do
not require registration. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (1996). For offers and sales to be within the
"safe harbor" provisions of rule 903 that deem them as "occur[ring] outside the United
States," however, there must be "no directed selling efforts . . . made in the United States."
17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b) (1996). "Directed selling efforts" are in tum defined in rule 902(b)(l)
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eign issuer that does not have any securities publicly traded in the
United States can engage in a public offering abroad and qualify for
an exemption under Regulation S from Securities Act disclosure
without having to meet any additional conditions designed to pre
vent their subsequent flow to the United States.1so As we will see
below, as long as the offering does not ultimately result in U.S. in
vestors owning more than fifty percent of the issuer's shares and the
issuer does not subsequently list the securities on a U.S. stock ex
change or NASDAQ, the issuer will not subsequently be required
to provide Exchange Act periodic disclosure either.
2. Issuer Disclosure Triggered by Secondary Market Transactions
Issuers, whether foreign or U.S., that have never engaged in a
public offering registered under section 5 of the Securities Act can
nevertheless become subject to U.S. disclosure requirements
through the Exchange Act's periodic disclosure regime.181 Issuer�
of both types wishing their shares to be listed on a U.S. stock ex
change, must, pursuant to section 12(a) , register these securities
with the SEC and thereby become subject to the Exchange Act's
periodic disclosure regime.1sz
For publicly traded issuers not wishing securities to be listed on
a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ, the situation is more complicated.
as "any activity undertaken for the purpose of, or that could reasonably be expected to have
the effect of, conditioning the market in the United States" for the securities being offered. 17
C.F.R. § 903(b)(l) (1996) (emphasis added).
In the domestic context, the SEC has interpreted the term "conditioning" very broadly to
include almost any publicity effort that reaches significant numbers of potential investors.
See Securities Act Release No. 3844, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 3,253, at 3,148 (Oct. 8,
1957); earl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843 (1959). The SEC, in its statements con
cerning the impact of news conferences on the availability of a Regulation S exemption, has
indicated, however, that it may not be as strict in its interpretation of the term "conditioning"
in the international context. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.703{T) preliminary note 7 {1996). The SEC
has recently issued for comment proposed rules that, if translated into a final rule, will clarify
its definition of directed-selling efforts. See Securities Act Release No. 7392, [Current
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 85,909, at 89,279 (Feb. 20, 1997).
180. 17 C.F.R. § 903{c){l) (1996).
181. Sections 12(b) and 12{g) of the Exchange Act set forth requirements for the registra
tion of the securities of certain issuers. Exchange Act § 13(a) requires issuers registered
under § 12 to file, in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the SEC, annual
reports and current information that follow up on the original § 12 registration application or
statement. See Exchange Act § 13{a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m (1994). An issuer that has en
gaged in an offering registered under § 5 of the Securities Act must, pursuant to Exchange
Act § 15( d), provide on a continuing basis the same annual reports and current information.
See Exchange Act §15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77e {1994).
182. Section 12(a) prohibits any member, broker, or dealer from effecting on a national
securities exchange any transaction in "any security" not registered in accordance with the
provisions of the Exchange Act. See Exchange Act § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1994). No dis
tinction is made in the statute between a security of a foreign issuer and one of a U.S. issuer.
The SEC has not interpreted the statute's reach more narrowly than its terms.
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Issuer nationality can have an important effect. First consider for
eign issuers. Exchange Act section 12(g)(l) requires any issuer
having assets of more than ten million dollars and a class of equity
securities held of record by 500 or more persons to register such
securities under the Act.183 The section makes no distinction be
tween domestic and foreign in terms of the nationality of the issuer
or its shareholders or the location of the issuer's assets.184 The
SEC, however, has exempted from these requirements any issuer
that has sufficiently foreign characteristics to be considered a "for
eign issuer"185 and that: (i) has no class of equity with more than
300 holders resident in the United States,186 or (ii) furnishes the
SEC with the disclosure information required by its home country's
regime (this second basis not being available for issuers first listed
on NASDAQ after October 1983).187 In effect, the SEC is imposing
its own disclosure system on foreign issuers wishing to commence
listing of securities on a national securities exchange or NASDAQ
and, for all others, is accepting as adequate the disclosure system of
their home countries.188
183. Section 12(g)(l) requires every issuer who is engaged in interstate commerce or
whose securities are traded by use of any means of interstate commerce and who has total
assets exceeding $1 million and a class of equity security held of record by 500 or more
shareholders to register such securities with the SEC and provide information comparable to
that required by a § 12(b) registration. See Exchange Act § 12(g)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(l)
(1994). Rule 12g-1 exempts from this requirement issuers with total assets not exceeding
$10,000,000. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1997).
184. The text of subsection 12(g) as a whole, which was added by amendment to § 12 in
1964, see Securities Act Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, §3, 78 Stat. 565, 565-68,
clearly suggests that § 12(g)(l) is to apply to foreign issuers as well as domestic. See Ex
change Act § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1994). There is explicit provision in § 12(g)(3) for the
SEC - by rule or regulation - to exempt any security of a foreign issuer. See Exchange
Act, § 12(g)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(3) (1994). This interpretation is confirmed by the legisla
tive history of the amendment. See H.R. REP. No. 88-1418, at 11 (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3013, 3023-24.
185. To qualify, the issuer must be a "foreign private issuer," as defined under rule 3b-4.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(c) (1997). This requires the issuer to be organized under the laws of
a foreign country and, if its operations are sufficiently connected with the United States, have
no more than 50% of its voting securities held by U.S. residents. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4
(1997).
186. See Rule 12g3-2(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(a) (1997).
187. The SEC in 1983 amended rule 12g3-2 to eliminate the availability of the 12g3-2(b)
exemption for all foreign issuers quoted on the automated quotation system of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASDAQ), unless the issuer was already quoted on NAS
DAQ prior to the date of the amendment, and was and continues to be in compliance with
the requirements of the exemption. The reasoning for eliminating the exemption was that
"trading on NASDAQ is substantially the same as trading on an exchange and therefore the
information available . . . should be essentially the same." Exchange Act Release No. 20,624
[1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'Il 83,435, at 86,293 (Oct. 6, 1983).
188. This acceptance of the disclosure system of the issuer's domicile has been strongly
criticized by Professor Buxbaum. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Securities Regulation and the
Foreign Issuer Exemption, 54 CORNELL L. RE.v. 358 (1969). More recently, some commenta
tors have pointed out that many such securities are traded within the United States via "pink
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For the typical publicly held U.S. issuer not listed on a U.S. ex
change, domestic trading or holdings in the United States are by
themselves sufficient to trigger imposition of the Exchange Act pe
riodic disclosure regime. Consider, however, a U.S. issuer with a
majority of its assets and management in this country that, perhaps
in an attempt to avoid U.S. disclosure rules, chooses to become a
public company but decides to do so only abroad. In other words, it
engages in no domestic public offerings, and it facilitates the trading
of its securities only abroad.189 Section 12(a) is not a pr�blem for
such an issuer because 12(a)'s registration requirements would only
be triggered by a listing of the issuer's shares on a U.S. stock ex
change.190 Section 12(g) may well still be a problem, however. The
simple fact that the issuer has gone public, regardless of where most
of its shareholders reside, is enough to trigger imposition of the
U.S. regime if the issuer remains incorporated in the United
States.191 If the issuer reincorporates abroad, it might escape the

sheets." See HAL s. Scorr & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSAC·
TIONS, PouCY AND REGULATION 50 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing COCHRANE ET AL., supra note
12, at 11-13). Pink sheets are stock quotations published twice daily by the National Quota
tion Bureau that include the names and telephone numbers of market makers. See id. In
1994, over 7600 foreign securities, and 440 American Depository Receipts (ADRs), traded
through pink sheets. See id. These trades averaged $136.2 million in daily dollar value. See
id.

189. Research reveals at least one previously nonpublic U.S. company, International Sig
nal and Control Group, that listed and offered its shares on the London Stock Exchange in
order to avoid U.S. disclosure requirements. See John H. Ehrlich, Comment, International
ization ofStock Markets: Potential Problemsfor United States Shareholders, 7 Nw. J. INTL. L.
& Bus. 532, 550 (1986).
190. A listing on a foreign stock exchange would not, under § 12(a), trigger a need for
such an issuer to register securities: section 12(a) applies only to transactions on a "national
securities exchange." See Exchange Act § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1994). No foreign ex
change is currently registered as a "national securities exchange." See 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 'll 21,310.10, at 15,705 (Feb. 2, 1994).
191. This assumes that the issuer is not so insignificant that it has less than $10 million in
total assets. It also assumes that by going public, the issuer has a class of equity securities
with more than 500 holders located somewhere in the world. If these assumptions are cor
rect, as long as the issuer remains incorporated in the United States, it would appear to be
required by § 12(g)(l) to register its securities. Section 12(g)(l), as we have seen, makes no
distinction between foreign and domestic security holders. Because foreign issuers are cov
ered unless exempted pursuant to a rule or regulation, see supra note 184, this issuer, being
from the United States, surely would, absent such an exemption, be covered as well, even if
most of its shareholders are abroad. No exemption is available for this issuer. Rule 12g3-2 is
the only exemption that concerns the foreign characteristics of securities potentially subject
to Exchange Act registration. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text. Assuming that
the issuer in question is incorporated in the United States, neither branch of the rule would
provide an exemption, because both require the issuer to be a "foreign private issuer." See
supra note 185. A corporation, to be a "foreign private issuer," must, under rule 3b-4, be
incorporated under the laws of a foreign country. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(b)-(c) (1997).
At least four issuers incorporated in the United States, but with fewer than 300 U.S.
resident shareholders, have applied, however, pursuant to the Exchange Act's catch-all ex
emption, § 12(h), for an order of the Commission exempting them from registration. under
§ 12(g). In each case, the Commission appears not to have issued the requested order. The
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U.S. disclosure regime. The requirements for doing so, however,
are strict: public offerings of its securities must be made exclusively
abroad, and, from the moment it becomes a public company whether through a public offering or by share ownership growing in
some other fashion to at least 500 holders - a majority of shares
must be held by persons residing abroad.192 Such an issuer would
be entitled to an exemption on the same basis as a foreign issuer.193

3.

Conclusion

In summary, U.S. practice currently works as follows. Issuers
that I categorize as U.S. nationals - those with their economic
center of gravity in the United States - are generally subject to the
U.S. regime. Potential escape is available through a combination of
going public only abroad and incorporating abroad, but only for
those issuers that meet strict requirements limiting the extent of
their U.S. ownership. For those that meet these strict requirements,
actual escape depends on the same factors as apply to foreign issu
ers. Foreign issuers are subject to the U.S. disclosure regime if they
offer their shares in the United States or list them on a U.S. stock
exchange or NASDAQ, but otherwise can probably escape the U.S.
regime.
staff of the Division of Corporate Finance stated that it would not raise any objection if the
issuers did not register their securities under § 12(g). See Equitable American Property Co.,
SEC No Action Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 79,403 (Dec. 19,
1989}; Paribas Properties, Inc., SEC No Action Letter (Feb. 29, 1988), available at 1988 SEC
No-Act LEXIS 222; States Properties, Inc., SEC No Action Letter (Nov. 30, 1987), available
at 1987 SEC No-Act LEXIS 2785; Petrogen Petroleum, Inc., SEC No Action Letter (Oct. 12,
1987), available at 1987 SEC No-Act LEXIS 2549.
As of January 1987, there were 14 U.S. companies traded on the London Unlisted Securi
ties Market (USM). For most of these companies, however, the reported attraction of
London was the lower cost of an initial public offering rather than avoidance of U.S. disclo
sure rules. See Philip Coggan, Low Costs Attract, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 20, 1987, at 6.
Since that time, the London Stock Exchange has closed the USM to make way for its new
creation, the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). See Christopher Price, Opportunities
for Investors: Managers' Ability Is the Key, FIN. TIMES (London}, Mar. 14, 1997, at 3. Most
of the companies previously listed on the USM have found their way to AIM, which now has
259 listed issuers. See id. At least one company, however, moved to NASDAQ. See LBMS
to Opt for American Listing, THE TIMES (London}, Sept. 29, 1995, at 28.
192. Should the issuer in question, despite having a majority of its assets and manage
ment in the United States, choose to incorporate abroad, it would be, under Exchange Act
rule 3b-4(b), a "foreign issuer." See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(b} (1997). It can be exempt from
registration under rule 12g3-2 if it has no more than 300 holders resident in the United States
or furnishes the SEC with the disclosure information required by authorities abroad, see
supra notes 186-87, but only if it qualifies under rule 3b-4(c) as a "foreign private issuer." See
17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(c) (1997}. That would require not only foreign incorporation but also
that no more than 50% of outstanding voting securities be held by U.S. residents. This might
or might not be true of a corporation originally owned by its founders, private-offering inves
tors, and employees and that subsequently goes public abroad.
193. See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
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Where an issuer is of U.S. nationality, the issuer is thus very
likely to need to comply with the U.S. regime. Where a significant
number of transactions in an issuer's shares are effected in the
United States, it is fairly likely that the U.S. regime will be applied
as well, even if the issuer is foreign. Where a significant number of
purchasers of an issuer's shares are U.S. residents, but the issuer is
foreign and the shares are neither offered in the United States nor
listed on a stock exchange or NASDAQ, the U.S. regime will proba
bly not be applied.
B. A Switch to the Issuer-Nationality Approach
Would Enhance U.S. Welfare

1. Selection of Issuers
The United States has a strong interest in the disclosure behav
ior of U.S. issuers. Greater disclosure, through its beneficial effects
on capital allocation and on aligning managerial and shareholder
interests, leads to greater returns on capital utilizing projects.194 It
also leads to greater costs.195 The suppliers of capital, entrepre
neurs, and the suppliers of the other factors of production - pri
marily labor - share the returns on such projects, after subtracting
these costs. The global return on capital, whatever the issuer's dis
closure practices, sets capital's share.196 Thus it is the entrepreneurs
and labor associated with U.S. issuers, who are concentrated in the
United States, that primarily feel the cost and benefit effects of the
disclosure behavior of U.S. issuers.197 U.S. officials are best situ
ated to decide if the disclosure of these issuers needs regulation
and, if so, at what level. This is equally true whether the issuer's
shares are traded only at home and held primarily by U.S. investors
or traded only abroad and held primarily by foreign investors.
The United States has only a weak interest in the disclosure be
havior of foreign issuers, even those whose shares are predomi
nantly owned by U.S. investors. Because the U.S. investors will
receive the global expected rate of return on capital, whatever a
foreign issuer's disclosure practices, concerns about improving the
expected rate of return for U.S. investors do not justify U.S. regula194.
195.
196.
197.

See supra section 11.A.3.
See supra section 11.B.
See supra section III.A.1.
See supra section III.A.2.
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tion of such issuers.198 More disclosure by these foreign issuers
would benefit less than fully diversified U.S. investors through re
duction in the risk of their portfolios.199 Regulation on this basis,
however, is less vital, because these investors can also reduce risk
simply by diversifying more. Not only are the benefits to the
United States from regulation of foreign issuers less, but the costs
to the United States are greater. Such regulation can reduce the
availability of foreign issuer shares to U.S. investors. This is welfare
decreasing for U.S. investors, even if the excluded foreign issuers
would have disclosed only at a very low level.200 It also can lead to
foreign-relations problems.
The place where an issuer's shares are traded does not affect
these conclusions. The only U.S. interests at stake are persons
whose rents depend on the volume of share transactions effected in
the United States. Because the United States has the strictest re
gime, these interests will be hurt, not helped, by having application
of the U.S. regime depend, in part or in whole, on whether transac
tions in an issuer's shares are effected in the United States. Such a
policy's negative effect - issuer managers deciding to have their
shares traded outside the United States in order to evade the strict
U.S. rules - will dominate its positive effect - issuer managers
deciding to have their shares traded in the United States in order to
enhance their reputations.201

2.

The Prevention of Political Pressures to Lower U.S. Disclosure
Requirements to a Suboptimal Level

The market for securities, as we saw in Part I, will become in
creasingly global in the future. Globalization has two components:
investors everywhere will be at a diminishing information disadvan
tage concerning issuers from other countries, and effecting share
transactions abroad will become increasingly inexpensive and easy.
Globalization has important implications for the U.S. mandatory
disclosure regime, which is currently the strictest in the world.202

198. See supra section III.A.Lb, which also includes a discussion of why the United
States has only a weak interest even if there is not a single risk-adjusted global expected rate
of return on capital.
199. See supra sections II.A.2 & III.A.
200. See supra sections II.A.2 & III.A.
201. See supra sections III.B.2-.3 & III.C.3.
202. The United Kingdom is a critical country for comparison with the United States.
The United Kingdom is the home of the International Stock Exchange (formerly the London
Stock Exchange), which, along with the New York Stock Exchange and the Tokyo Stock
Exchange, is one of the world's three major stock exchanges. The United Kingdom is consid
ered by the SEC to have disclosure requirements that are closer to those of the United States
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approach to statutory reach includes as relevant

factors the nationality of the buyers and the place where the trans
actions occur. If we maintain this approach, increasing globaliza
tion is likely to cause a significant reduction in the
required disclosure. This relaxation of the

U.S.

U.S.

level of

regime will result

from increasing political pressure by persons seeking to maximize

U.S., most prominently
U.S. securities industry, and will occur even if,
diminishes U.S. welfare. A switch to a pure

the number of transactions effected in the
from members of the
as seems likely, it

issuer-nationality approach would avoid these pressures and hence
the welfare-diminishing reduction in required disclosure.

a.

i.

Globalization-Induced Pressures to Lower
U.S. Disclosure Standards.

The Issuer-Nationality Approach.

This statutory-reach-ap

proach-based disparity in the impact of globalization on the strict
ness of the

U.S.

regime relates to a particular kind of issuer

than those of other countries (except Canada). See Securities Act Release No. 6568, [19841985 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'll 83,743, at 87,319 (Feb. 28, 1985). Neverthe
less, a detailed comparison between the disclosure requirements of the United States and the
United Kingdom for companies that issue equity securities reveals that the United States
requires significantly more information. Differences between U.S. and U.K. requirements
include differences in the amount of detail that must be provided describing the nature of the
issuer's business and the results of the various lines of business in which the issuer partici
pates; the need to discuss management-identified trends that may affect its future liquidity,
capital needs, or operating results; and the need to provide information concerning manage
ment compensation and share ownership. See David H. Landau, Note, SEC Proposals to

Facilitate Multinational Securities Offerings: Disclosure Requirements in the United States and
the United Kingdom, 19 N.Y.U. J. INTL. L. & P01.. 457, 459-68 (1987); see also BENSTON,
supra note 130, at 20-21, 37; 1987 SEC INTERNATIONAUZATION REPORT, supra note 33, at
IIl-91. European countries in general put much less emphasis on full disclosure. See Peter
Widmer, The U.S. Securities Laws - Banking Law ofthe World? (A Reply to Messrs. Loomis
and Grant), 1 J. CoMP. CoRP. L. & SEc. REG. 39-40 (1978). Japan, the home of the Tokyo

Stock Exchange, has a securities statute that closely parallels the Securities Act and the Ex
change Act of the United States. However, the staff responsible for promulgating regulations
and enforcement is very small compared to that of the SEC. Many provisions of the statute
are treated as inoperative. The emphasis is on de facto screening of issuers by regulatory
authorities rather than full disclosure. See 1987 SEC INTERNATIONALIZATION REPORT, supra
note 33, at III-127; Kunio Hamada & Keiji Matsumoto, Securities Transaction Law in Gen
eral, in DOING BusINESs IN JAPAN § 1.02[1], [4] (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1996).
The United States, in addition to having a set of regulations and an administrative appara
tus that solicits more information from issuers than those of other countries, has a liability
system that prods more information out of issuers. Under § 11 of the 1933 Securities Act, the
issuer is absolutely liable for materially false or misleading statements in the registration
statement. See 1933 Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994). The underwriter is liable as
well, unless, under § ll(b), he sustains the burden of proof that after conducting a reasonable
investigation ("due diligence") he believed the statements at issue to be true. See 1933 Se
curities Act § 11(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1994). The liability system in the United King
dom, for example, is not as far reaching. See 1987 SEC INTERNATIONAUZATION REPORT,
supra note 33, at III-116.
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sensitivity. This is the sensitivity of issuers to the level of disclosure
required by the U.S. regime when they make their choices as to
whether or not to have their shares offered or traded in the United
States. The greater this sensitivity, the larger the portion of issuers
currently unwilling to have their shares offered or traded in the
United States that would change their minds in response to a lower
ing of the U.S.-required disclosure level by any given amount.
Greater issuer sensitivity leads to a greater desire by interests
whose well-being depends on the volume of transactions effected in
the United States to have the U.S. disclosure level lowered.
Under a pure issuer-nationality approach, an issuer's choice of
whether or not to have its shares offered or traded in the United
States would have no impact on whether the U.S. regime is applied
to it. Issuers thus are completely insensitive to the required disclo
sure level of the U.S. regime, and there is no reason globalization
would change this.203 Consequently, globalization would not in
crease the pressure on U.S. officials to lower the U.S. disclosure
requirements.
ii.

The Current Approach.

Under the current U.S. approach

to statutory reach, factors relating to the nationality of the buyers of
an issuer's stock and the country where transactions in shares occur
are taken into account in determining whether to apply the U.S.
regime. As a result, issuers are sensitive to the level of U.S. disclo
sure standards. The issuer can often avoid being subject to the U.S.
regime by a strategy of not offering shares in the United States and
of discouraging or preventing secondary trading there.204 We have
seen that issuers, left unregulated, are likely to disclose at a level
lower than is socially optimal, in part because they bear all the costs

of their disclosures but do not enjoy all the benefits.205 Issuers, U.S.
and foreign alike, would therefore prefer to be regulated by a less

203. The desensitizing effect of a switch to the issuer-nationality approach will also en
hance welfare in terms of an issuer's choices as to where to have its shares offered and
traded. The choice of each issuer, rather than being guided by an effort to come under the
regulatory regime it prefers, will instead depend on the economic fundamentals of the situa
tion: the efficiency with which different markets effect trades, the country or countries of
residence of their most likely investors, and the extent to which such investors find markets
in their own country or countries the cheapest and most convenient places to transact.
204. Location is an explicit factor not only under the market-protection approach - in
which it represents the whole concern, see supra section V.A.1.b - but under the investor
protection approach as well, see supra sections V.A.1.a and V.B. The strategy also helps
issuers avoid the U.S. regime because, without offerings or secondary trading in the United
States, two other indicators used by the United States in determining whether or not to apply
its regime - the percentage of their shares held by U.S. residents and the absolute number
of such U.S. holders - are likely to be lower as well. See supra section V.B.
205. See supra section II.B.
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strict regime than the U.S. regime, even if being subject to the U.S.
regime confers some reputational benefit.206 This means that under
the current approach, issuers will have an incentive not to offer
their shares in the United States and to discourage or prevent sec
ondary trading there as well.
Avoiding the U.S. market, however, also involves a sacrifice. It
reduces the pool of potential investors in the issuer's shares and
thus leads to a lower share price. Each publicly traded issuer in the
world, in deciding whether to have its shares offered and traded in
the United States, must compare this sacrifice to the burden of
complying with the U.S. disclosure regime.207 Those that find the
sacrifice less than the burden of compliance will avoid the U.S. mar
ket. Their absence represents foregone rents for U.S. persons
whose welfare depends on the volume of transactions effected in
the United States. In order to minimize the number of issuers
avoiding the U.S. market, these persons can be expected to exert
ongoing pressure

on

U.S.

officials to lower

U.S.

disclosure

requirements.
Avoiding the U.S. market traditionally has constituted a particu
larly big sacrifice for U.S. issuers because the United States is the
residence of a large portion of their most likely potential investors.
Hardly any U.S. issuers have chosen to do so.208 Tue converse of
this proposition is that for many foreign issuers, avoiding the U.S.
market has been much less of a sacrifice. In fact, most foreign issu
ers - all but about 700 out of total of about 28,400

-

have avoided

206. See supra section II.C.2. Consistent with the rest of this discussion, this statement
assumes that, absent international regulatory competition, each country's required disclosure
level will be at least as high as the socially optimal one for issuers of its nationality. Even if
this assumption is not correct, the United States would still attract more issuers by lowering
its required level of disclosure as long as that level starts out at least as high as is socially
optimal for U.S. issuers and the level of what is socially optimal for issuers of each other
country is no higher than that for U.S. issuers.
207. Compliance with the Exchange Act's periodic disclosure requirements is necessary
for any foreign issuer's shares to trade on a U.S. stock exchange. See supra notes 182-88 and
accompanying text. Through a grandfathering provision, a number of foreign issuers that
were trading over NASDAQ prior to October 6, 1983, have been permitted to continue to do
so by meeting a substitute, minimal disclosure requirement. See supra note 187. Any foreign
issuer wishing to commence NASDAQ trading at this point, however, must undertake full
compliance. See id. Full compliance is not necessary for a foreign issuer's shares to be traded
in the United States in a forum other than an organized U.S. exchange or NASDAQ. Such
an issuer can commence having its shares traded among U.S. brokers on the basis of "pink
sheets" simply by meeting the same substitute minimal requirements imposed on the
grandfathered NASDAQ issuers. The spreads associated with this kind of trading are consid
erably larger, however. Investors purchasing these shares will experience a lower expected
return and less liquidity. See, e.g., Iain Jenkins, 'Pink Sheets' Mix Risk with Rewards, INTL.
HERALD TRIB., Nov. 19-20, 1994, at 19 (asserting that the spread in the OTC market for
ADRs can be as much as 10%).
208. See supra note 189.
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the U.S. market. For them, the sacrifice is small enough to be less
than the burden of complying with the U.S. regime.209 Globaliza
tion, however, will change the extent of sacrifice for both U.S. and
foreign issuers.
m.
The Impact of the Global Diffusion of Financial Informa
tion. The increasing global diffusion of financial information will

diminish the information disadvantage that all investors face with
regard to issuers from countries other than their own. Assume for a
moment that it is impossible to effect orders abroad: initial share
purchases and subsequent secondary trades by U.S. residents occur
only in the United States, whatever the nationality of the issuer.
This assumption isolates the effect of global diffusion of informa
tion on issuer sensitivity from the effect of the further reduction in
the cost and difficulty of effecting transactions abroad. With this
assumption, a U.S. or foreign issuer will, under the current ap
proach to statutory reach, have to comply with U.S. disclosure rules
in order to have a significant number of U.S. resident investors.
The larger the number of the world's issuers that choose to comply,
the larger the total volume of transactions effected in the United
States.210
Today, almost all U.S. issuers comply with the U.S. regime and
have their shares traded in the United States because the sacrifice
of relying on foreign investors alone is too great. Thus, U.S. issuers
currently are insensitive to lowering U.S. standards, because they
are all traded in the United States anyway. With the global diffu
sion of financial information, however, the costs to a U.S. issuer of
relying solely on foreign investors will decrease. Absent an action
by the United States to make its disclosure requirements more lax,
209. According to the International Fmance Corporation's annual survey of world stock
exchanges, the total number of listed domestic companies worldwide in 1994 was 36,176. See
INTERNATIONAL FIN. CORP., supra note 159, at 21. Of these companies, 11,291 were in the
world's developed markets outside of the United States and 7770 were U.S. companies. See
id. As of September 1995, there were 602 SEC-registered and reporting foreign companies
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ. See
COCHRANE ET AL., supra note 12, at 10. One hundred registered and reporting foreign com
panies were trading over-the-counter. See id. at 10 n.8. Another 1173 unregistered foreign
companies were trading over-the-counter, exempt from the SEC's reporting requirements
under § 12g3-2{b). See id. at 10. The 242 foreign companies currently being traded on the
New York Stock Exchange represent only about one-tenth of the overseas companies that
meet the Exchange's listing qualifications. See id. at 2.
210. Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that if U.S. residents have made available
to them the shares of a greater array of the world's issuers, they will both save more and
invest a larger portion of their savings in equities. This seems plausible given the significant
improvement in the trade-off between risk and return that can be attained through interna
tional diversification of equity investment. See supra Part I.
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a significant number of U.S. issuers may in the future opt to offer
their shares and have their shares traded only abroad. These issu
ers would be induced to stay at home, however, if U.S. standards
were lowered sufficiently. In the future, the volume of trading of
U.S. issuer stocks thus

will be sensitive to

a relaxation of the U.S.

regime.

In contrast, there is no reason to believe that the sensitivity of
foreign issuers will significantly increase or decrease. Foreign issu
ers will be sensitive to a lowering of the U.S. required level of dis
closure both now and in the future. Aggregating the effects of
further globalization on U.S.- and foreign-issuer sensitivity, a given
drop in the level of disclosure required by the U.S. regime would,
under the assumption of this subsection, increase U.S. trading vol
ume more in the future than now. Globalization will thus increase
the political pressure to relax the U.S. regime.

iv. Reductions in the Cost and Difficulty of Effecting Transac
tions Abroad. Now consider the impact from the reduction in the
cost and difficulty of effecting transactions abroad - the other
component to globalization - on the sensitivity of U.S. and foreign
issuers. This requires a very specific description of the U.S. ap
proach to statutory reach and how it is implemented. If the United
States adopted an exclusive investor-protection approach to statu
tory reach and implemented it perfectly - that is, did not rely on
evidence concerning where transactions in an issuer's shares occur,
whether as proxy for the residency of the shares' buyers or other
wise - a reduction in the cost and difficulty of effecting transac
tions abroad would not affect the pressures for a lower U.S.
standard. In that situation, only the increasingly global diffusion of
information would influence such pressures, and the analysis above
would describe the whole story.211

In reality, however, the U.S. government is not perfectly imple
menting the investor-protection rationale. This article's review of
current practice shows that it is more likely that the U.S. regime will
211. Any issuer seeking a significant number of U.S. buyers or holders would, in that
situation, have to comply with the U.S. regime, regardless of whether or not it was selling its
shares or promoting secondary trading of its shares in the United States. Such issuers there
fore face no disincentive to selling and promoting their shares in the United States. Even if
the cost and difficulty for U.S. residents of purchasing securities abroad substantially de
clined, some loss of potential U.S. investors would remain whenever an issuer's shares were
not offered or traded in the United States. As in the analysis above, an issuer's decision that
the benefits of access to the pool of U.S. investors outweigh the costs of compliance is there
fore tantamount to a decision to offer its shares and have its shares traded in the United
States.
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be imposed on an issuer if transactions in the issuer's shares occur

in the United States than abroad. An issuer thus has an incentive to
avoid the transacting of its shares in the United States. As it be
comes cheaper and easier for U.S. investors to effect transactions
abroad, this incentive increases. Issuers are no longer forgoing as
many U.S. investors when their shares are only offered or traded
abroad, and so the sacrifice is less. In a certain portion of cases, the
fact that an issuer's shares are sold or traded only abroa_d will tip
the balance, and the U.S. regime will not be applied. The lowering
of the sacrifice associated with having shares sold or offered only
abroad will induce more issuers, both U.S. and foreign, to choose
that route. This will reduce the volume of transactions effected in
U.S. markets relative to what it would be absent the use of location
as a factor by the United States in determining whether to apply its
regime.
Remember that almost all U.S. issuers today comply with the
U.S. regime. Relaxing U.S. disclosure requirements therefore can
not attract additional U.S. issuers. Remember also that this will
change in the future as a result of further global diffusion of finan
cial information. Foreign demand for U.S. issuer shares will in
crease sufficiently that, even if it were impossible for U.S. investors
to effect transactions abroad, some U.S. issuers, to avoid the cur
rent U.S. level of required disclosure, would have their shares sold
and traded only abroad. Adding the second component of global
ization into the analysis, this phenomenon will in fact be all the
greater because it will be increasingly easy and inexpensive for U.S.
investors to effect transactions abroad.
A somewhat different analysis applies to foreign issuers. A time

will come when, for a U.S. investor, effecting a transaction abroad
becomes almost as easy and inexpensive as effecting one at home.
At that point, no reason exists for foreign issuers to tolerate current
U.S. disclosure requirements - at least to the extent that the
United States does not use a perfectly implemented investor-pro
tection approach. This will be true no matter how much global dif
fusion of information has added to U.S. investor demand for their
shares. Notwithstanding increases in U.S. investor demand for for
eign issuer shares, the second component of the globalization trend

will, with current requirements, in the long run decimate at least the
secondary trading in the United States of shares of foreign issuers
that have not previously engaged in primary offerings in the United
States or listed their shares on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ. Mar
ginal reductions in the level of disclosure required by the U.S.
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would not help much, but a total elimination of the difference be
tween the U.S. level and levels abroad would help a great deal.212
What then, is the overall effect of globalization's two compo
nents on the sensitivity of U.S. and foreign issuers to a reduction in
the U.S.-required level of disclosure? The effect on U.S. issuers is
clearly to increase their sensitivity. Many foreign issuers, on the
other hand, might be almost entirely insensitive to minor reductions
in the U.S. standard but very sensitive to a major reduction - one
that takes the U.S. level down to the level of foreign countries. This
situation will give rise to a mix of political pressures demanding, on
the one hand, a major reduction in the U.S. level, and on the other,
a move away from location-based tests for determining statutory
reach. As discussed above, to the extent that the second element of
the mix succeeds, the analysis of the effects of globalization returns
to the immediately preceding section, which was devoted to the
pure effects of global diffusion of information. Globalization will
then be seen as increasing the sensitivity of issuers to the level of
the U.S. disclosure requirements, but the reduction in cost and diffi
culty component to the trend would not be a contributing factor.

b. How Increased Political Pressure U,nder the Current Ap
proach Can Lead to a Suboptimally Low Level of U.S. Required
Disclosure. If the United States fails to switch to the issuer-nation
ality approach to statutory reach, there are good reasons to believe
that the resulting increasing political pressures from globalization
will succeed in lowering the disclosure required by the U.S. regime
to a suboptimally low level.

One reason for concern is the possibility of a disclosure "race to
the bottom," as the United States and other countries each compete
to grab as much of the world's securities trading activity as possi
ble.213 We have seen that it is reasonable to assume that in the
prior era of relatively little transnational trading, the United States
developed a regime requiring a level of disclosure that maximizes
U.S. welfare in terms of its capital allocation and agency cost of
212. The dynamic nature of the situation may make this statement a slight oversimplifica
tion. It will probably be some time before it is almost as easy and inexpensive for a U.S.
investor to effect a transaction abroad as at home. Until then, some foreign issuers will be
sensitive to more minor reductions in the U.S. level of required disclosure. This, combined
with the fact that under the current U.S. approach to statutory reach a foreign issuer's deci
sion to offer or list its securities in the United States and comply with to U.S. regime is
essentially irreversible, might induce particularly strong political pressures for even a moder
ate relaxation of the U.S. regime.
213. This simple "prisoner's dilemma" game theory model is set out with more detail and
rigor in Fox, supra note 136, at 45-46, app. 2.
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management reducing effects (the "substanti vely optimal" level of
discl osure ).214
Imagine the f oll owing scenari o. Transnati onal securities trans
acti ons bec ome m ore prevalent , and U.S . auth orities , in a desire n ot
t o l ose U.S . issuers and t o attract foreign issuers , l ower the U .S.
re quired discl osure level . Assume for a m oment that this w ould
appear t o be a welfare-enhancing m ove because , c ompared with
maintaining the old stricter regime , the increased rents fr om the
larger volume of transacti ons effected in the United States exceed
the efficiency l osses fr om re quiring less than the substantively opti
mal level of discl osure. Other countries , h owever , n ow f ace a wel
fare l oss as a result of the l oss t o the United States of transacti ons
that w ould have occurred on their territ ories but f or the reducti on
of the U.S. re quired discl osure level . In resp onse , they l ower their
discl osure levels , seeing that the rents fr om the recaptured transac
ti ons exceed the welfare decline fr om n ow als o having substantively
sub optimal discl osure levels. Each c ountry , including the Unite d
States , ultimately suffers a welfare l oss : it has a substantively
sub optima lly l ow discl osure level and d oes n ot receive any c ompen
sating rents.
The result w ould be the same if an other c ountry had m oved first
instead . Ad opting a substantively sub op timal discl osure level of re
quired discl osure is , in game-the ory terms , a d ominant strategy .
Each c ountry is better off choosing this l ower level of re quired dis
cl osure , n o matter what the other c ountries d o. Thus , ch oice of this
l ower level by a ll of them is an e quilibrium. Absent s ome difficult
t o-reach agreement am ong them , they are certain t o make it .
The race -t o-the -b ott om st ory describes h ow , under the current
appr oach t o statut ory reach , a g overnment that acts t o maxim ize
nati onal welfare can end up with a substantively sub optimal discl o
sure level . The gain in rents fr om increased volume , which initially
exceeds the welfare l oss fr om reduced efficiency, withers away as a
result of the c ompetitive regulat ory reacti ons of other c ountries.
But this race-t o-the-b ott om st ory d oes n ot need t o be right t o c on
clude that , under the current appr oach t o statut ory reach , gl obaliza
ti on may well result in g overnment p olicies representing a welfare
l oss t o the United States . Public ch oice the ory suggests h ow a g ov
e rnment c ould ch oose a substantively sub optimal level of re quired
discl osure when the gain in rents is insufficient , even initially , t o
make up f or the welfare l oss fr om reduced res ource a ll ocati on effi214. See supra section IV.B.3.
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ciency. This is because the persons enjoying the higher rents members of the securities industry - are concentrated, whereas the
losses from reduced efficiency are spread over a large portion of the
public in the form of labor and suppliers of entrepreneurial talent.
Politically, the actions of the concentrated gainers outweigh those
of the diffuse losers.
CONCLUSION

Since their inception, mandatory disclosure rules have had at
least three rationales. One is to protect investors from making poor
investment decisions due to lack of knowledge. A second is to pro
tect the reputations of the markets in which investors buy securities.
A third is to promote efficiency through better capital allocation
and reduced agency costs of management. These rationales coex
isted peacefully for many decades because they differed little in
their implications for legal choice. Their peaceful coexistence is
coming to an end. Technological and political forces are moving us
toward a situation where the share market for a large number of the
world's issuers is becoming global. This trend raises the issue of
statutory reach: Which country's disclosure regime should apply to
which issuers? The different rationales give very different answers
to this question.
The need to decide on the best approach to statutory reach is
thus an occasion to reexamine the three rationales for mandatory
disclosure. The reexamination is revealing. Investor protection,
while a worthy goal for many aspects of securities regulation, is a
surprisingly weak justification for mandatory disclosure rules. As
for market protection, it is hard to argue that in a world of compet
ing markets, any one market will enjoy a net gain in trading volume
by having strict disclosure rules that give it a better reputation. The
only rationale for mandatory disclosure that really holds up is
efficiency.
Identification of efficiency as the paramount rationale for
mandatory disclosure suggests a clear principle of statutory reach.
Each country should regulate the disclosure behavior of issuers of
its nationality and no others. It should not be concerned with
where an issuer's shares are traded or what the nationality of the
buyers is. This approach assigns to each country regulatory author
ity over the issuers whose disclosure behavior most affects its wel
fare. Global welfare will be maximized, because each issuer will be
regulated by the country that will benefit most by getting the level
of required disclosure right. A switch to the issuer-nationality ap-
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proach will also prevent a kind of regulatory competition that could
lead to suboptimally low disclosure levels required by all countries.
For similar reasons, the issuer-nationality approach is also the_
best approach for the United States in terms of promoting its own
welfare. This is so even if other countries do not follow suit.
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APPENDIX
THE EFFECT OF LABOR SAVING BEITER ALLOCATION
ON THE MARGINAL PRODUCT OF LABOR

Economists commonly assume when examining economy-wide
phenomema that firms have constant elasticity of substitution
("CBS") production functions. This requires that the production
function (i) is linear homogenous (see supra note [capital saving in
novation analogy]) and (ii) has elasticity of substitution (the per
centage change in the ratio of marginal products-the marginal
rate of substitution-for a given percentage change in inputs) that
is constant over the full range of possible input combinations.21s
An example is the Cobb-Douglas production function, where the
elasticity of substitution is 1.
A CES production function for X may be expressed in the form

Qx = X(L,K)

=

b[a LP+ (1-a)KP]11P

Y's production function, which differs from X's only in that the ac
tual number of units of labor act as though they were a greater
number than that of "effective" units, can thus be stated as Qy =
Y(L,K) = b[a (ELL) P + (1-a) KP)11P, where EL > 1 .
The elasticity of substitution for a CES production function can
be shown to be 8=1/1-p. It is usually assumed to be somewhere
between 0 (no substitutability) and 1 (unitary substitutability) and
thus it is assumed p ::; 0.
The question of whether a reallocation analogous to a labor-:
saving innovation increases mppL is the question of whether d2Qyl
dLdEL > 0. If it is, dY/dL = dX/dL when EL=l (that is, when
Y(L,K) =X(L,K)) and dY/dL > dX!dL for and given L when EL>l
(as assumed here).

(1)

>O
>O
>O
>O
l-2p
p-1
d2 Q
p
(2) -- =ba.LP-1 �[(l-p)[a.(EL
L)P + (l-a)KP] p (aLPEL EL )+
,--&-,
dLdEL
<O >O
>O
�--�--� l:et
.-Y
[ a(EL L)P + (l-a)KP] P pE{
215. See HENDERSON & QUANDT, supra note 99, at 62, 85-89.
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For notational convenience, set

1-2p
(1-p)[a(ELL)P+(l-a)KP] P (aLPELP--1)ELP

u=

and
v=

Examination of

1-p
[a(ELL)P+(l-a)KP] ppELP--1

(2) shows that U > 0, V < 0.

Thus

d 2Q

Y_>O

_
_

dLdEL
if and only if

-V

-

(3)

<

1.

-

=

u

U

(4)

=

--

-------

(1-p)

a.(ELL)P

( -=e._ l[ 1 + (1-a)KP
l 1-p j
a(ELL)P J

(1-a)KP/a (ELL)P, the second part of the expression in brackets,

is the ratio of capital's share of national income to that of labor.
This is because

(1-a)KP--1

(dQ/dK)

--- = ----

and so

(5)
Thus, with

(dQ/dK)K

(1-a)KP

(dQ/dL)L

a(ELL)P

empirical estimates

substitution a and hence of

p

B-1

= --

a

of the marginal rate

of

,

and of the ratio of capital's to labor's shares of national income, we
can tell, assuming CES production functions, whether labor saving
reallocation will raise or lower the marginal product of labor.
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Labor's share in the United States has been estimated at
approximately 0.65 and capital's share at approximately 0 .35 .216
Thus, equation (5), which equals the second part of the bracketed
expression in equation (4), equals 0.54. The entire bracketed
expression would therefore equal 1.54. Given this, we can see from
equation (4) that - VIU will be less than 1 (and hence mppl will
increase with labor saving better allocation) if (-p/1-p) is less than
0.65. This would be true for any value of p > -1.86 and hence for
any elasticity of substitution greater than 0.37 - because the
elasticity of the production function equals 111-p.
Kravis, using a time series analysis, has estimated the "historic"
elasticity of substitution of the U.S. economy as 0.64.217 Arrow,
Chenery, Minhas, and Solow explored various ways of measuring
the elasticity of substitution in various sectors of the economy, in
the U.S. economy as a whole and transnationally. Using two
different time series tests, they developed respective estimates for
the nonfarm sector of the U.S. economy of 0.569 and 1.10.218 They
also performed a cross-section analysis involving 24 industries and
19 countries.219 The elasticity of substitution in all but one was less
than 1.00, but none were lower than 0.721. A review of the
significance tests of these estimates suggests that most of them
would be greater than 0.37 at a ninety-percent confidence leve1.220
Overall, the available evidence suggests that it is very unlikely
that the elasticity of substitution in the United States or in other
developed economies is less than 0.37 and thus very unlikely that
even labor-saving allocational improvements would lower labor's
marginal product.

216.
217.
218.
219.

See Kravis, supra note 113, at 925.
See id. at 940.
See Arrow et al., supra note 113, at 244-46.

Arrow et al. suggest that their industry data in their 19 countries are best explained,
not by the assumption that the production function for each industry is the same in every
country, but that the industry's elasticity of substitution is the same for every country with
the production functions differing only by a factor neutral efficiency factor - in the
statement of X's and Y's production functions, b. See id. at 234-38, 246.
220. See id. at 227-28.

